The role of the governor in the legislative process : by Bernick, Emil Lee,
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce diis document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If  it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If  necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
77-1812
BERNICK, Emil Lee, 1947-
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE
STATE ANALYSIS.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1976 
Political Science, general




THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS; 
A COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 




EMIL LEE BERNICK 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1976
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
A COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS
APPROVED BY
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
A COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS 
BY: E. LEE BERNICK
MAJOR PROFESSOR: SAMUEL A. KIRKPATRICK
This study examines the governor's legislative role 
with particular concern for his impact on legislators'
voting behavior and the ability of the governor to be suc­
cessful in executive-legislative relations. A quasi-ex- 
perimental and longitudinal design was used to assess the 
governor's legislative role under varying degrees of parti­
san congruence. This permitted a test of the importance of 
partisan attachments for both the legislature and the 
governor. Twelve governors in seven states (Florida,
Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and
Wyoming) during 1963 to 1973 were used in the analysis.
Legislative roll-call votes and interviews with the gover­
nors were the two basic forms of data.
The findings suggest that votes of interest to the 
governor tended to show greater partisan division than 
votes of little interest to the governor. It was concluded 
that the governor does have some influence on legislative 
voting behavior, causing parties to become a more salient 
voting cue. Both the opposition party and the governor's 
party exhibited greater cohesion when the governor became a 
factor in voting. Analysis also revealed a pattern of 
greater cohesiveness for the minority party, especially 
when it was the governor's party.
A theoretical discussion was presented concerning the 
problems surrounding the concept of gubernatorial success. 
Success was defined using an amalgamation of gubernatorial 
programs, vetoes, appointments, and the governor's ability 
to work with the legislature. It was found that partisan 
attachment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi­
tion for success; majority party governors as well as 
minority party governors can be successful or unsuccessful. 
Analyses of the governors with other explanatory variables 
proved inadequate for explaining success.
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CHAPTER I
RESEARCH ON THE STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND 
GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
Most research on the legislative process in the United 
States has dealt with Congress or has focused narrowly on 
selected issues of a single legislature or individual legis­
lators within a given state.^ The difficulty with such an 
approach to understanding the major policy-making branch of 
government in the United States is the somewhat parochial and 
unscientific nature of the resultant research products.
While Congress is a vital unit of analysis, it must be recog­
nized that state legislatures are not perfect Congressional
microcosms, and that research on one does not always provide
2usable information on the other. State legislatures are 
different from Congress in the power and scope of their 
activities, their institutional structures, and the environ­
mental base within which they operate. In addition, the 
individuals who make up the state legislatures, along with 
those who interact with them, often perform different roles 
than those operating within the congressional subsystem.
The Need for Comparative Analysis
Although there are important differences among state 
legislative bodies, there are some uniformities in their 
institutional components, as well as in their environments, 
which would allow us to study state legislatures in a com-
3parative setting. It is this comparative analysis which is 
so lacking and yet so needed to test the validity of contem­
porary theories, as well as much of the folklore concerning 
the American states. The shortage of comparative studies and 
the resultant problems are well documented in the literature, 
since virtually any review essay of research conducted on the 
legislative process emphasizes this serious error of omis­
sion.^ To develop a theory of the legislative process or 
even to understand some of the elements relevant to the be­
havior of legislators, requires systematic comparative anal­
ysis. Failure to conduct comparative research inhibits the 
process of theory development and adds new knowledge in a 
disjointed fashion. Even worse, we may be building a body of 
facts without any conceptual adhesion to hold the parts to­
gether. Comparative legislative studies enable one to look 
for uniformities in legislative behavior, and conversely aid 
in discerning the 'unique' within legislatures. The
". . . comparative method proves to be very useful: 
it dispels some of the mystiques of the unique which, 
in the comparative perspective, turn out to be unique 
not because of any 'intrinsic' or essential charac­
teristic, but because it deviates from what one might
theoretically expect and from what, in fact, one 
finds empirically in most studies."5
Comparative legislative studies are a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for developing a theory of legislative 
behavior. Furthermore, an emphasis on comparative research 
does not constitute a rejection of the utility and necessity 
of legislative research which is single-case oriented.' The 
demand for one does not imply the denial of the other.
Rather, "if our goal is to achieve increased understanding of 
the behavior of legislatures, then we need to place greater 
stress on comparative analysis."^ While the objectives 
implicit in comparative research may seem remote, they 
"should certainly be our 'guiding star,'" as Jewell and
7Patterson have counselled.
Approaches to the Legislative Process
Political scientists during the last decade have made 
several initial attempts at overcoming the limited and some­
times atheoretical approach to the study of state legisla­
tures. In an attempt to avoid atheoretical approaches, a 
number of conceptual frameworks have been constructed to 
guide research. These paradigms are usually constructed by 
analysts aware of some of the key components that must be 
utilized in any attempt to understand legislative behavior.
The usual nomenclature consists of a political system 
within which the legislature operates, the legislative
institution itself, and the performance of the legislative 
process. Figure 1-1 is a typical model of the legislative 
process. Studies conducted on the impact of parties, inter­
est groups, and constituencies are illustrative of the type 
of research that demonstrates the effects of the environment 
on legislative behavior. Variations in constituency, socio­
economic and partisan configurations have had a considerable
8effect on the policy output of the legislature. While a 
significant portion of state legislative research has been 
concerned with the "environment," there is no lack of re­
search pertaining to the components of legislative institu­
tions. For example, one need only examine a bibliography of 
state legislative studies to find research concerning the 
norms within a legislature. In addition, a number of other 
institutional components have been subjected to analysis, 
including the role of the leadership, the distribution of 
power, and the structural make-up of the legislature (size, 
apportionment, duration of sessions).Similarly, several 
studies have focused on the third broad area of legislative 
research--legislative performance.
One component of the legislative system which is often 
avoided is the office of chief executive. Its prominence 
lies not only in its importance, but also in the noticeable 
absence of any well-developed body of knowledge concerning 
the legislative role of the executive office. As Rosenthal
Figure 1-1. A Framework for State Legislative Study


































Source: Allan Rosenthal, "Contemporary Research on State Legislatures: From Indi­
vidual Cases To Comparative Analysis," in Political Science and State and 
Local Government (Washington, B.C.: American Political Science Association,
1973), p. 70.
Note: The effects of political system characteristics on legislative performance
(Path A) and on legislative institutions (Path B); the effects of legisla­
tive institutions on one another (Path D); the consequences for legislative 
performance of legislative institutions (Path C); and the consequences for 
the political system of legislative performance (Path E).
has noted, "the executive branch of state government is 
another element of the political system that is commonly be­
lieved to play a major part in determining the behavior of
12the legislature." Moreover, it is almost axiomatic that 
one of the major tasks of a governor is to be "chief legis­
lator" of a state. Indeed, his performance of that task is 
generally regarded by the public as the test of the quality 
of the governorship. In the literature this idea usually 
resembles the following phraseology--"it is a fact of contem­
porary American politics that governors are now judged pri­
marily by their legislative program rather than by their ad-
13ministrative ability...." In addition, some scholars have 
hypothesized that the high turnover rate among governors is 
due to the public's unhappiness with the governor's perform­
ance as a legislative leader.
Although such presumptions may be overstated, we have 
little substantial research on the role of the governor in 
the legislative process to serve as a basis for evaluation. 
Indeed, research on the governor is so scarce that Jewell 
suggested in 1960 that "no aspect of legislative studies
stands in greater need for research than the governor's
15legislative role." Yet, some twelve years later, Rosenthal 
was forced to make another remonstration that "we still know 
little about distributions of power and function between 
legislatures and governors, the conditions under which they
vary among the states, and what kinds of differences they 
make.
In the absence of any substantial body of research which 
attempts to empirically test the governor's role in the 
legislative process, one may inquire whether the governor 
performs a legislative function by which the public can and 
should measure him. If the governor is the "chief legis­
lator," then he should be an important unit of analysis in 
research on legislative voting.
One-party dominant legislatures have also been a ne-
17glected area of legislative research. Few projects have 
been conducted on one-party states and those that are carried 
out show a heavy emphasis on explaining the variation in 
voting among legislators. Normally, the most frequently used 
explanatory factors related to variation in voting are parti­
san attachments and cleavages. Research on the role of 
political parties has produced contradictory findings with 
regard to competitive state legislatures. While some re­
search indicates that partisan attachments do not have an 
appreciable effect on legislators' voting, other studies have 
suggested the opposite. Generally, the literature on one- 
party states has discounted the impact of parties, for, as 
Jewell and Patterson have noted, "where a single party con­
sistently has a monopoly or an overwhelming majority of 
legislative seats the party is not a reference group for
1 olegislative voting." However, recent research has ques­
tioned this broad assumption, with the results suggesting 
that parties take on considerable importance in certain
issues areas and in controversies directly involving a
19minority party governor. "
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis
The most traditional and formalized location for public 
policy-making rests with the legislative body. In any one 
year in which all fifty state legislatures are in session, 
approximately 125,000 bills will be introduced and legis­
lators will enact into law, on the average, one-fourth of
20these proposals. The decision process of legislatures in 
determining which bills are passed has long been of concern 
to students of the legislative process and public policy 
analysis. Various methods have been employed in searching 
for an explanation of why and how certain bills become poli­
cy. While the legislative process may be viewed as a con­
glomerate of decision areas, we have relied quite extensively 
(though not without some critical evaluation) on studying the 
voting behavior of legislators to aid in the analysis of 
public policy formulation. The literature abounds with 
arguments for and against analyses of this nature; however, 
Patterson has offered us the best summary argument for their 
use:
Roll-call data are easy to gather because they are a 
permanent part of the legislative record. Carefully 
used, they do reflect the public position of legis­
lators in the final stages of the legislative proc­
ess. Analysis of roll-call voting has developed to 
a fairly high state of sophistication. While roll- 
call voting is only one form of legislative action, 
and it may not be the crucial one for sorting out 
alternative policies or deciding in what policy areas 
to act or not, these data do yield fruitful indicators 
on legislators' general policy preference. Nothing 
is clearer from research on legislative voting than 
the fact that responses of legislators at the roll- 
call vote stage are not chaotic or random: rather, 
they tend to follow a consistent pattern.21
Contending Forces in Voting
These patterns in voting have been identified by a
variety of methodological techniques and explained with a
number of independent variables. Much of the work has
attempted to detect the voting cues used by legislators in
their decision-making process. It has been found that voting
controversy among legislators is not especially prevalent,
with most roll-call votes being unanimous or near unanimous
22in their outcome. However, when conflict is present, the 
influence of political parties has been subjected to inten­
sive study. Conflicting findings have been produced on the 
significance of parties, although the weight of evidence 
sides with those who argue that parties are an important
23factor in the legislators' determination of how to vote. 
Further work in this area indicates that there are differ-
10
ences in voting between parties based on their raajority-
minority status.
Deviation from party voting has also been found to be
related to the characteristics of the legislator’s district,
with the most deviant legislators coming from districts which
25are atypical of districts represented by the party. More­
over, some researchers have found that the election margin is 
significant in determining how legislators will vote. Mem­
bers from "safe" districts are much more loyal to the party 
while those whose margin of victory is small tend to deviate 
from the party line much more frequently. Researchers have 
also noted that differences exist in voting patterns relative
to the particular chamber, with members of lower houses vot-
27ing differently than those from upper chambers. Two addi­
tional variables have been used in the analysis of legisla­
tive party voting--experience (seniority) and leadership. It
has generally been noted that the longer one serves in the
28legislature, the more loyal one is to the party. Simi­
larly, members holding legislative positions vote with the
29party to a much higher degree than their colleagues.. 
Furthermore, the position of legislative leaders on issues
30has been found to be a cue to other members of the chamber.
Constituency characteristics have also been used to ex-
31plain differences in legislative voting. A great deal of 
research pertains to the urban-rural makeup of a district.
11
although there is little evidence to suggest that legislators
32oppose one another solely on the basis of urban-rural ties.
However, other constituency characteristics have been found
to relate to how legislators vote, such as ethnic makeup,
33industrialization, and religious and racial composition.
In addition, ideology and issue orientations of legislators 
have also proven to be important indicators of legislative 
voting.
One-Party States
Most of the research mentioned above is confined to
competitive state legislatures. This is a most unfortunate
circumstance since a sizable number of state legislatures are
not competitive. It is generally accepted that in one-party
states party labels have little or no importance, for as Dye
has noted, "in terms of legislative behavior, in fact, one-
35party states are really no-party states." A major conclu­
sion of work on one-party states is the inadequacy of any
36variable beyond party. Factional systems (either hi- or
multi-) tend to develop, but they are often transistory,
arising over particular issues and dissolving when the issues
37before the legislature change. In other isolated cases,
regional differences act as cues for legislators to form voting 
38blocks. Thus, urban-rural differences have arisen to some
39minor extent in one-party states. Other factions develop
12
in this setting, based on ideological position (liberal- 
conservative dimensions), and even personality types--^^ 
with the governor a favorite explanation for this devi­
sion. Researchers have used other factors, such as con­
stituency differences or institutional variables (e.g., 
seniority); however, most have been unsuccessful.^^
While it has not gone unchallenged, Patterson's "Di­
mensions of Voting Behavior In a One-Party State Legisla­
ture" is a landmark work in this area. Patterson concluded 
that there was no substitute for party, and that legislators 
tended to vote in an unrelated m a n n e r . T h i s  study con­
cerning the 1959 Oklahoma House of Representatives (composed 
of 110 Democrats and 9 Republicans) was conducted to deter­
mine uniformities in voting and explanations for them.
While seven voting dimensions were empirically determined 
in the voting of Oklahoma legislators, "only the governor's 
program scale was associated with other scales to any 
e x t e n t . P a t t e r s o n  also found that the governor's scale 
(votes supporting the governor’s legislative program) was 
associated with one variable outside the institution (the 
competitiveness of the legislator's district) and one 
variable within the institutional setting (leadership 
position). He concluded that legislators in leadership 
posts had high support for the governor's program because the 
governor in Oklahoma had a tradition of direct involvement in 
determining the leadership within the H o u s e . M e m b e r s  from
13
very competitive districts tended to support the governor on 
his p r o g r a m . W h i l e  this contradicts research suggesting 
that legislators from close seats are least supportive of the 
party, this phenomenon was largely unexplored. Finally, al­
though some of the other issue dimensions were related to a 
particular variable (including urban-rural composition, con­
stituency characteristics, competition, and others), there 
was no single factor that explained legislative voting across 
the dimensions. It was Patterson's conclusion that "in the 
absence of party as a reference group, the legislator is
likely, consciously or unconsciously, to respond to different
48pressures in different voting areas."
In an attempt to add a developmental dimension to 
Patterson's work, Bernick and Hebert replicated the study ten 
years l a t e r . S u m m a r y  statistics indicated that the party's 
role was not substantial. However, the five voting dimen­
sions found with cumulative scale analysis were less inde­
pendent than those found by P a t t e r s o n . I t  was further 
concluded that control of the governorship by the minority 
party increased the importance of voting in a one-party 
dominant legislature.^^
While work by Bernick and Hebert tends to corroborate
the findings of Patterson and others on the importance of the 
52governor, there is an important distinction between the re­
search settings examined in Oklahoma. During the legislative
14
session studied by Patterson, the governor was from the 
dominant party, while the governor represented the minority 
party in the Hebert and Bernick research. While it may seem 
contradictory to suggest that a one-party dominant legisla­
ture may have to deal with a governor from the opposite 
party, this occurs not too infrequently, as can be seen in 
Table 1-1. Comparing the percentage of minority party gover­
nors in one-party states to the percentage in competitive 
states from 1963-1973, we find little difference between the 
two. The one-party states had only slightly fewer cases; 31 
percent of the governors came from the minority party (as de­
fined by party control of the legislature) while only 38 per­
cent of the governors in competitive states came from the 
minority party.
Although the governor may be an important factor in 
legislative voting, this role has only been marginally 
studied--we know very little about why or how the governor 
is an important force in legislative decision-making. Re­
searchers have failed to realize that "the legislative in­
fluence of governors varies from state to state and over time
53within states." This suggests that comparative analysis is 
not a luxury, but a necessity. Political scientists have 
been too narrow in their perspective, and negligent in their 
research concerning one-party state legislatures since they 
tend to dismiss them as objects of study. This has resulted
15
Table 1-1. Partisan Congruence Between the Legislature and 
the Governor by Competitiveness of State Legis­










Competitive ALegislature 627o(N=51) 38%(N=31) 100%(N=82)°
One-Party
Dominant
Legislature 69 (N=109) 31 (N=48) 100 (N=157)
a) Data compiled from The Book of the States for appropriate 
years.
b) Partisan makeup of states was determined by procedures 
discussed in Chapter Two. See Table 2-2.
c) The governor in these circumstances came from the party 
in the minority in both houses of the Legislature under 
study.
d) The N's in each category were smaller than the potential 
since the legislatures where the houses were split in 
partisan control were excluded. Forty-four such occur­
rences were found for competitive states while there were 
five such legislatures in one-party states.
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from their insistence that (1) political parties and only 
political parties bring about the responsiveness and account­
ability of government that is so important to democratic 
theory, and (2) the role parties play in legislative deci­
sion-making can only be discerned by analyzing roll-call 
votes. We need to determine the factors which will aid us in 
our explanation of how legislators make decisions in one- 
party states. If one accepts the belief that legislative 
voting is not chaotic, it is incumbent upon legislative 
scholars to conduct research in one-party states which is 
comparative, and longitudinal, or both, in an effort to 
discern how legislators make decisions.
Role of the Governor
We have alluded to the role that the governor may play 
in legislative decision-making, while at the same time noting 
the paucity of work in this area and its speculative nature. 
Hunger has claimed that "only the crudest of comparisons have 
so far been accomplished. . . . Renewed interest in the 
role of the governor has occurred in the last decade because 
of the increasing importance of the office. Governmental 
reorganization, which has given the governor more control 
over executive departments, along with increased constitution­
al power within the office, has heightened this importance 
and i n t e r e s t . I n  addition, the demand on government by
17
citizens for solutions to problems has brought about a grow­
ing interdependence between the legislative and executive 
branches of government, while at the same time forcing the 
governor to take on new responsibilities in setting policy. 
This has resulted in the belief that . . the governor is 
responsible for everything that happens in the state during 
his term of office whether he has the authority or the 
capacity to do anything about it or not.''^^ The public is 
not to blame for maintaining such a view regarding the gover­
nor, since a gubernatorial candidate during a campaign makes 
the promise, "often a rash promise, that he will secure the 
enactment of this program by the legislature."^^ Is the 
promise rash or can a governor secure his program? What is 
the exact role that the governor plays in his relationship 
with the legislature? The problem in discerning the nature 
of this role is compounded by the sparse literature about the 
governor's office which, for the most part, is not related to 
executive-legislative relations.
One of the more important and systematic studies of 
gubernatorial power is the work of Joseph Schlesinger. In 
"The Politics of the Executive," he establishes a formal 
power index for the governor which is based upon a series of
indices for tenure potential, powers of appointment, budget-
58ing power, and the veto power. The office of governor for 
each state is ranked according to the combined index scores.
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Schlesinger contends that the most important power is the 
tenure potential of a governor, because if governors can have 
long terms the " . . .  office could become a true position of 
political leadership in the s t a t e s . P e r h a p s  no other
article has had more impact on research concerning the state
chief executive.
The power index created by Schlesinger is an attempt to 
operationalize the theories presented by Lipson, when he 
argued that :
. . . problems which lie at the root of the governor's 
executive leadership are intimately bound up with his 
legislative leadership. His relationship with the two 
branches must be considered together; the one cannot 
be divorced from the other. The governor's leadership 
is not dual but single. It is a unified influence 
prevading both phases of the governmental process.60
As Keefe and Ogul have noted, "the executive becomes a 
legislator because his environment and formal power provide 
both opportunity and rationale, while his representative 
capacity imposes on him the obligation to do so." That the
governor is involved in the legislative process, for whatever
reason, has been a universal observation since the develop­
ment of tripartite government. The primacy of that role for 
the governor has been an equally universal assumption. The 
question, therefore, does not pertain to the existence of 
such a role, but to its nature. Confounding our attempt to 
discern his role is the fact that executive leadership and 
influence have become intertwined with the concept of execu-
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tive control or dominance. Much of this is the result of the
responsible two-party concept:
What affects the ability of the governor to control 
his legislative party is a question seldom asked and 
rarely investigated except by the harassed occupant 
of the executive mansion. This is surprising since 
the definition of party-responsibility is closely 
related to executive control.62
However, the governor is a "legislator” not because he must
control the legislature, but because demands are placed upon
him both by the law and by the environment within which he
fi ̂works. The governor seeks to accomplish the goals he sets 
for himself and the promises he makes to the public; there­
fore, he must interact with the legislature.
One of the seminal research efforts on the governor's 
role in the legislative process is that by Sarah McCally 
M o r e h o u s e . I n  order to examine the degree of gubernatorial 
control over the legislative party, Morehouse conducted a 
comparative state study. She attempted to discern "what 
affects the ability of the governor to control his legisla­
tive party . . . ?" in order to uphold the party's program 
and make a good record for the next e l e c t i o n . P r o f e s s o r  
Morehouse found a negative relationship between the seats 
held by the governor's party and the support he received from 
the party. While she offered two tentative explanations (the 
strategy theory and the rivalry explanation), in the end she 
concluded that only the rivalry explanation is acceptable.
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It was her opinion after further analysis of the data that 
governors in competitive two-party states with a small 
majority (55 percent of the seats) in the legislature have a 
better chance for success than under any other condition.
Further analysis of variation in gubernatorial success
uncovered the governor's post-legislative session primary
68election as the best indicator of success. However, such a 
finding must be seriously questioned. According to this 
argument, the governor builds a coalition within the legisla­
ture to aid his electoral coalition outside the legislature, 
and the best indicator of how successful he has been in 
building this legislative coalition is the primary after the 
session. This ignores the temporal ordering of the events--a 
fact which must be c o n s i d e r e d . I n  addition, this argument 
runs counter to her previous declaration of the unaccepta­
bility of a coalition theory which she rejected as an expla­
nation for the correlation between seats in the legislature 
and the success of the governor. Moreover, this view ignores 
the session which does not have a primary immediately follow­
ing it, a circumstance which may occur under two different 
conditions: (1) when the legislature has only one session in
each two-year period, or (2) when the session is the first of 
two sessions for a legislature. Under either condition it is 
difficult to conceive that the governor could build and sus­
tain a coalition for that duration. It is also equally
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difficult to accept that the coalition may last through an 
intervening legislative session. Furthermore, this theory 
would not explain the governor's success when he chooses not 
to run or is unable to run for office again. Anyone familiar 
with state-local electoral politics knows that current gover­
nors do not build coalitions for their successor; rather, 
they have, in many cases, little to say with regard to who 
their successor will be.
Any interpretation of Morehouse's analysis is further 
clouded by the design of her research. Her determination 
that the best indicator is the post-session primary is based 
on a biased sample of a non-random selection of states. It 
makes little sense to attempt to understand gubernatorial 
success when the selection of cases (states) used in the re­
gression analysis is directly related to one of the inde­
pendent v a r i a b l e s . I t  may well be that the post-session 
primary was the best predictor of success, since only ses­
sions which had a post-session primary were used. What the 
results might have been using different legislative sessions 
is left unanswered for the reader, since Morehouse failed to 
perform regression analysis on all the possible sessions in 
her sample.
In her second article, Morehouse sought to measure the
72effects of variation in party structure on policy output.
She used gubernatorial success with his program as the
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measure for policy output, while party structure was re­
flected by (1) the percentage of seats held by the governor's
party in the legislature, and (2) the results from guberna-
73torial primaries. She concluded that there was little 
correlation between primary and electoral competition for 
legislators and their support of the governor. In addition, 
she concluded that socio-economic variables do not account 
for the variation in patterns of support or gubernatorial 
success. However, when the governor was unable to "control 
his legislators," socio-economic variables then became im­
portant explanatory factors in defining the factions which 
developed.
Research Issues on Gubernatorial Influence
One of the problems underlying both of the above studies 
is more philosophical than methodological in nature. The 
concept of responsible party government is at the very base 
of these studies, and therefore it determines the procedures 
used in measuring the governor's influence. The responsible 
party, which would have the governor as its head and the 
members dutifully following his instructions, should have 
been generally ignored in the construction of a framework for 
the study of the political process in American legislatures. 
This model emerged more as a prescriptive theory on how 
political scientists thought government in the United States
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should behave. But the model is not isomorphic to legisla­
tive politics today. As Evron Kirkpatrick noted in his re­
appraisal of "Toward a Responsible Two-Party System," a re­
port which he helped to write:
The report was explicitly therapeutic in aim. . . 
the report was both normatively and empirically 
deficient. Little attempt was made to clarify or 
justify norms or goals. Repeatedly, instrumental 
propositions linking proposed reform to goals were 
based on inadequate evidence or no evidence at 
all. . . .Subsequently, research has produced a 
rich body of literature making clear that much of the 
substance of the report was simply m i s t a k e n . 75
Success
There are several "pitfalls" which may develop be­
cause of a reliance on the responsible two-party model. The
definition of gubernatorial success used by Morehouse is one 
of these "pitfalls." She has defined success as the ability 
of the governor to gain enough votes from his party to 
win.^^ This measure rarely taps the success of the governor 
in the legislature and does not conform to political reali­
ties. For example, a governor may be highly successful in 
marshalling support from within his party and yet never 
achieve success in terms of the passage of legislation. This
would be especially true for a governor from the minority 
party. Governors often rely on coalitions composed of mem­
bers from both parties to gain the necessary support for 
their programs. It is also true that the philosophical posi­
tion of the governor may actually align him more closely to
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7 7the supposed "opposition party." In attempting to evaluate
a governor's success one should take into account the ability
of the governor to achieve his desired goals irrespective of
where he receives the support.
It may be argued, moreover, that measuring the success
of a governor with any index is highly dangerous, if not a
completely misleading task. As Keefe and Ogul have noted,
"any of the statistics for the success or failure of the
chief executive must be treated with caution. What they hide
78may be as important as what they show." The quality of 
legislation is as important as the quantity. Those governors 
who ask little of consequence may be superficially quite 
successful; while those who ask for much and receive 
relatively little may appear less successful but have greater 
impact. It is possible for a governor to have a piece of 
legislation which is so important to him and to the overall 
policy of the state that he would be willing to forego the 
rest of his program for this one request. As one governor's 
legislative assistant commented when asked about the gover­
nor's program; "The 1971 session was corporate tax reform. 
The success of the governor was the passage of that one piece 
of legislation."^^
Even if one were able to ascertain the legislation which 
the governor felt was the major portion of his program, one 
is still confronted with the fluidity of the program. At its
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worst the legislation may be routinely defeated, or it may be 
so modified that it bears little resemblance to the original 
set of proposals. Similarly, circumstances may arise whereby 
a governor faces an opposition majority party which subse­
quently defeats his legislation. Thereafter, the majority 
party may make some minor revisions and pass the proposed 
legislation. This would allow them to take some of the 
credit away from the governor. While some governors would 
find this objectionable, others would have little difficulty 
in accepting this latter situation, since what is important 
for them is the substance of the legislation.
An additional dilemma facing researchers discussing 
success and the governor's program is that some pieces of 
legislation require several years for passage. It is not 
uncommon for a governor to introduce legislation in one ses­
sion with little immediate expectation of passage. This 
initial introduction serves more as a "release valve" for 
the emotions that may surround the legislation. When re­
introduced at some later point it may be easier to pass.
Under this circumstance, the problem then becomes one of de­
termining at which point in time, initial introduction or 
final passage, it is best to analyze. Looking at either one 
of the two times by itself would be misleading without taking 
into consideration some aspect of the other time. Moreover, 
a number of key pieces of legislation in the governor's
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program may not be taken into account when success is de­
fined as the ability of the governor to obtain enough votes
from his party to win. This may occur because the study of
roll-calls often uses only bills that show conflict, and 
thus bills from the governor's program which pass through 
the legislature with little or no interference from any 
opposition group become law and are left unanalyzed. Surely 
one would consider the governor successful in this situa­
tion, yet such an analysis would not take these bills into 
account. In direct contrast to the above situation is the 
circumstance where the governor's bills never get voted on 
because the bills never come out of committee. It is not
uncommon for many bills from a governor of the opposition
party to die within a committee, and therefore, never re­
ceive any votes in the full house or senate. It is hard to 
imagine that one would want to call a governor successful 
when he is unable to get his legislation out of committee, 
but under the Morehouse measure there would be no indication 
of the governor's failure.
To determine gubernatorial success, both static and
80dynamic analyses must be used. Indices may be used if 
we do not forget that they are gross measures which may 
ignore unique circumstances of considerable importance.
What needs to be studied is gubernatorial influence as a 
voting cue for legislators. Such an approach does not deal
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with the notion of success or support, but examines whether 
legislators vote differently when the governor becomes in­
volved with a bill. No research approach currently does this. 
In Morehouse's original article, for example, the reader does 
not know what the results of the computation might have been 
if bills totally unrelated to the governor's program had been 
used. It may be that the index of support or success might 
have been as high, if not higher, for bills with which the 
governor theoretically was not involved. Thus, a comparison 
between voting behavior of legislators on bills related and 
unrelated to the governor is appropriate.
The Veto
Another problem with the Morehouse research relates to 
the use of votes on "overrides" as a measure of the gover­
nor's support or success. There are a number of fallacies 
emerging from an analysis of votes sustaining vetoes. First, 
there is a validity concern for what is being measured. A 
vote to override, if there is one at all, is often a mere 
formality. This is the conclusion suggested by Ransone when 
he found that "in a rather substantial group of states the
governor's vetoes have been overridden so infrequently that
81they have become almost absolute."
It may also be argued that the successful governor would 
not have to veto any bill, and therefore, any veto is an 
indication of at least a partial failure. Under this
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argument the successful governor would monitor legislative 
action closely enough to determine which bills would be re­
pugnant to him and thereafter use his influence to make sure 
they never get passed. Former Governor Williams of Michigan 
was an advocate of this tactic. Fe has noted that he worked 
with the leaders of both parties in the legislature to keep
objectionable bills to a minimum, and therefore, he had few
82vetoes.
Vetoes on bills during the legislative session may be 
very important, but it is likely that the most important 
bills will emerge at or near the close of a session. Thus, 
vetoes during the session may be on inconsequential bills.
If the crucial bills are passed at the end of the session, 
then vetoes of them would be most important; but these 
vetoes, if the legislature has already adjourned, can be made 
by the governor in most states without any immediate checks 
on his decision. Under Morehouse's design no recognition of 
these bills and their importance is possible.
One way to overcome this deficiency is to measure all 
votes which are related to bills the governor later vetoes. 
The governor presumably makes pronouncements throughout the 
time the legislature is in session, informing the legislators 
as well as the public as to his position on legislation. The 
governor is regularly involved in the passage of legislation 
and "executive influence is not confined to suggesting ideas
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to legislators and to receiving bills from legislative
O Obodies.' He may attempt to pressure legislators to act for 
or against legislation, and therefore, the individual vote by 
a legislator on a bill may be the direct result of this pres­
sure. Surely, it is unwise to dismiss votes on bills for which 
the governor has shown some concern.
Another problem with vetoes involves the substantive 
reason for which governors veto bills. Although most bills 
are opposed by a governor for reasons of "public policy" or 
"public interest," some are not. Governors may veto bills 
for purely political reasons, since by vetoing a bill the 
governor establishes an issue that he may want to pursue in 
an upcoming political campaign. Certainly one would want to 
weigh differently vetoes which are partisan and those arising 
out of the governor's firm conviction that the bills are 
against the public interest. In the latter situation, the 
governor would want as much legislative support as possible, 
while in the former he may not be as concerned about success 
or support. When the veto is political, the governor may be 
able to use either an override or a sustaining vote to his 
advantage, since the veto itself is the key act of the gover­
nor.
There is another situation where the veto, Morehouse's 
measure of a governor's success or support, and the responsi­
ble party model must be suspect. When a governor's party is
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in the minority, he may be able to sustain a veto if a high 
degree of cohesion is displayed by the legislators of his 
party and if the party is not hopelessly small. However, 
there are times when the veto cannot be sustained even if the 
governor's party displays perfect cohesion on his behalf. If 
the governor's party is hopelessly small (usually less than 
30 percent of the seats), he cannot achieve success without 
the aid of the opposition party members. However, support by 
the opposition party strikes at the very base of the respon­
sible party theory.
This discussion should not be interpreted as a rejection 
of the use of vetoes in studying the governor's role in the 
legislative process, but rather as a warning about employing 
only this measure. The veto is an important tool of the 
governor and should be studied; but by itself it may mislead 
the researcher more than it may assist. Therefore, it should 
be used with caution and with the understanding of the prob­
lems indicated above. Along with some other indications of 
the governor's activities in the legislative process it may 
be perfectly acceptable.
New Designs
In her two most recent works. Professor Morehouse was 
concerned with the proposition "that governing parties with 
sufficient internal cohesion to pass programs to which they 
commit themselves, will bring about a wider distribution of
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the benefits of state expenditures across income classes.
A key phrase in the preceding propositions is "to which they 
commit themselves. . ." It cannot be said that every govern­
ing party commits itself to a wider distribution of bene­
fits. In many states the governing party is quite conserva­
tive, and in these states redistribution of benefits would 
not necessarily be one of the goals of the governor or his 
party. We can test whether unity within a party will bring 
about change in benefits only within a party that has the 
initial proclivity for this substantive change in policy.
While this proposition may detract somewhat from her 
research, there are a number of components which commend this 
current work over her previous attempts to study the governor 
and his relations with the legislature. In her latest paper 
she has shifted away from a measure of gubernatorial success 
and has decided to use her measure of gubernatorial support, 
as well as an Index of Opposition and an Index of Party Like­
ness. This move away from the success index is noteworthy,
because the measure was fraught with idiosyncrasies and
8 5theoretical problems. In addition, Professor Morehouse has 
decided to use the governor's actual program instead of 
vetoes and, in the process, take on the enormous task of 
determining what comprises the governor's program. This is 
surely an improvement ; yet she has decided not to use vetoes. 
This is unfortunate since many governors in dealing with the
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legislatures take on this primarily negative posture. Their 
primary task is to review the legislation passed and to veto 
that which is repugnant to their position. Certainly, ve­
toes do have some significance in the role that the governor 
plays in the legislative process; therefore, they should 
continue to be used in any roll-call analysis of the gover­
nor 's influence.
A further change in her research design involves a more 
systematic selection process for the states used in the 
analysis. The choice of states was made prior to actually 
conducting the research because "they represent varying de- 
grees of inter-party competition. . ." In addition, she 
notes that the twenty states selected have the following 
characteristics: (1) there are an equal number of Republic-
can and Democratic states, (2) all have gubernatorial pri­
maries, and (3) there was a geographical cross-section of 
states. This process gives the research two advantages over 
her previous work. First, the one-party states have not 
been omitted in the research, and secondly, the systematic 
design improves the ability of the researcher and reader to 
draw valid conclusions and generalizations.
In spite of these noteworthy changes a number of prob­
lems detract from an otherwise worthwhile attempt to study 
the governor's influence and state policy-making. The com­
parative component in her study misses two important features 
that should be used in a study of the governor's influence.
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She wants to measure the governor's influence over his party 
on major legislation, and she then uses his program as the
test for this influence. However, as we have noted previous­
ly, to test the governor's influence in his party there 
should be a comparison within the party: voting behavior of
legislators on the major pieces of legislation should be com­
pared to that legislation which is unrelated to the governor.
Moreover, her determination that the formal executive powers 
are an important variable in the determination of the gover­
nor's influence highlights the necessity for another compara­
tive component. Her analysis, while across twenty states, 
was not concerned with states over time. While the gover­
nor's formal power may be important across states (a finding 
still open to further investigation), this variable cannot 
account for variation in success or influence within a state 
over time. Dynamic analysis within a state may detect more 
important explanatory measures.
The reported findings tend to substantiate the need for 
additional research across time, since one could conclude 
that the individual governor has little impact on policy­
making, and that it is his formal powers and the party coali­
tion which are the dominant explanatory factors. Morehouse 
concludes that "the governor's political power is a function 
of the dominant leadership coalition within his party. . . a 
coalition which outlasts his term of office and perpetuates
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87in power candidates of its own choosing,” and that "the 
legislative party is not an independent entity, but is sub­
ject to the direction and influence of the governor's coali-
O Q
tion within the electoral organization." These findings 
would support the existence of a monolithic structure capable 
of choosing governors and deciding policy. This rather de­
terministic theory would make the selection process for a 
governor a mere sham and negate any importance that might be 
placed on the voting process. We have seen in recent times
that the electorate behaves more independently and is capable
89of differentiating between individuals running for office.
This theory also negates the importance of the individ­
ual occupying the governor's chair. The individual governor 
makes a difference in policy-making and these differences 
within states do not arrive from differences in formal powers 
or electoral support alone. Differences arise because of the 
perception of the powers they use, whether they are formal or 
informal powers.
In addition, her theory cannot explain why individuals 
from the minority may win the governorship and enjoy varying 
degrees of influence. Lastly, these findings do not satis­
factorily account for the process within one-party states, 
especially those which are multi-factional within a single 




The subject of gubernatorial power has been addressed 
in detail by Sprengel.^^ He offered a typology of guberna­
torial power consisting of four categories: direct formal,
91indirect formal, informal direct, and indirect informal.
The first, direct formal, includes "giving" a message to the
legislature (normally a state of the state and/or a budget 
92message). The message power may include calling for ini­
tiation of legislation, and it is useful because it centers 
attention on the governor's program. This is especially 
crucial since the message receives wide coverage by the 
media. A second formal power is the authority granted to the 
governor to call special sessions which enables him to focus 
public attention on an issue, thus intensifying pressures on 
the legislature. Unlike the two previous powers, the veto's 
importance is beyond doubt ; indeed, some scholars have 
claimed that the veto and/or its threat are the ultimate 
weapons of a governor, especially since a veto is seldom 
overridden by the legislature. The threat of a veto may be 
sufficient to induce legislative cooperation with the gover-
nor.”
There are some powers formally given to the governor 
which influence his ability to deal with the legislature, but 
are not under the rubric of his legislative role. These
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indirect formal powers may be as important as, if not more 
important than, the formal direct powers. The ability, in 
fact, the duty, of a governor to appoint individuals to offi­
cial positions may be used as an effective bargaining device 
with legislators. The significance of this power is of no 
small importance, as Allen has noted: "as it has been true
of all previous governors. Governor Welsh (Indiana) found it 
advantageous in some cases to leave people (legislators) 
wondering who would get what position. . . . However, 
appointments are not the only form of patronage that a gover­
nor has at his disposal. The discretion surrounding the dis­
persion of money--the "letting" of contracts to friends of
the administration--is another form of patronage that must be
95considered an important tool. This is related to the power 
that the governor possesses as the chief executive of the 
administrative branch. As administrative head of the execu­
tive branch of government, the governor also possesses the 
power to gather information. That the governor has at his 
disposal a much larger amount of information than what legis­
lators possess places the lawmakers in a subordinate posi­
tion. The power to prepare a budget is also extremely im­
portant to the governor, particularly since the budget is a 
policy statement.
The third type of power that the governor possesses is 
informal but direct. These powers are not given to the
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governor in any formalized way within the governmental struc­
ture but are external and are a result of his office. One of 
these powers lies in the role of party leader. His use of 
this position is dependent upon the political setting within 
which he operates. A cohesive majority gives the governor 
greater authority than if he must face a recalcitrant major­
ity, or if his party is a hopeless minority. A governor in a 
one-party state "cannot inspire either intense loyalty or 
intense opposition by party identification. Legislators run
independent of the governor and have no political stake in
97the success of the gubernatorial program." As the visible 
spokesman and leader of the party within a state, the gover­
nor's views become the party's views. Some believe that a
norm exists within the legislature to support the governor's
98program because it is the party's program. However, 
Sprengel found no empirical evidence of such a norm, and con­
tended that "we cannot justifiably conclude that the party
99constitutes a basic element in the executive power scheme."
Some believe that the governor, being an elected offi­
cial of the state, has substantial political "clout." A 
frequent tactic of a governor is to appeal to the people for 
support of his program, and since he is the most visible 
state official, the media are often a willing organ. "The 
governor, like the president, has gained a larger role in the 
legislative process primarily because of his ability to
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dramatize his stand on issues and enlist public support 
through modern communication m e d i a . N o  one should under­
estimate the use of public opinion by the governor. The 
prestige of the office and informal meetings between a gover­
nor and legislators are important pools for the chief execu­
tive. During a legislative session, the governor's doors are 
normally open to any legislator. The holding of frequent 
meetings with legislative leaders and/or individual legis­
lators is the norm rather than the exception. Sprengel makes 
a strong argument in presenting his beliefs that the prestige 
of the office itself is the most important power. He claims 
that legislators defer to the governor out of a power syn­
drome, and appear to be moved by this sense of deference, 
awe, and respect "for the governor personally, for his office 
generally, and for his power s p e c i f i c a l l y . R a n s o n e  con­
firms this, noting that "it may not be necessary for the 
governor to promise the legislators anything tangible in the 
way of patronage or other rewards. Frequently, the prestige
of the governor's office coupled with a forceful presentation
102of his views may be all that is necessary."
In Sprengel's fourth source of power, known as indirect 
and informal, there are no constitutional prerogatives, nor 
are there any other outside sources. The power lies not in 
the office, but with the individual holding office. The 
"political style" of a governor, largely dependent upon his
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personality, has a great deal to do with how he is received
by legislators. Wyner and others would argue (as does
Neustadt about the presidency) that the real power of the
governor is his power to persuade, which is directly related
103to his style and personality. It may well be that "a
governor's influence may depend on his concept of guberna­
torial prerogatives. Lipson also has voiced concern 
about these informal powers. He suggests that the transitory 
nature of these powers makes them, to some extent, disadvan­
tageous. Formal powers, once created, stay with the office 
but informal powers leave with the individual and, therefore, 
must be reacquired. The "chief executive does not inherit 
personal ascendancy or party influence from his predeces­
sors."^®^ While this may be true, little systematic analysis 
of these powers has been conducted to prove their importance.
The Need for Continued Research
It would appear that the powers enumerated above give 
the governor a very advantageous position with regard to the 
legislature and his potential to influence it. Seldom, how­
ever, does a governor run "rough shod" over a legislature, 
and quite often one is forced to question how influential the 
governor really is. The governor may receive very little of 
what he asks for and his influence or leadership will vary 
greatly among and within states, for as Keefe and Ogul
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contend
The executive's Influence in the legislative process 
is . . . related to a series of environmental factors 
which set boundaries within which his own personality, 
role conception, ideology, and political skills and 
aspirations can be relevant.
Obviously one of the environmental conditions is the partisan 
composition of the legislature. The governor must operate 
with a legislature that may take on numerous partisan con­
figurations and these configurations will, in turn, affect 
the ability of the governor to achieve his desired goals.
The partisan makeup of a legislature may take on an almost 
unlimited number of potential variations. However, there are 
generally three main ways to categorize the legislature's 
partisan makeup. A governor may (1) work within a competi­
tive two-party state legislature within which his party com­
mands a majority of both houses, or (2) find the opposition 
in control of one or both houses, or (3) govern in a one- 
party state. If the governor finds himself in a situation 
where the opposition controls both houses in a competitive 
state legislature, then he must temper his language and base 
his tactics on compromise. Partisanship thus gives way to 
a bipartisan form of leadership since any partisan action 
would tend to diminish the potential influence or success of 
the governor.
In contrast, there are competitive states where the ma­
jority party is the governor's party; he thus enjoys a certain
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advantage in dealing with legislators. Lawmakers know that 
the governor's program will be identified as the party's 
program and, therefore, the success of his program will have 
a substantial effect on them since they carry the same party 
label. Under this condition or under the situation where the 
governor's party controls one house, or has a strong minority 
in one or both houses, the governor can operate from some 
base of strength.
The governor of a one-party state, however, is unable to
use the party label, since there is an absence of substantial
opposition from a second party. A governor must build a
coalition or faction within the party to accomplish his
goals. Jewell notes that "the one-party governor has one
unique advantage, he lacks an organized opposition party . . .
In a one-party state, the governor has few institutional
108assets but fewer institutional liabilities."
A circumstance not discussed above is one where the legis­
lature is controlled by one party--it is a one-party dominant 
legislature--and the governor is from the opposition party. 
While this may seem unusual, it is not unique. There are a 
number of examples to confirm its reality, including Oklahoma 
with governors Bellmon and Bartlett, Arkansas with Governor 
Rockefeller, Florida with Kirk, and North Dakota with Gover­
nors Guy and Link. The governor cannot rely on his party and 
legislative leaders are not prone to cooperate with the
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governor. Little is known about the effects of the gover­
nor's influence upon the legislature under these circum­
stances and much needs to be done to understand what the 
governor's role and influence is under this partisan con­
figuration.
Summary
A review of the existing body of knowledge on the 
governor's legislative role has demonstrated the need for 
continued research on this subject. An excessive amount of 
previous research has been of the single case study varie­
ty, with little interest expressed in developing a theory 
of executive-legislative relations. One-party dominant 
states have been neglected as areas of study even though 
evidence suggests that the governor plays an important role 
in the legislative process in these states. In addition, 
research on the governor has not sought to determine what 
factors may explain variation in success for a governor.
The work by Morehouse, while innovative, has not sub­
stantially increased the already existing body of knowledge 
on the governor's legislative role. In fact, her reliance 
on the responsible two-party model may have inhibited the 
development of a theory of executive-legislative relations 
since its links with reality are tenuous. Morehouse's re­
liance on simple measures of success and/or support do not
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adequately portray the dynamics of executive-legislative 
relations and may, in fact, lead to incorrect conclusions.
Thus, any research which seeks to add to the already 
existing body of knowledge on executive-legislative rela­
tions must overcome some of the deficiencies described 
previously. First, comparative research on the governor's 
legislative role is a necessity. Comparisons of executive- 
legislative relations across states as well as over time 
will overcome the idiosyncratic nature of much of the pre­
vious research. Secondly, a study which measures guberna­
torial success through a variety of procedures will aid 
substantially in overcoming the problem of making erroneous 
conclusions from a single measure. Indeed, the governor's 
legislative role may be measured in other ways. An analy­
sis of the voting behavior of legislators on votes of 
interest to the governor as compared to votes on issues 
seemingly unrelated to the governor may assist in the de­
termination of the governor's legislative role.
This study is a comparative assessment of the gover­
nor's legislative role in one-party states over a ten year 
period. An assessment of the governor's influence over 
legislators and his ability to be successful will be 
evaluated in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN
The lack of significant research on one-party dominant 
legislatures, the paucity of work on the governor in the 
legislative process, and the need to develop a basis for 
comparative analysis of state legislatures shape this re­
search effort. The primary focus is on the nature of the 
governor's role in the legislative process in one-party 
states. It examines the governor's "success" with the key 
components of his program, using both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques and evaluates the governor's impact 
on voting patterns of legislators. The analysis compares 
roll-call votes for bills in which governors showed partic­
ular interest with votes on legislation for which they 
demonstrated no apparent concern.^
With knowledge that "the legislative influence of
governors varies from state to state and over time within 
2states," this research was structured to undertake a 
systematic testing of hypotheses through a quasi-experi- 
mental and longitudinal design. Because the environment in 
which a governor must act is presumed to affect his tac­
tics, the design is constructed to test the governor's 
success in influencing state legislatures under varying
3partisan configurations. The states selected for analysis 
all have one-party dominant legislatures, but have experi­
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enced various combinations of partisan control of the 
governorship. This permits a test of the importance of the 
partisan attachment of both the legislature and the gover­
nor as a factor influencing the degree of cooperation and 
conflict in the legislative process. Two waves of analysis 
are accomplished for each state giving the study a longi­
tudinal component, since "it has the advantage of holding 
constant some of the variables that change when we move 
from state to state.
In short, the design consists of several comparative 
components. First, the research contrasts states within a 
single time period or wave. Secondly, it compares legisla­
tures and governors over time within and between states. 
Finally, within a legislative session, it juxtaposes votes 
on the governor's program and issues with those votes seem­
ingly unrelated to the governor.
The Selection of States
A quasi-experimental design has been constructed to 
facilitate the comparative components of the study. States 
to be studied are chosen selectively rather than on a ran­
dom basis, with controls for the partisan composition of 
the legislature. This is accomplished by selecting states 
which vary in the dominance of each party and the partisan 
control of the governorship.
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The selection component of the research design is de­
picted in Table 2-1. It shows two states with the party of 
the governor and the senate congruent over time, and two 
other states with the governor and the senate constantly in 
opposition. The governorship is usually controlled by the 
Democrats in two states, while in the remaining two states 
we find the Republicans usually in control of the executive 
office. Selecting states for study where the governor's 
office is in the hands of two different parties within a 
state over time allows us to control for variation between 
states and to analyze the importance of the party label of 
the governor on one-party legislatures.
The design specifies the use of state senates, chosen 
for the following reasons: (1) senates are smaller and
more manageable units for analysis, (2) senators usually 
have longer terms of office with less turnover, which 
allows for a greater degree of consistency, and (3) state 
senates usually have fewer procedural rules to complicate 
research.
The selection of states is not an easy task given the 
required configuration of the governor's party ties. There 
are actually many more one-party dominant legislatures than 
normally assumed. This underestimation of party dominance 
in state legislatures has been the result of errors in the 
design of previous classification schemes. In many schemes













































The years given are those used in the two waves of analysis.
R or D denotes which party controlled the governorship.
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only the southern states are considered one-party, which 
often results in southern states being excluded by re­
searchers.^ This is unacceptable for comprehensive com­
parative state legislative research.
Although the consistency and degree of Democratic 
strength in the southern states for all offices has been 
impressive, there are a number of northern states where 
one-party control of the legislature is equally pervasive. 
In measuring competition, the extent to which the two par­
ties compete for elected offices is a common criterion. 
However, there is no uniform measure of this phenomenon; 
indeed, there are several different measures of party com­
petition for the states.^ Zody and Luttbeg argue that all 
of the common measures are significantly correlated, that 
they are more similar than dissimilar, and that the degree 
of competitiveness is relatively stable over time.^ Their 
conclusion is supported by research conducted on Michigan 
which found that the partisan control of legislative seats 
changed very little during the period studied. Becker 
et al., found that in the chosen time period for Michigan,
O
97 percent of the seats were won by the same party. The 
problem with classifying states according to electoral 
competitiveness lies in the determination of the offices, 
the particular time period considered, and the measure of 
competitiveness employed. The time period chosen is an
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arbitrary decision, regardless of the theoretical under­
pinnings, since it is possible to construct equally satis­
factory arguments to support or contradict any time frame.
There is only one obvious set of offices useful for 
classifying state legislatures; the respective state 
house and senate. The competitiveness of state legisla­
tures should not be measured by the percentage of votes for 
a president or United States senator--even worse the votes 
for gubernatorial office should not be used to measure 
party competition in state legislatures. Nevertheless, 
these have all been common measures employed by research­
ers. If we use a measure which only examines state legis­
latures and their control by party, an entirely different 
picture emerges.
A measure of state legislative competition which re­
flects the percentage of state senators and state repre­
sentatives for each party is used in this r e s e a r c h . T h e  
period for computing the measure is 1963 to 1973 (essen­
tially six elections), a period which largely follows the 
Supreme Court's decision on reapportionment.
The majority party in each house is assigned a value 
based on three levels of the size of its majority. A party 
in the majority at the maximum level in all six elections, 
would receive a score of ±18 (e.g., 6 x 3 =  18). If both
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houses were controlled by the same party at this level then 
±18 X 2 = ±36 would be the assigned value.
and ^maj = D then S .maj = 1
^maj = R ^maj = -l
and ^maj = D then ^maj = 2
^maj = R ^maj =-2
"mai'76 and ^maj = D ^maj = 3
^maj = R ^maj =-3
Where Smaj is the size of the majority party control as 
measured by percentage of seats controlled. D indicates 
Democratic majority, while R indicates Republican control.
The classification scheme also takes into considera­
tion the consistency of control by a party. Four points 
are assigned to a party for each election controlled. If a 
party maintains control after all six elections, a value of 
±24 is assigned (+24 if controlled by the Democrats), while 
a party in control for five elections would have a value of 
±20.^^ Thus, the consistency value can range from -24 to 
+24, depending upon the number of years a party controls a 
chamber.
The maximum value that could be achieved using the 
majority value score plus the consistency value in both 
chambers is ±84. [e.g., total Democratic control in both
Houses = 6 X 3 = 18; 18 x 2 (# of Houses) =36; 24 points 
in each house for consistency x 2 houses = 48 points; 48 + 
36 = 84.] A score near zero indicates party balance. One-
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party state legislatures were determined to be those in
which one party had, on the average, from 61 to 75 percent
of the seats during the entire time span for both cham- 
12hers. Under this procedure we find, quite naturally, all 
eleven southern states still classified as one-party Demo­
cratic; in addition, there are nine other states which meet 
the designated criteria. If we examine states where the 
Republicans are dominant in the legislature, we find that 
there are seven which may be so classified (see Table 2-2), 
In total, there is one-party dominance in 27 states--over 
50 percent of the universe.
Seven of the eight states used in the analysis are 
clearly one-party legislatures, with Oregon somewhat more 
competitive than the others. Despite the relative position 
of Oregon in the ranking of partisanship, it was used be­
cause it was the only state in the time period (1963-1973)
where the Democrats had continuous control of the senate
13and where the governor was always a Republican. In 
several cells of the design there are few possible choices, 
while in other cells there is some flexibility. Like 
Oregon, North Dakota can be considered somewhat of an 
aberration, in that one does not normally expect to find the
partisan configuration of one party always in control of 
the legislature, while the other party is always in control 
of the governorship. As one might expect. North Dakota is
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Alabama 84 Connecticut 22
Arkansas 84 Oregon 21
Georgia 84 Alaska 20
Louisiana 84 Delaware 9
Maryland 84 Michigan 1
Mississippi 84 Pennsylvania 0
South Carolina 84 New Jersey -5
Texas 84 Arizona -23
Oklahoma 82 New York -31
North Carolina 81 Iowa -35
Virginia 81 Utah -35
Florida 75 Indiana -37
Rhode Island 75 Maine -44
West Virginia 75 Colorado -52
Massachusetts 74 Illinois -52
New Mexico 74 Ohio -52
Hawaii 73 Wisconsin -53
Missouri 72 Wyoming -57
Kentucky 71 New Hampshire -59
Tennessee 65 South Dakota -59
California ...."4T Idaho -63
Washington 34 North Dakota -67
Montana 32 Vermont -70
Nevada 25 Kansas -74
Minnesota and Nebraska were generally non-partisan 
during the time period of the study, and therefore were not 
used. A score of ±56 or greater (lower for the negative 
valued Republican's) indicates a one-party state. States 
with the same value are listed alphabetically.
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the only state that fits into cell E (Table 2-1); however, 
unlike Oregon, North Dakota is clearly a one-party state as
can be seen in Table 2-2. Wyoming was the only state where
the Republican party was dominant in both the legislature 
and the governorship throughout the time period examined.
Unlike these preceding three states, there was a large
potential pool of states to select for cell A. Texas was
chosen primarily because of the size of its population; 
many of the other states chosen for study were sparsely 
populated. Vermont and Idaho, on the other hand, are both 
states where the legislature was controlled by the Republi­
can party. Vermont was used in cell G because the Republi­
cans only controlled the governorship from 1969 to 1973. 
During the time period of the research. Republicans were in 
control of the executive office in Idaho from 1963 to 1971. 
However, in 1971 the Democrats captured the governorship.
Oklahoma is one of the few states where the legisla­
ture was dominated by Democrats, while the executive office 
was normally in the hands of the Republicans. From 1963 to 
1970 the Republicans had control of the executive office, 
electing two different governors, while in 1970 the Demo­
crats elected their candidate to office. Cell C had several 
potential states that could have been used in the design be­
sides Florida, such as Arkansas and New Mexico. However, 
Florida was chosen because of the similarity in its
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political culture to Oklahoma and Texas. A more important 
consideration in the choice of Florida over Arkansas was 
that all of the governors were potentially available for 
interviews. In Arkansas, Republican Governor Rockefeller 
died prior to the study. In addition, New Mexico is one 
of the few states where roll-call data are not readily 
available.
The Selection of Time Periods
The selection of years within each of the eight states 
was dictated by several factors. In all states, the first 
session of a legislature was used because they tend to be 
more all-encompassing.^^ In many states the second ses­
sion, if there is one, is usually designed for one specific 
purpose (e.g., budgeting) and only that designated task may 
be discussed. The first wave for study in each of the 
states was selected for various reasons. In both Oregon 
and Wyoming, 1967 was chosen because it was the first ses­
sion for governors who held the office from 1967 to 1974. 
Thus, we have in these two states the ability to measure 
the influence of a governor over an extended period of 
time--analyzing his first and last legislatures. This is 
extremely valuable, because a determination of the gover­
nor's perception of his ability to build coalitions and 
influence over an extended time period, as well as the
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importance of tenure potential as perceived by the governor 
was desired. In North Dakota, 1965 was selected because 
the data were more readily available. The selection of 
1969 for Texas was based on two considerations. It was the 
first session for Governor Preston Smith (who served only 
one two-year term) and because the preceding Governor, John 
Connally, was assumed to be unavailable for interview be­
cause of his involvement in a criminal trial. When other 
factors permitted, the most recent session was used. Thus, 
in Texas, Oregon, North Dakota, and Wyoming 1973 was used 
for the second wave of the analysis.
In the other four states, selection of the sessions to 
study was dictated by design and general desire to use the 
first legislative session. The study sought to test the 
effects of partisan change in the governorship on the 
voting behavior of the legislature and the success of the 
governor. Thus, in Florida, 1967 was the first session for 
the Republican governor, while 1971 was the first session 
in which the governorship was regained by the Democrats. In 
Vermont the Republican governor took office in 1969 while 
the Democrats won the executive office back in 1973. In 
Oklahoma, 1967 was the first session for Republican Governor 
Bartlett, while the Democrats were finally able to gain the 
governorship in 1971. In Idaho, 1967 saw Governor 
Samuelson meet with his first legislature. The selection
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of 1973 for Idaho as the second wave of analysis goes
against the normal procedure to use a first session for a
governor, but information regarding the 1973 legislative
session was more accessible than that for the 1971 
16session.
Data Collection
In an analysis of voting patterns in legislatures the 
usual procedure employs recorded roll-call votes. Unfor­
tunately, they are not uniformly taken among the various 
states. Some states require them on all votes, while 
others only use them upon request of a designated number of 
legislators; and even within a legislature, there are dif­
ferent rules for their use. Only two of the eight states 
do not require a roll-call vote automatically on final pas­
sage (Texas requires roll calls upon request of three 
senators while Vermont requires only one). Some states
allow for roll-call votes at other points in the passage of 
17legislation. Consequently, some roll-call votes have 
little meaning, especially when most of the votes are 
unanimous.
Unanimous votes tell a researcher little about 
voting behavior because they lack variation; thus, some 
process of differentiating the significant roll calls from 
the insigificant ones must be found. Only those votes
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which show some degree of conflict will be used in this 
analysis. The definition of conflict has varied in legis­
lative research, but the usual standard is that at least 10
percent of those voting must be voting in opposition to the 
18majority.
More than one vote per bill may be used in the analy­
sis. However, it is not misleading to use more than one 
vote per bill, since different votes on a bill take on dif­
ferent meanings. Voting on passage of the bill, for exam­
ple, may not be the same as voting to amend or override.
Since roll-call data and their analysis do not fully 
take into account the governor's influence, the research 
was designed to enable an examination of the governor's 
role in a more detailed manner. Interviews were conducted 
with each of the governors, along with the legislative or 
executive assistant of the most current governor. In addi­
tion, an interview with at least one news reporter in each 
state, as well as an employee of the "legislative research 
agency " was sought.
Fourteen governors, both past and present, comprised 
the target sample for the eight selected states. In Oregon 
and Wyoming the same individual occupied the governor's 
chair in both waves of the analysis, thus, the potential 
number of governors for interviewing was fourteen instead 
of sixteen. Of the fourteen, ten were personally inter-
69
19viewed. Only one trip was scheduled to each state for 
interview purposes; this was necessitated by the limited 
amount of funds available. In three states it was impossi­
ble to personally meet with the prospective interviewees,
but written or telephone responses to the interview sched-
20ule were subsequently obtained. All but a few of the inter­
viewees permitted taping of the conversations (none of the
governors objected) and evidence suggests that the responses
21were frank and revealing. The interviews with a cross 
section of knowledgeable people tended to corroborate these 
findings, although from a slightly different perspective.
The interview schedule for the governors was divided 
into two sections. The first section included questions 
which were essential, since they called for answers using 
their perception (i.e., the general role of the governor, 
the importance of partisan ties, the significance of the 
historical context within which he held office, the "tools" 
or "powers" relevant for his success, and the key bills 
facing the legislature), The second section of questions 
were also relevant to the governor himself, but when it was 
impossible to ask them directly the administrative or 
legislative assistant to the governor was interviewed.
These latter questions were more factual (i.e., whether a 
particular individual introduced legislation for the gover­
nor, the governor's program, the arrangements for meeting
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22with legislators). This division of questions was neces­
sitated by the lack of control over the time the governors 
allowed for the interviews. The meetings lasted approxi­
mately one half - hour to forty-five minutes, while a few 
extended to an hour and one half. There was no pattern to 
the length of the interviews with regard to the size of the 
state. While one would expect that former governors would 
give more time than those currently in office, this was not 
the case. Most of the individuals who were former gover­
nors were in high office in government, including the 
United States Senate and one as a Secretary of the Interior, 
Those questions left unanswered by governors were 
asked of their assistants. Other questions, similar to 
those asked of the governors, were put to the assistants in 
an attempt to acquire another perspective on the relation­
ship between the executive office and the legislature. 
Specific questions about the progress of the governor's 
program were also asked, including reasons for its failure 
or success. Similarly, when possible, individuals from the 
legislative service agency were questioned concerning the 
programs of the respective governors within their state. 
Occasionally, it was possible to interview leaders of the 
state senate, or other individuals working in the senate in 
some capacity. These interviews usually focused on the
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relationship between the senate and the office of governor. 
While these interviews were not as systematically collected 
as others (since the legislature was often out of session 
and senators were generally not present), they provided in­
valuable information. Additional interviews with members 
of the capitol press corps produced information and in­
sights with regard to the governors and their programs that 
were not readily available from other sources. Information 
concerning the political environment within a state was 
also gathered in these interviews. In each state, at least 
one member of the press corps was interviewed and in most 
cases this included two or three reporters. The member of 
the capitol press corp regarded by other press people and 
politicians as the most knowledgeable and objective was 
chosen. The totality of these interviews, along with roll- 
call data, provided a large body of information useful for 
analysis of the governor's role in the legislative process.
Data Analysis
The analysis, as mentioned previously, follows two 
lines of development. First, the analysis examine the 
voting behavior of legislators quantitatively in each of 
the eight states over the two time waves. Secondly, the 
analysis focuses on each of the sixteen governors and their 
legislative performance in the selected years.
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Analysis of Voting Behavior
In order to. analyze voting behavior the Index of Party 
Likeness and Index of Party Cohesion were employed for the 
first part of the research. The former measures the simi­
larity in voting between two parties, while the latter 
measures the voting patterns within a party.
The above indices were first developed by Stuart Rice
p oin the 1920's. The Index of Party Likeness "measures the 
difference between the two groups in their responses to a 
roll call,"^^ i.e., it measures the degree of support or 
opposition of the two groups on the roll call. It is com­
puted by subtracting the percentage of yea (or nay) votes 
cast by one party from another and then subtracting the re­
sults from 100. The equation may be written as follows:
IPL = 100 - ("Party A" Percent - "Party B" Percent)
An index score of 100 reflects complete similarity, and a 
value of zero shows complete dissimilarity.
According to one source, "Rice defined cohesion as the 
extent to which the distribution of votes on a legislative
roll call deviates from the distribution that would be ex-
25pected if all influence operated in a random fashion..."
For example, if 100 votes were randomly cast, they would be 
distributed as 50 "yeas" and 50 "nays." At this 50-50 
split, cohesion is considered zero within the group. Com-
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plete cohesion would exist when all members of the group 
vote together; the score would be 100. Any division of the 
group between a 50-50 split and a total consensus would re­
sult in a score between 0 and 100. In order to determine 
the index for any group, one finds the percentage of the 
total group voting "yea" and the percentage of the total 
group voting "nay," and then takes the absolute difference 
between the two percentages, multiplying the result by 100. 
The equation for the Index of Cohesion may be written as 
follows :
I.e. = X 100
where I.C. = index of cohesion
Y = number of yea votes
N = number of nay votes
T = total number of votes
Votes were divided on the basis of gubernatorial 
interest. Votes on bills in the governor's program, votes 
to override a veto, or votes on bills later vetoed by the 
governor and votes on bills for which the governor ex­
pressed some significant concern (in favor or opposition)
were designated as gubernatorial interest votes. All votes
not falling into any one of these previous areas were 
placed in a category called "non-gubematorial interest" or 
"other."
Voting between the parties is examined first, fol» 
lowed by an analysis of voting patterns within the respec-
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tive parties. On each index, a value below 60 denotes a
26quantitative difference in the voting. For the party 
likeness index, a value below 60 indicates partisan voting, 
while on the index of cohesion a value of 60 or below indi­
cates that a party was not voting cohesively as a group. 
Material offered by governors on the importance of parti­
sanship during their respective tenure will be used to aid 
in this analysis.
Gubernatorial Success
Gubernatorial success in the legislative process is a 
secondary focus of the study. Since there is no single 
quantitative measure to analyze the governor's success and/ 
or impact, such assessments must be largely qualitative.
Any measure of success must consider the number of bills 
passed (even those which show no conflict) in proportion to 
the number introduced. Yet, this alone is too simplistic, 
since a governor's program is many-faceted. First, deter­
mining what legislation the governor sincerely supports and 
what legislation he is willing to have defeated is diffi­
cult. Second, some governors may introduce only legisla­
tion which they feel will be successfully passed; this 
false appearance of success must be taken into considera­
tion. Third, it is essential to examine the qualitative 
nature of legislation. Two different qualitative com-
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ponents must be considered: (1) the degree of similarity
between a bill as originally conceived by the governor and 
the final product, and (2) the general importance of the 
bill (e.g., tax measures will generally be considered more 
important than financing educational television).
In order to assess the above, each governor's program 
was evaluated in its entirety, seeking to determine the 
ultimate outcome of the program. The analysis also con­
sisted of examining the governor's ability to sustain 
vetoes and achieve confirmation of nominees. Finally, an 
assessment of the working relationship between the governor 
and the legislature was undertaken. While this may often 
produce findings from which generalizations are limited, 
the longitudinal design, as well as its quasi-experimental 
characteristic, enhance external validity beyond that of 
earlier studies. Furthermore, the interview schedule ad­
ministered to governors and their associates was carefully 
designed so as to improve the ability to generalize.
Hypotheses
The voting behavior of the state legislators, within
the context of their respective parties, should be quite
similar. A measure of party similarity should indicate
little party voting for the legislators since past research
27has shown that party is unimportant in one-party states.
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However, there is reason to believe that at times the 
governor may be an important cue to legislative voting and 
that his presence may result in an increase in partisan
O Qpolitics. Thus the hypothesis is that if the governor 
provides a cue for legislators in determining their votes, 
there should be a significant difference between voting be­
havior on bills of direct interest to the governor and on 
those about which he is ambivalent or unconcerned.
The degree of similarity between the parties should be 
lower on bills of interest to the governor than on bills 
seemingly unimportant to the governor. An analysis of 
party cohesion will be used to examine several hypotheses 
concerning the effects of gubernatorial interest in legis­
lation. The opposition party should display a higher level 
of cohesion in voting on bills of interest to the governor 
than on bills unrelated to the governor. This is expected 
to occur because the opposition party has a highly partisan 
interest in opposing and embarrassing the governor.
By contrast, the governor's party will reflect a more 
complex voting pattern on bills of interest to the chief 
executive. The complexity in voting is partially the re­
sult of the majority-minority status of the governor's 
party in the legislature. On bills of interest to the 
governor, members of his party will display a higher degree 
of cohesion than on bills unrelated to the governor. It is
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presumed that the governor, his office and its power, along 
with his partisan position, will encourage his party's 
legislators to support him. The resulting higher cohesion 
should reflect the potential incentives the governor can 
offer which generally outweigh any benefits the legislators 
(of the governor's own party) might gain by opposing him.
As indicated above, there is likely to be a higher 
level of cohesion found on gubernatorial votes as compared 
to other votes among the governor's party, depending on 
its majority-minority status. When the governor's party 
is the dominant party in the legislature, there should be 
a smaller increase in cohesion than when his party is in 
the minority. The expected difference should result from 
the governor with a large majority being less constrained 
to seek maximum support from his party's legislators.
The governor is in a better position to allow deviation 
among party members because he does not need full support 
to pass legislation. A high degree of cohesion for the 
governor would expend unnecessary effort and resources 
for support which he does not need. Situations where the 
governor has a minority party will show a larger increase 
in cohesion for the party since the governor needs as much 
support as possible to achieve success. The minority 
party, even when hopelessly small, should have higher co­
hesion in support of the governor out of a felt need to
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"stick together" to survive. The legislators know that the 
governor has benefits to bestow upon them (or their dis­
tricts) which are normally denied minority party members, 
and as a result they will be more cohesive than is normally 
the pattern for a minority party.
Comparative Expectations
While some hypotheses have been offered with regard to 
voting patterns within legislatures, no statements have been 
made concerning expectations across time and states. The 
focus now turns to the specific states under study, and a 
determination of patterns of voting expected within these 
states. Oregon, like North Dakota, was used to test the 
effects of having one party dominate the legislature while 
the other party continually controlled the governorship. It 
may be that a prolonged period of opposition forces the two 
branches to develop some form of a working agreement.
Little change over time in partisan voting is expected in 
these two states. Change that does occur should result in 
a decrease in partisanship. Compared with the other states 
(except Texas and Wyoming), there should be less variation 
in voting over time. Texas and Wyoming are treated as the 
"control" cases in the study. In both states the majority 
party was in constant control of the governorship. Rela­
tively low levels of party voting and few differences over
79
time are expected in these states. Under such conditions, 
it is possible to conclude that any changes in voting over 
time are due not to party but to the individual holding the 
governor's office or to particular issues. Thus, an exami­
nation of changes over time facilitates a reassessment of 
prior propositions about the importance of party.
In Florida and Idaho the dominant party generally con­
trols the governorship. Partisanship will be highest when 
the governor from the minority party enters office. As 
voting patterns of legislators between two points in time 
are compared, there should be more cohesion shown by both 
parties when the minority party is in the governor's 
office, as compared to when the governor is from the major­
ity party. Increased partisan voting, along with lower 
party likeness scores are expected, with more of this 
partisan voting occurring when the minority party holds the 
executive office.
Oklahoma and Vermont are examples of the situation 
where the governor is normally in the hands of the minority 
party. In Oklahoma, a period of Republican control of the 
governor's office was followed by a shift to partisan con­
gruence between the traditional Democratic legislature and 
the governorship. Vermont, on the other hand, had a Demo­
cratic governor followed by a brief period of Republican
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control of both branches of government. When congruence 
between two branches occurs following a period of divided 
control, the success of the governor should be greatest, 
with a spirit of new found intra-party cooperation within 
the majority. As the minority party plays the role of a 
loyal opposition in order to generate causes for the next 
campaign, it should result in a high degree of support for 
the governor by the dominant party and a lower than normal 
level of party likeness.
Organization of the Volume
In summary, the subsequent pages contain both quanti­
tative and qualitative data on executive-legislative rela­
tions in the eight states over two waves of analysis. 
Chapter Three is a brief overview of the political culture 
of each state. The political climate of the state, the 
official nature of the governor's office, and the peculari- 
ties of the legislature will aid in an understanding of 
executive-legislative relations. Such an overview is im­
portant, since the environment within which political 
actors operate has a significant impact on their behavior.
Chapter Four includes an analysis of the governor's 
effect on the voting behavior of legislators. The chapter 
relies primarily on roll-call analysis. Each governor is 
subsequently evaluated (Chapter Five) with regard to his
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success in the legislature. The concluding chapter pre­
sents a brief review of the study, a heuristic model for 
examining executive-legislative relations, and some 
thoughts about research on the governor's office.
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1. Because the governor's interest could be interpreted in 
many ways the dichotomy could have taken many forms^,. While 
several procedures are used (discussed later) to.determine a 
governor's interest, two items have generally been avoided:nom­
inations of gubernatorial appointments by the Senate are 
routinely approved and they have been excluded; secondly,
some lists of gubernatorial programs are unnecessarily 
large since they contain "housekeeping bills" (bills which 
must be introduced to aid in the performance of government 
but generally are not part of the governor's substantive 
program).
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9. Zody and Luttbeg, "An Evaluation of Various Measures of 
State Party Competition," 723.
10. The percentage was computed from data in The Book of 
the States for each of the following years: 1963, 1965,
1967, 1969, 1971, 1973. The number of seats held by a 
party out of the total possible seats was used. In some 
states there were vacancies, members from a third party, or 
individuals who did not align themselves with either party 
resulting in some circumstances where the two parties' 
percentages summed to less than 100 percent.
11. However, if one party has control for five elections 
and a second party has control of the house for the re­
maining term, the first party does not receive a value of 
20 but rather 16. Thus, a value of 16 may be achieved in 
two ways--the manner described above and when one party 
maintains control for four elections with neither party in 
control for the other two. While it seems unlikely that 
ties would occur, this was the case in a number of state 
houses during the period.
12. The actual number of points necessary in the determi­
nation of a one-party state was ±56 (twelve points in each 
house for strength of party determination plus 16 points 
for consistency in each house; twenty-eight points neces­
sary in each house to be classified one-party dominant).
13. It must be noted that after the field research in 
Oregon we learned that the Democratic majority was somewhat 
misleading and tenuous. In some of the six sessions a 
coalition was developed by conservatives in both parties to 
choose a conservative Democratic President of the Senate.
14. While Wisconsin, Colorado and New York fit in this 
cell to some degree, they were below the designated cut-off 
point in terms of party competition and, therefore, Wyoming 
was used.
15. A number of states have only one session per legisla­
ture. Secondly, while many states have more than one ses­
sion per legislature the second often requires shorter 
duration. In addition, second sessions usually are limited 
to a substantive area (i.e., the execution of the budget).
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16. More Information was provided by the governor's office 
for the 1973 session than for the 1971 legislature. In 
addition, the state legislature began to use a computer re­
trieval and record system in 1973, which aided the 
analysis.
17. In Oklahoma votes are taken for amendments as well as 
the emergency clause. In a few others, roll calls are 
taken for amendments as well as other procedural matters, 
such as a motion to table or reconsider. Each state is 
unique and an understanding of the rules is necessary.
18. Although this is an arbitrary percentage it is one 
that is often used as the criterion, see Jewell and 
Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 
p. 419.
19. While we technically met with ten governors, the 
meeting with Governor Dolph Briscoe was so short it was 
rendered useless.
20. The visit to Vermont to meet with the "sitting" gover­
nor was scheduled at a time when former Governor Deane 
Davis was out of town. However, correspondence by phone 
and letter with Davis enabled us to collect the material 
normally covered in the interview. In Oregon, an interview 
with Governor McCall was scheduled, but upon arrival at his 
office, we were informed that the governor was ill and 
unable to hold the personal interview. However, Governor 
McCall answered all of the questions within the schedule 
via a lengthy letter. In Texas, time precluded us from 
meeting with former Governor Preston Smith, but a subse­
quent phone interview provided the necessary information. 
Former Governor Kirk of Florida was the only respondent for 
which we have no personal information. Repeated attempts 
to make personal contact with the former governor failed, 
even when a tentative appointment had been made. While his 
perspective is missing, phone interviews with three former 
assistants to the governor were obtained. In addition, the 
newspaper coverage of the capitol was extensive during his 
term and this proved useful, as did a conversation with an 
individual from the capitol press corp.
21. See Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Inter­
viewing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
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was most useful to know as much about the governor as pos­
sible before the interview.
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Analysis, p. 44.
25. Ibid., p. 32.
26. Although the level is somewhat arbitrary, there is 
some precedence for it, see Jewell, The State Legislature, 
2nd ed., p. 109.
27. Patterson, "Dimensions;" Jewell and Patterson, The
Legislative Process in the United States, 2nd ed., pp. 
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28. Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the 
United States, 2nd ed., pp. 312, 462-463; Bernick and 
Hebert, "Emergent Partisanship and the Dimensions of Roll 
Call Voting;" Bernick, Legislative Voting Patterns and 
Partisan Cohesion in a One-Party Dominant Legislature.
CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICAL SETTING
There is an overarching American political system
within which the states operate;^ some argue that there is
a basic American character or culture acting upon all the
2states, that they are more similar than dissimilar. While 
the variables outside each of the state systems are in­
fluential, we are concerned in this eight-state study with 
the more immediate environments within which the legisla­
tures operate. It is very important in comparative analy­
sis to understand these immediate characteristics of the 
environment, since their minor variations may explain dif­
ferences in the functioning of state legislatures.
The underlying pattern of attitudes, knowledge, and 
actions that people have toward their government comprises
3the political culture of that system. Thus, the political 
culture constitutes the belief system that people maintain 
about what government is, how it should act, and the degree 
of success it has in the performance of its responsibili­
ties.^ This chapter examines the social and political 
culture of the eight states chosen for analysis and reviews 
the influences of the more important institutional com­
ponents of each legislature and the governor's office. It 
also examines the background of the governors under study
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and the issues which governors and legislators alike must 
solve.
Political Culture
This analysis largely draws from Daniel Elazar's 
conceptualization of political cultures in American 
states.^ He argues that there are three dominant political 
cultures: individualistic, moralistic, and traditional-
istic. If a continuum of the three were created, the 
moralistic culture would be placed at one end and the 
traditionalistic at the other. Members of the moralistic 
culture view government primarily in a positive light, with 
its major responsibility being that of promoting the com­
monwealth of the body politic (which is dependent upon the 
honesty and selflessness of people). Politics is viewed 
mostly as a duty or obligation, in an altruistic sense. 
Partisanship is generally weak, if not unimportant, in this 
type of culture. The traditionalistic culture is one where 
the role of politics is viewed as insuring the existence of 
an already established social order. Politics becomes 
custodial, conservative, paternalistic and elitist. Politi­
cal parties play a minimal role in the governmental proc­
ess. Finally, politics in the individualistic culture is 
viewed primarily as the province of the professionals who 
are oriented toward giving the people what they want rather
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than being initiators of public policies for the common 
good. Government operates as if it were a marketplace and, 
thus, a "business" orientation is predominant. Concerns 
about a "good society" are not within the domain of govern­
ment since government operates for utilitarian reasons.
After carefully observing the development and charac­
ter of the fifty states, Elazar classified each of them 
according to his three-fold typology. Like any other 
continuum, there is no easy delineation of where one cul­
ture ends and another begins; therefore, Elazar created 
additional categories of cultures based on patterns of 
dominance :
M MI IM I IT TI T TM 
While it would have been intuitively satisfying to find the 
eight states evenly spread across each of the categories or 
located in the three main classifications, there is no 
special need for this given the design of the study.^
Three of the eight states chosen for analysis (North 
Dakota, Oregon and Vermont) are classified as moralistic, 
while a fourth (Idaho) is an "MI" state, or moralistic 
dominant with a strong individualistic strain (see Figure 
3-1). It has been suggested that an individualistic cul­
ture prevails in Wyoming, along with some strong moralistic 
overtones (IM). The three remaining states (Florida, 
Oklahoma and Texas) are located toward the other end of the
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Source: Daniel J. Elazar. American Federalism: A Vew From the States, (New York; 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), p . 117.
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continuum and are categorized as traditionalistic dominant
7with some individualism present.
The fact that only one state, Wyoming, has primarily 
an individualistic culture should not be totally unex­
pected, since parties play an important role in a state 
with the individualistic culture. One of the main themes 
in previous legislative research on one-party states is 
that political parties are unimportant. As a result, one 
would expect to find such states with cultures where party 
politics is of low importance, i.e., moralistic and tradi­
tionalistic societies.
There is sufficient evidence from an analysis of each 
of the eight states to generally confirm Elazar's classifi­
cation. North Dakota, Oregon, and Vermont, in particular, 
are examples of states in which the public has been heavily 
involved in decision-making. Vermont has long had town 
meetings, amateur legislators, and large legislative
Qbodies. North Dakota's history has been strongly moralis­
tic; it has a state-owned bank, state-owned grain eleva­
tors, and a provision allowing voters to make overriding
gdecisions about any act passed by the state legislature.
Oregon's reform system, including an elaborate primary
system, initiation and petition, and high voter participa-
10tion all demonstrate its moralistic character.
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Wyoming ' s rej ection until recently of any federal aid 
for education, along with a general attitude of self-reli­
ance and the denial of governmental interference in the
activities of the individual are all characteristics of an
11individualistic state.
Conflict centered within rather than between parties 
is characteristic of a traditional political culture; this
is evident within the dominant political party of Florida,
12Texas, and Oklahoma. The power centers are still largely
controlled by a small dominant minority supported and
maintained by a few major (and mostly economically-based)
13interest groups within these states.
A key feature of a political system's socio-economic 
environment (see Table 3-1) believed to be relevant to 
policy making is the degree of urbanism. States which are 
basically rural in their population have a different set of 
demands placed upon decision-making agencies than those 
with large urban c e n t e r s . U n t i l  the mid-1960's, most 
state legislatures were controlled by rural minorities, and 
the prevailing argument was that they were unsympathetic to 
urban problems and refused to respond to urban demands.
The implication was that an urban-rural conflict affected 
the entire legislative process.
While two of our states--Texas and Florida--rank 
fairly high on most measures of size and urbanism, they are














Calif. 19,953 90.9 Conn. 63 N.Y. 87 Nev. 1
N.Y. 18,241 85.6 Iowa 61 Calif. 70 Calif. 2
Penn. 11,793 71.5 Kans. 60 111. 68 Wyo. 3
Tex. 11,196 79.7 Mass. 60 N.J. 65 Colo. 4
111. 11,114 83.0 Nebr. 60 Mass. 62 Oreg. 5
Ohio 10,652 75.3 N.H. 59 Tex. 62 Wash. 6
Mich. 8,875 73.8 Utah 59 Penn. 61 Mont. 7
N.J. 7,168 88.9 Wise. 59 Ohio 60 Nebr, 8
Fla. 6,789 80.5 Ind. 58 Fla. 59 Kans. 9
Mass. 5,689 84.6 Minn. 58 Md. 57 Utah 10
Ind. 5,194 64.9 N.J. 58 Mo. 57 Conn. 11
N.C. 5,082 45.0 R.I. 58 Mich. 56 Del. 12
Mo. 4,677 70.1 S . Dak. 58 Colo. 54 Idaho 13
Va. 4,648 63.1 Idaho 57 Conn. 53 Fla. 14
^Population is listed in thousands. Source of data: U.S. Department of Com­
merce, Bureau of the Census, 1970, U.S. Census of Population, Vol.l, U.S. Summary.
^Alaska and Hawaii were not used in Crittedon's analysis nor in the Hofferbert 
research.
^John Crittenden's "Dimensions of Modernization in the American States," 
American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), p. 998; the values are the factor 
scores assigned to the states.JRichard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 
1890-1960," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (1968), 412; the states are 









State (000) Urban Message Factor Factor ment Factor
Ga. 4,590 60.1 Ohio 57 Ga. 52 Iowa 15
Wise. 4,418 65.9 N . Dak. 56 La. 52 Ariz. 16
Tenn. 3,924 58.7 Oreg. 56 Wise. 52 Minn. 17
Md. 3,922 76.6 Vt. 56 Wash. 52 N.Y. 18
Minn. 3,805 66.4 Colo. 56 Minn. 51 N.J. 19
La. 3,643 66.1 Del. 56 Va. 51 Mass. 20
Ala. 3,444 58.4 Mich. 56 Tenn. 50 111. 21
Wash. 3,409 72.6 Mont. 56 Okla. 50 Ohio 22
Ky. 3,219 52.3 111. 55 Nev. 49 Mich. 23
Conn. 3,032 77.4 Penn. 55 Ind. 49 N . Mex. 24
Iowa 2,825 57.2 Wyo.
Maine
55 Kans. 48 S . Dak. 25
S. C. 2,591 47.6 54 Ariz. 48 Okla. 26
Okla. 2,559 68.0 Wash. 54 Ala. 48 Tex. 27
Kans. 2,249 66.1 Calif. 52 R.I. 47 Ind. 28
Miss. 2,217 44.5 Md. 51 Nebr. 47 Md. 29
Colo. 2,207 78.5 Mo. 51 Oreg. 47 N.H. 30
Oreg. 2,091 67.1 Nev. 50 Iowa 45 N . Dak. 31
Ark. 1,923 50.0 W. Va. 46 Miss. 45 Wise. 32
Arix. 1,771 79.6 Okla. 46 Utah 44 Penn. 33
W. Va. 1,744 39.0 N.Y. 46 N . Mex. 43 M o . 34
Nebr. 1,484 61.5 Va. 43 Mont. 43 Vt. 35
Utah 1,059 80.4 Ariz. 43 Ky. 43 R.I. 36N . Mex. 1,016 69.8 Ky. 43 N. C. 43 Maine 37
Maine 994 50.8 N . Mex. 42 Ark. 42 Va. 38
R.I. 950 87.1 Tenn. 39 Del. 42 Ky. 39















Idaho 713 54.1 N. C. 37 Wyo. 42 Ga. 41
Mont. 694 53.4 Fla. 37 W. Va. 41 Tenn. 42
N.H. 738 56.4 Ga. 34 N.H. 40 La . 43
S . Dak. 666 44.6 Ala. 33 Maine 38 Ark. 44
N . Dak. 618 44.3 Ark. 32 S . Dak. 37 Ala. 45
Del. 548 72.2 S. C. 32 N . Dak. 36 N. C. 46
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the only ones with such characteristics in the study. 
Vermont and North Dakota, on the other hand, are two of the 
most rural states in the Union--indeed, Vermont has the 
lowest percent of people living in urban centers of all the 
fifty states.
While all eight states studied may not reflect a wide 
diversity with regard to population, they represent a broad 
cross-section of the country (see Table 3-1). Crittendon's 
"Integrative Message Exchange Factor" and "Metro-Urbanism 
Factor," along with Hofferbert's "Cultural Enrichment 
Factor" were found to be related to legislative capabili­
ties by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. The 
correlation between these three factors and the Citizens 
Conference's overall ranking of legislative performance was 
.314, .375 and .424, respectively.^^ Education, income, 
good housing, extent of telephones and television coverage 
all loaded high on the integrative message exchange factor; 
in general, the factor is indicative of high levels of 
literacy, standards of living and complex communication 
networks. Hofferbert's cultural enrichment or affluence 
factor is quite similar to the integrative message exchange 
with education, property values, and income all loading 
high. However, the Hofferbert factor weighs income and 
wealth more than the integrative-exchange factor. On both, 
the states studied here are not particularly biased along
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any one segment of the factors. Thus, diversity in social 
characteristics are indicated by the rankings across all 
levels of the factors. Crittendon's metro-urbanism factor 
measured population, ethnic diversity, and urbanization, as 
well as other elements that can be found in large metro­
politan communities. As noted in the preceding paragraph, 
the chosen states are less populous and more rural. How­
ever, Texas and Florida rank among the top ten on this 
factor, with Oklahoma and Oregon falling somewhere in the 
middle of the rankings. These factors were considered im­
portant because of their ability to define the fifty 
states' social and cultural make-up.
Institutional Traits of Legislatures
State legislatures are dynamic institutions undergoing 
rather rapid change, especially within the last fifteen 
years. Any description, then, is only a momentary one 
which cannot capture the legislature over the entire
IQspan. This description seeks only to offer a brief por­
trayal of the legislatures in order to facilitate the 
reader's understanding of the legislative process.
While it is obvious that these eight states are not 
representative of all fifty with regard to population, they 
are quite representative with regard to legislative charac­
teristics. The size of the senates are rather normal, with
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thirty being the smallest (Oregon. Vermont and Wyoming) and 
fifty-one (North Dakota) the largest (ëee tablé . fed­
erally, the senates are small and within the size limit that
19the Citizens Conference deemed manageable.
Another important element is the time period available 
to the legislature to conduct its affairs. The complexity 
of government, reformers contend, requires full time legis­
lators. As with most of the other states in the Union, 
there has been a trend toward annual legislative sessions 
by these eight states. In 1967, Oklahoma was the only one 
which had annual sessions, but three additional states had 
gone to annual sessions (Florida, Idaho, and Wyoming) by 
the end of the period of study (1973). The four remaining 
states have largely circumvented any constitutional re­
straints on the number and length of sessions by utilizing 
various procedures. Oregon and Texas usually conduct spe­
cial sessions, while Vermont subverts the requirements for
a single session by not adjourning sine die but rather to a
20specified day in the following year. Only the North 
Dakota legislature conducts its business in a single bi­
ennial session. The states in this study appear to realize 
that they can no longer manage effectively and responsively 
when their legislative branch meets for only sixty days 
every other year.












Florida 120 40 odd annual 3925 953 officers yes
Idaho 70 35 odd annual 660 365 no no
North
Dakota 102 51 odd odd 1072 611 no yes
Oklahoma 101 48 annual annual 874 356 no no
Oregon 60 30 odd odd 1911 781 no yes
Texas 150 31 odd odd 2928 1067 no no
Vermont 150 30 odd annual^ 446 136 no yes
Wyoming 62 30 odd annual 692 270 no yes
VO
00
1973 was used as the base year in the determination of size.
^This information was collected for 1971 from the Council of State Governments, 
The Book of States: 1972-1973 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1972), pp. 74-75.
^Normally, only the governor may call a special session but there are states 
where legislatures can convene a special session. In Florida the session may be 
convened by a joint call of the presiding officers of both the houses.
*^This refers to the ability of the legislature to determine subject matter to 
be discussed in the special session. We have listed yes for Wyoming but there is a 
constitutional question regarding that which has not been tested.
Vermont divides sessions in order to meet in even years.
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For a larger state, the requirements to meet frequent­
ly are more crucial. As one might expect, the larger 
states generally have a greater volume of legislation 
introduced per session than the smaller states (see Table 
3-2). The Texas and Florida legislatures have a phenomenal 
number of bills to study--usually over 4,000 for Florida 
and in excess of 2,000 for Texas--while Vermont and Wyoming 
have a much smaller work load, with bill introductions be­
tween 500 and 750. There is evidence that the work load 
(in terms of bill introductions) for these eight states is 
generally lighter than the norm for all states.
Legislative Performance
While the legislatures may be small and the work load 
light, this cannot be directly related to their capability. 
In an exhaustive and detailed study of the fifty states, 
the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL) ranked 
each of the states according to five categories of per­
formance (FAIIR): (1) functionalism, (2) accountability,
(3) information-handling, (4) independence, and (5) repre­
sentativeness. It then established a composite final rank
for each state, which was based on the aggregate of the
21component rank scores. The CCSL defined a functional 
legislature in terms of its potential for carrying out
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activities basic to the legislative process, including bill 
drafting and deliberations.
Accountability is conceptualized by the CCSL as having 
both internal and external dimensions. The former refers 
to power held within the legislature and the extent to 
which it is relatively unrestrained. In addition, it takes 
into account the individual legislator’s ability to func­
tion effectively within that power structure. External 
accountability refers to the complexity of the structures 
and procedures, and the ability of the public to understand 
the actions of the legislature. However, a system that was 
comprehensible on paper but not open to the public in 
actuality would be lacking accountability; therefore, 
public access is a basic accountability requirement.
A legislature's information-handling capacity is based 
upon its ability to systematically collect, analyze and 
apply data. A salient requisite is that information should 
be gathered independently of interest groups and executive 
agencies. This allows the legislature to function as a 
place of review and oversight. The amount of time availa­
ble to study the information as well as the size and spe­
cialization of the legislative staff, are important aspects 
of a legislature's information-handling capacity.
101
Legislative independence is characterized by a high 
degree of autonomy for the legislature, including the 
ability to determine its own destiny (e.g., the duration 
and frequency of sessions).
The structure and procedures that allow a member to 
act effectively, the diversity of membership (demographi- 
cally), and constituent identification (including single­
member districts and one-man/one-vote) are all components 
of the representative scale.
Where do the eight states treated in this analysis 
fall with regard to the FAIIR criteria taken individually 
or collectively? An examination of the data in Table 3-3 
shows no major clustering of the eight states at any single 
point; rather, a distribution of the states across all 
ranks is evident. The Florida legislature is at the most 
desired end of the rankings, placing fourth overall and 
first in independence. Only a rather low ranking (30th) in 
representativeness detracts from its overall positive 
assessment. Oklahoma and Idaho assemblies stand 14th and 
18th respectively in overall ranking, which places them 
well above the median. Oklahoma's position is the result 
of its functionalism (9th) and representativeness (8th), 
which were considerably above the rest of its rankings (the 
remaining three cluster around the median). The Idaho
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Account Inform. Ind. Rep.
1 California 1 3 2 3 2
2 New York 4 13 1 8 1
3 Illinois 17 4 6 2 13
4 Florida 5 8 4 1 30
5 Wisconsin 7 21 3 4 10
6 Iowa 6 6 5 11 25
7 Hawaii 2 11 20 7 16
8 Michigan 15 22 9 12 3
9 Nebraska 35 1 16 30 18
10 Minnesota 27 7 13 23 12
11 New Mexico 3 16 28 39 4
12 Alaska 8 29 12 6 40
13 Nevada 13 10 19 14 32
14 Oklahoma 9 27 24 22 8
15 Utah 38 5 8 29 24
16 Ohio 18 24 7 40 9
17 South Dakota 23 12 15 16 37
18 Idaho 20 9 29 27 21
19 Washington 12 17 25 19 39
20 Maryland 16 31 10 15 45
21 Pennsylvania 37 23 23 5 36
22 North Dakota 22 18 17 37 31
23 Kansas 31 15 14 32 34
24 Connecticut 39 26 26 25 6
25 West Virginia 10 32 37 24 15
26 Tennessee 30 44 11 9 26
27 Oregon 28 14 35 35 19




Rank State Funct. Account Inform. Ind. Rep.
29 Massachusetts 32 35 22 21 23
30 Maine 29 34 32 18 22
31 Kentucky 49 2 48 44 7
32 New Jersey 14 42 18 31 35
33 Louisiana 47 39 33 13 14
34 Virginia 25 19 27 26 48
35 Missouri , 36 30 40 49 5
36 Rhode Island 33 46 30 41 11
37 Vermont 19 20 34 42 47
38 Texas 45 36 43 45 17
39 New Hampshire 34 33 42 36 43
40 Indiana 44 38 41 43 20
41 Montana 26 28 31 46 49
42 Mississippi 46 43 45 20 28
43 Arizona 11 47 38 17 50
44 South Carolina 50 45 39 10 46
45 Georgia 40 49 36 33 38
46 Arkansas 41 40 46 34 33
47 North Carolina 24 37 44 47 44
48 Delaware 43 48 47 38 29
49 Wyoming 42 41 50 48 42
50 Alabama 48 50 49 50 41
Source: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. State 
Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness (New 
York: Praeger, 1971), p. 40.
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Legislature ranks very high on accountability (9th) and 
much lower on the other four scales.
North Dakota (22nd) and Oregon (27th) have great 
variations in their scores. The information level and the 
accountability of the North Dakota legislature are above 
its overall rank and tend to balance out the rather low 
levels of independence (37th) and representativeness 
(31st). The Oregon assembly rates as more accountable and 
representative than one would expect from its overall rank­
ing, but is lower on independence and information.
Vermont (37th), Texas (38th), and Wyoming (49th) have 
rankings which cannot make any informed citizen of these 
states proud. If it were not for the relatively high rank­
ing (17th) on representativeness, Texas would be even 
lower. Vermont's poor position is in large part due to in­
adequate compensation, lack of office space and materials, 
and a lower house which is one of the largest (150 mem­
bers) . In addition, the "town meeting" heritage which is 
so strong in New England has resulted in a perpetuation of
multi-member districts in Vermont, another feature which
22the Citizens Conference criticized.
The Wyoming legislature ranks uniformly low across all 
five categories. However, since the study was conducted, a 
number of major changes have taken place to significantly 
alter the Wyoming legislative process. The legislature has
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gone to annual sessions rather than the previous constitu­
tionally limited forty-day biennial session. Perhaps more
important to the development of the Wyoming legislature has
23been the creation of a legislative research agency.
Prior to the research agency's formation, both chambers of 
the legislature had only two attorneys to assist in re­
search and bill drafting, which forced it to be dependent 
upon outside interest groups and state a g e n c i e s . S t u ­
dents of Wyoming politics have noted a new sense of inde­
pendence among solons with the formation of a professional­
ly staffed service agency.
In sum, a variety of qualities are represented in the 
legislatures examined in this study, with four above the 
national median and four below in terms of overall legisla­
tive performance. If these states were closely grouped on 
the FAIIR rankings, we could not easily draw distinctions 
in their capabilities. However, one can say that those 
states ranked in the top twenty are better able to carry 
out their legislative functions than those ranked in the 
lower twenty. A state's ranking may be important to sub­
sequent analysis, since there is a potential for the gover­
nor or his office to exert more influence in the legisla­
tive process because of a legislature's weak position.
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Legislative Independence and Gubernatorial Power
Legislatures dependent upon the governor's office are
in a weak position to evaluate the legislative program of a
chief executive. However, Declercq suggests that the
governor and the legislature may not necessarily play a
zero-sum game in their relationship, since both may have
26independent sources of powers. It is not necessarily
true that the legislature must be deficient if the governor
has an above average number of formal prerogatives. Thus,
the governor and the legislature may both possess power
27without endangering the other branch's power. However, a 
legislature which is knowingly weak (defined here as lack of 
independence) must be at the mercy of any power source, espe­
cially if that power is of direct concern to the legisla­
ture. A legislature in such a position reacts to the de­
mands, wishes, and influences of that source of power (the 
governor) very differently than a legislature with a great 
deal of independence. Declercq measured "legislative in­
dependence" using raw data collected from the 1970 Citizens 
Conference Study. The scale "is simply the summation of
state scores on twelve criteria relevant to independ- 
28ence." Using the scale of legislative independence 
created by Declercq, one finds that only Florida and Oregon 
are above the mean scale of 4.8, with scale scores of 6.0
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and 5.9 respectively (see Table 3-4). All of the remaining 
six states fall below the mean, with Vermont having the 
lowest scale score of all fifty states (1.0). This sug­
gests that Oregon and Florida can compete with the gover­
nor's office, while one must expect the governor to play a 
rather dominant role in the other six states.
Gubernatorial dominance might exist in most states if
all governors possessed an equal amount of power and that
power was uniformly high. However, just as the states vary
among themselves with regard to legislative independence,
they also differ in the power possessed by the governor's
office. To examine the variation in gubernatorial power,
this study will use the most widely known scale created by
29Joseph Schlesinger. Schiesinger created an ordinal rank­
ing of the formal powers of the governor's office in the 
fifty states in a combined index. He saw four formal 
powers--appointive power, tenure potential, budgeting re­
sponsibility, and veto capabilities--as being essential to 
a governor and, thus, created scales for each of these.
The values were summed to derive a combined index (see 
Table 3-5).
Perhaps the two most important indicies of the four, 
at least with respect to the governor as "chief legis­
lator," are the power to formulate the budget and the power 
to veto legislation, since they both directly relate to the
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Source: Eugene R. Declercq, Gubernatorial Power and Legis­
lative Independence in the Fifty States, a paper presented 
at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political. Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1975.
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Table 3-5. Combined Index of the Formal Powers of the 
Governors































State Schlesinger's Score Declercq's Score
New Hampshire 11 12
New Jersey 19 19
New Mexico 10 10
New York 20 20
North Carolina 10 10





Rhode Island 11 12
South Carolina 8 8







West Virginia 8 14
Wisconsin 15 14
Wyoming 17 18
Source: Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Execu­
tive," in Politics in the American States, 2nd ed., by, 
Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971), p. 232; Eugene R. Declercq, Gubernatorial 
Power and Legislative Independence in the Fifty States, a 
paper presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1975.
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governor's attempt to get his program passed or legislation 
defeated which he opposes. The budget is almost always an 
expression of the governor's policy toward programs--old 
and new. The governors in the eight states have been in a 
relatively strong position concerning budget preparation, 
with only the Texas governor having to share his responsi­
bility with the legislature. Less uniformity is exhibited 
in the veto power of governors in the eight states. The 
governor in Vermont has no item veto and only a two-thirds 
majority of the legislators present is required to over­
ride. Florida, Idaho, Oregon and Texas all give the gover­
nor the item veto, but only a two-thirds majority of the 
legislators present is necessary for an override. In North 
Dakota the governor is in a stronger position, since two- 
thirds of the elected legislators are necessary to pass 
legislation over the governor's veto. The Oklahoma gover­
nor has powers similar to those in North Dakota, including 
an item veto and the two-thirds elected requirement. How­
ever, there is one occasion when an additional burden is 
placed upon the Oklahoma legislature. If legislation has 
the emergency clause attached to it, the necessary number 
to overcome the veto is three-fourths. Since Schlesinger's 
scale was originally created in 1968, there have been 
several updates of the index. One of the revisions, car­
ried out by Declercq, found that 27 states changed in their
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overall scores to some degree since 1968, yet a rank order
correlation between his index and Schlesinger's resulted in
30a Spearman's coefficient of .89. Using Declercq revised 
computations, we find that Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon and 
Wyoming rank high (above the mid-point) on gubernatorial 
power, while Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont and Florida rank low.
The integration of gubernatorial powers and legisla­
tive independence results in an interesting structure, as 
can be seen in Table 3-6. It was Declercq's reasoning that 
where one branch has a great deal of power and the other 
very little, the former will play the dominant role in 
their relationship. Thus, cell 2 has the governor domi­
nant, while those states in cell 3 have a system where the 
legislature is expected to be in control. Cells 1 and 4 
present an entirely different situation, since it is un­
clear which branch of government is the more powerful. In 
cell 1 neither of the institutions are highly developed 
(both have low power index scores), while in cell 4 both 
branches have a great deal of potential for power; thus, we 
are left with uncertainty regarding which institution will 
be the most influential. Unfortunately, the eight states 
chosen by other criteria in the quasi experimental design 
are dispersed among all four cells (see Table 3-6). In a 
later chapter (V) the study will examine the relationship 
of the two branches as depicted in Table 3-6.
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Formal powers are not the only influence mechanisms 
available to governors, nor are they employed uniformly by 
all governors. Equally important are the informal tools of 
the governor discussed in Chapter I. In addition, the 
governor's personality and background play an integral role 
in his relationship with the legislature. Therefore, a few 
brief comments are in order regarding the background of the 
individuals who held the office of governor during the 
period under study. Table 3-7 lists all of the governors 
who presided over the eight states during the time period, 
with those utilized in the study designated by an asterisk. 
In all, 22 individuals held the office, with Florida having 
the most governors (4), and North Dakota, Oregon and 
Wyoming the least (2).
Service in the legislature can be very advantageous to 
a governor, since one should gain a better understanding of 
the legislative process. In addition, building friendships 
within the legislature can be important for a former legis­
lator who goes on to become governor, since he may be able 
to use these personal associations to assist in the passage 
of a legislative program. While friendships may prove 
valuable, they may also be detrimental if a governor shows 
too much deference to the branch with which he was formerly
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Table 3-7. Governors of States 1963-1973
State Governor Party Years
Florida Farris Bryant D 1/61-1/65
Haydon Burns D 1/65-1/67
*Claude R. Kirk, Jr.* R 1/67-1/71
*Reubin O'D Askew D 1/71-
Idaho Robert E . Smylie R 1/55-1/67
*Donald W. Samuelson R 1/67-1/71
*Cecil D. Andrus D 1/71-
North Dakota *William L. Guy D 1/61-1/73
*Arthur A. Link D 1/73-
Oklahoma Henry L. Bellmon R 1/63-1/67
*Dewey F. Bartlett R 1/67-1/71
*David Hall D 1/71-1/75
Oregon Mark 0. Hatfield R 1/59-1/67
*Tom McCall R 1/67-1/75
Texas John B. Connally D 1/63-1/69
*Preston Smith D 1/69-1/73
*Dolph Briscoe D 1/73-
Vermont Philip H. Hoff D 1/63-1/69
*Deane C. Davis R 1/69-1/73
*Thomas P . Salmon D 1/73-
Wyoming Clifford P. Hansen R 1/63-1/67
^Stanley K. Hathaway R 1/67-1/75
^ASTERISK indicates that governor was used in the re-
search.
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affiliated. Of the fourteen governors used in the study, 
nine served previously in the legislature; only five did 
not (Davis of Vermont, Hathaway of Wyoming, Kirk of 
Florida, McCall of Oregon, and Hall of Oklahoma). Five of 
the nine governors who served in their respective legisla­
tures had relatively little legislative experience.
Dewey Bartlett, a state senator from Tulsa County with 
oil and ranching interests, became the second Republican 
governor in Oklahoma history, running on a "no new tax" 
platform. His legislative experience, though short, was 
important when he became governor because of his ties to 
leaders in both houses. Governors Briscoe (Texas) and Guy 
(North Dakota) also had little legislative experience prior 
to their election as governors. Briscoe served briefly in 
the Texas legislature in the 1950*s before returning to his 
ranching and banking interests in West Texas. In 1968, he 
unsuccessfully tried for the gubernatorial office and was 
defeated in the primary. Then, in 1972, with scandals sur­
rounding many of the power holders in Texas politics, in­
cluding Governor Smith (the Sharpstown Scandal), he won a 
31narrow victory.
William Guy, at 41 and with only two years of legisla­
tive experience, won North Dakota's 1960 gubernatorial 
race, defeating a much older candidate, C. P. Dahl, who had 
been the lieutenant governor for a number of years. Much
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of the groundwork for his victory was laid in the U.S. 
Senatorial race won by Quentin Burdick in June. The victo­
ry in June and then in November was the culmination of a 
new coalition between the Democratic party and the Non- 
Partisan League (NPL). Guy's twelve years was the longest
period any individual held the office of governor in North
32Dakota history. Both Cecil Andrus and Don Samuelson 
served in the Idaho Senate and twice ran against each other 
for governor. In 1966, Don Samuelson, taking advantage of 
several political circumstances, beat the formidable Re­
publican incumbent (Governor Robert Smylie) in the pri-
O Omary. Andrus was a late entry in the governor's race 
when the Democratic party's original candidate died in a 
plane c r a s h . H i s  late entry, plus previous support for a 
recently passed sales tax, was a severe handicap against 
Samuelson (who had voted against the tax). However, in 
1970, Andrus faced Samuelson in a rematch and narrowly de­
feated him. The election in 1970 was characterized as an
election of life style, with Andrus being an environ- 
3*5mentalist.
In contrast to the preceding governors, Askew 
(Florida), Solomon (Vermont), Link (North Dakota), and 
Smith (Texas) had significant service in the legislature. 
Governor Preston Smith of Texas, besides serving as a 
legislator for a number of years, also served as lieutenant
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governor. In Texas, the Lieutenant Governor plays a vital 
role in the Senate and is not merely the titular leader. 
Thus, Smith's six years of service in that position appear
to have been significant for his subsequent position as
36governor. The other three governors served at various
times as leaders of their parties in the legislature. 
Solomon was minority party leader in the Vermont house, 
while Link was house speaker the only time the Democrats 
controlled either chamber of the North Dakota assembly
since 1963, and served in Congress prior to his election as
37Governor. Governor Askew served in the legislature from
1958 until his election in 1970, and had won several awards 
for his work in the state senate. In addition, he pre­
viously served as president pro tempore of the Florida 
Senate during his tenure in that body.
Five governors had no service in the legislature. 
However four of the five had prior political experience of 
some kind. Probably the most experienced was Deane Davis 
of Vermont, who had served as a judge and long time Re­
publican party worker (e.g., national committeeman).
Davis, in his late sixties when he became governor, was a 
wealthy retired insurance executive. He sought to bring 
his business management skills to the executive office of 
state government. In contrast to Davis's experience,v 
Claude Kirk of Florida was a political novice who capital-
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ized on increased crime in Florida. While David Hall had 
not served in the legislature, he held public office in 
Tulsa County (district attorney), and had run unsuccess­
fully for governor in 1966. Stanley Hathaway, a University 
of Wyoming-educated lawyer, had never run for a major 
office before beating his Democrat opponent easily in 1966, 
winning all but three of the state's counties. His victory 
overcame a general constraint to discuss issues placed upon 
the campaign as the result of the sitting governor's de- 
cision--a Republican cohort--to run for the U.S. Senate.
Any negative comments by Hathaway (especially about the 
very poor economic situation within the state) would be 
politically dangerous both for him and the governor, 
Clifford Hansen.
Prior to being elected as Oregon's Secretary of State 
in 1964, Tom McCall had been a political analyst for a 
television station in Portland, a position which served him 
well as governor. Although Republican McCall served a 
rather undistinguished term as secretary of state, he had 
considerable popularity with the people of Oregon. Oregon­
ians perceived him and his opponent, Robert Straub (the 
state treasurer), as being quite similar--honest, dedi­
cated, and competent public servants. This situation dic­
tated McCall's major campaign strategy of avoiding direct
O Qconflict with Straub, since it could only lose him votes.
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In 1970, McCall won reelection, handily defeating Straub 
again in an issueless campaign. In sum, all of the gover­
nors studied except Kirk had some political experience 
which they could draw upon in their use of the formal and 
informal powers of the chief executive's office vis a vis 
the legislature.
Issue Configurations
The actors in the executive-legislative process do not 
perform in a vacuum, but rather in an atmosphere where de­
mands, supports, and expectations of what government should 
or should not do are continually being transmitted to them. 
These inputs are defined by the issues relevant to the 
times.
In surveying the issues that concerned the state 
legislatures over the two waves of analysis, two interest­
ing patterns emerged. First, there was a great deal of 
similarity in the general "issue areas” across all the 
states; and, secondly, there were a number of issues which 
showed an unusual amount of consistency across the two time
periods. One problem area confronting most legislatures
39during the late 1960's was highway legislation. In the 
1970's, environmental issues became a topic of concern in 
most of the states. Oregon, and later Vermont, passed 
legislation banning "non-retumables," while Wyoming
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created an Environmental Quality Department, as did other 
s t a t e s . A n o t h e r  popular subject in the 1970's was land- 
use planning--a subject under study in Oregon, Vermont, and 
Idaho. A fourth subject of concern for all the states at 
some time period was reform of the criminal justice system. 
Depending upon the state, the reform focused on one or all 
of the following subjects: penal institutions, enlarging
and modernizing the court structure, and rewriting the 
criminal code. Oklahoma's 1967 session, for example, was 
immersed in judicial reform activities amidst one of 
the worst scandals in the state's history, with several 
supreme court justices being implicated in illegal activi- 
ties."
Meanwhile, there were three subject areas which 
transcended time and states--government reorganization, 
education, and taxation. Reorganization usually centered 
around modernizing the executive branch, including the re­
duction or consolidation of agencies. In addition, in­
cluded under the rubric of reorganization are demands for 
improvements of the legislative branch (including annual 
sessions, size reductions, and better staffing) and con­
stitutional revisions. Education, next to taxes, was 
probably the area most studied by legislatures. The 
public's expectation of a quality educational program for 
anyone who desires to go to school (and is qualified) has
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placed continuing demands upon legislators. Proposals, 
ranging from instituting kindergartens, establishing four 
year colleges, and increasing emphasis on vocational train­
ing, were seen throughout the eight states. In addition, 
increased salaries and collective bargaining for teachers 
were also topics of legislative concern. Lastly, the 
states were being strongly urged by local governmental 
officials to accept a larger burden for financing the en­
tire educational program. Spiraling increases in property 
taxes and court decisions surrounding their use as a means 
of financing primary and secondary educational systems in­
flamed the property tax controversy.
The problem of the property tax has been a source of 
contention for many states, forcing legislatures to spend 
vast amounts of time searching for new sources of revenue. 
Legislatures have devoted considerable energy to find ways 
for financing government without imposing new taxes or in­
creasing existing ones. Some governors have had to promise 
that no new taxes would be imposed as part of their pro­
gram. They considered themselves successful if the legis­
lature did not pass a bill increasing tax burdens. More­
over, some governors and legislatures have sought to give 
tax relief (especially to the elderly).
During the period of analysis a new oil and gas tax 
was established in Oklahoma, accompanied by revisions in
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already existing income tax structures in Oklahoma and 
Oregon. A corporate tax was created in Florida and 
approved by the people. Sales taxes were written into law 
in Idaho, Vermont and Oregon, although in Oregon it was 
later rejected by the people. While these were being 
implemented, relief from taxes came in many forms, includ­
ing assistance on personal property taxes (North Dakota-- 
later defeated by the people), the removal of the inventory 
tax (Vermont and Idaho), increased property tax credits 
(Vermont, North Dakota, and Wyoming), and the exemption of 
certain items from sales taxes. Anyone studying state 
legislatures over time must conclude that legislators were 
indeed like Don Quixote, tilting with windmills in their 
attempt to solve the financial and educational problems of 
their states.
Summary
We have taken a brief glimpse at the political setting 
within which the legislative and executive actors must 
participate. The eight states under study fall into two 
cultures (with one exception)--moralistic and tradition- 
alistic. Although these states are not skewed on several 
indicies, they tend to represent social structures more 
rural than average. At the same time, the relative ranking 
of the states on the Citizen's Conference schedule of
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capability occurs across all levels. The governor's formal 
and informal powers, as well as the legislature's potential 
powers were examined, and a variety of possible power rela­
tionships were uncovered. Since formal powers are not 
assumed to be the only factor in the executive’s relation­
ship with the legislature, the background of each of the 
governors was briefly examined. Most of the governors had 
experience in the legislature (only five did not and only 
one had never run for any public office). A final component 
of the political setting drew attention to the issues faced 
by both the legislature and the governor. While there were 
several temporary local concerns in each state, three main 
subjects displayed continuity: governmental reorganization,
education, and taxes.
Attention now turns to an analysis of executive-legis­
lative relations, first examining the voting behavior of 
legislatures and the governor's influence.
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CHAPTER IV
GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE ON ROLL CALL VOTING
The preceding chapters have provided the background 
and outlined the methodology to be used in the analysis of 
executive-legislative relations. This chapter focuses on 
patterns of voting among legislators and the effect of the 
governor upon those patterns. Does the governor make a 
difference in the way legislators vote, and if so, what 
patterns in voting emerge because of it? Similarity in 
voting for the two political parties across all the ses­
sions will first be examined, using the Index of Party 
Likeness. Votes on the basis of gubernatorial interest 
will then be identified and analyzed to further determine 
if partisan voting is the result of influence from the 
chief executive. Finally, the analysis will turn toward 
the influence of the governor on each legislative party by 
analyzing the cohesion within each party.
Several preliminary comments regarding the analysis 
and adjustments in the design are necessary at the outset. 
Texas has not been used in the roll call analysis as pre-r 
viously designed; furthermore, the analysis of the desig­
nated legislative sessions is supplemented with "special 
sessions" for several states. Texas has been excluded be­
cause of the size of the minority party and difficulties in
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the data collection. The Republican party's representation 
in the Texas Senate has been so small (three senators in 
1969 and three in 1973) that calculation of the Index of 
Party Likeness and the Index of Party Cohesion is unrelia­
ble.^ In addition, while a brief phone interview was con­
ducted with former Governor Preston Smith, we were unable 
to identify in concrete terms the contents of his program. 
The conversations with individuals working in and around 
Texas state government in Austin were somewhat helpful, but 
not definitive enough about Smith's program. Newspaper 
accounts can be confusing since many of the major programs, 
including the financing of education, came from mixed 
origins. As is often the case in working with this type of 
data, it is hard to delineate who really introduced what 
and for whom. In addition, the extent to which the gover­
nor actually pushes for part of his program is difficult to 
determine. Are endorsements from a governor given the same 
weight as proposals? In Wyoming, for example, there is a
definite distinction according to former Governor 
2Hathaway.
The second wave of analysis in Texas was no easier to 
accomplish and, therefore, was also excluded. The legisla­
tive assistant for Governor Briscoe noted in a personal 
interview, for example, that the governor's office does not 
really draw up any legislation. They have been "reactors"
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rather than "initiators.” He further noted that once all 
the bills have been introduced in the legislature and 
studied, "I will know which bill we agree with and if we 
don't agree with it, we will draw up some committee sub­
stitutes .
Members of the press corps in Austin substantiated 
this process, noting that it was almost impossible to de­
termine what comprised the governor's program.^ The main 
goal of the governor was to forestall any legislation in­
creasing the tax burden of the people of Texas. It should 
also be noted that the governor of Texas has very weak 
constitutional powers and that the real power may well rest 
with the Speaker of the House and the President of the
5Senate.
The use of "special sessions" is, indeed, important to 
study because special sessions have been cited as a tool 
used by governors to influence legislatures. "The governor 
in calling a special session centers the attention of the 
state on the problem or problems for which the session is 
called and thus places the legislature in the position of 
either acting on these proposals in the manner in which the 
governor suggests or taking the political consequences..."^ 
Most of the states during the period of study did not have 
a special session, or the sessions were of such limited 
scope and duration as to make them inappropriate for use.
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The analysis of special sessions will be confined to four 
sessions in two states: Oregon (1967 and 1974), and 
Florida (1967 and 1971).
Party Similarity
The Index of Party Likeness is used as a measure of 
the extent to which parties play a role in the determina­
tion of how legislators vote. A low value (below 60) for 
this index indicates little similarity in voting between 
the parties.^ Conversely, high scores indicate a degree of 
uniformity in voting between members of the two parties 
which would not be present if the parties were a voting 
cue. The conventional wisdom that party is not a source 
for voting cleavages in one-party states is seemingly sup­
ported by the data, as shown in Table 4-1. Only two out of 
the fourteen sessions used in the study give any indication 
that party voting was present. These two sessions were the 
Vermont 1969 session and the Florida 1967 sessions, which 
had mean party likeness values of 55.2 and 52,6 respective­
ly. The low party likeness values were not unexpected and 
in fact were previously hypothesized. It was suggested that 
party voting would be more prevalent when the governor's 
party identification was an aberration in the respective 
states, and this is exactly what occurred. Both the Vermont 
1969 session and the Florida 1967 session found the
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governor from the party normally not in control of the 
executive office.
However, the other two aberrations in executive 
dominance, Idaho 1973, and Oklahoma 1971, do not support 
this hypothesis. Neither state has a party likeness score 
indicative of party voting. While the Oklahoma 1971 ses­
sion does not have a score below 60, it does have a score 
of 62.3, which is significant when compared to the 1967 
session which resulted in a score of 74.3. The difference 
between the two lends support to the expectations of in­
creased partisanship when the executive office is con­
trolled by a governor of the party not normally in office. 
The two Idaho sessions do not support our theory, but, as 
will be discussed in greater detail later, party plays only
Q
a minor role altogether in Idaho politics.
Analysis of the three other states offers mixed re­
sults concerning the expectation of partisanship. With the 
legislature and the governor being in the hands of the same 
party throughout the study, it was expected that Wyoming 
would have little party voting and high levels of party 
likeness across the two waves of analysis. As can be seen 
in Table 4-1, this is exactly what occurred with both ses­
sions (1967 and 1973)--over 70.0 and a difference of only 
3.2 existing between the two. Both North Dakota and Oregon 
were expected to display similar voting patterns since, in
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both, one party dominated the legislature and the other 
party was in control of the governorship throughout the 
time period. Low levels of partisanship were expected and 
any change would have been a movement toward less partisan­
ship. Both states have party likeness scores above the 
cut-off level that was established (60.0). It appears that 
North Dakota further supports the hypothesis with a de­
crease in partisanship in the second time period, moving 
from a score of 67.4 to 73. However, Oregon does not sub­
stantiate our expectation of decreased partisanship— some 
increase in party voting actually occurred. The increase 
in partisanship is understandable and will be examined in 
greater detail in a later analysis of Oregon. In summary, 
most of our expectations concerning the importance of party 
were supported. Using Table 4-1, one concludes that legis­
lative voting was more similar than dissimilar with regard 
to partisan ties.
It should be remembered, however, that in similar 
circumstances previous research has revealed that an appar­
ent highly nonpartisan legislature was found to have some 
deep partisan cleavages within it. When the presence of 
the governor's influence became evident on voting concern­
ing legislation closely related to the governor's program 
or on bills the governor vetoed, lower party likeness 
scores were displayed.
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With this in mind, the data were further analyzed by 
establishing a gubernatorial interest dichotomy: (1) votes
of direct interest to the governor, and (2) all other votes 
on legislation. Upon inspection of the findings presented 
in Table 4-2, a somewhat different picture appears than the 
one first presented.
It is no longer valid to uniformly dismiss party as a 
determinant in legislative voting. Focusing on those votes 
in which the governor had an interest, it was found that 
partisan voting was present in five of the fourteen ses­
sions. While this is not overhwleming--and one could not 
say it is definite proof--it is, however, enough of a change 
for us to take notice. What is needed is to further study 
this possible trend to determine whether an increase in 
partisanship is actually occurring and why. In support of 
the proposition that increased partisanship develops around 
the governor are the party likeness scores for the other 
half of the gubernatorial interest dichotomy. Greater party 
similarity in voting can be seen in the non-gubernatorial 
interest votes, with the parties being more similar in all 
but two of the fourteen sessions on non-interest votes than 
on votes of interest to the governor. Only in Idaho in 1967 
and Vermont in 1973 do the parties vote more alike on issues 
concerning the governor than on those of little or no inter­
est to the governor. While it is also true that only
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Table 4-2. Mean Index of Party Likeness for State Senates 

































































All bills that were part of the governor's program or 
that he vetoed were labeled "Governor.” This includes 
votes on a bill prior to the veto. All other votes were 
labeled "other."
^The number in parentheses denotes the number of votes 
used in the analysis.
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five sessions have party likeness scores for gubernatorial 
interest below the established cut-off point, we do see 
some rather large differences for other sessions. In four 
more sessions the difference in mean party likeness scores 
for the two sets of votes is at least ten points. This 
amount of change further supports the notion that a gover­
nor's involvement created a more partisan atmosphere. 
Another indication supporting the importance of the gover­
nor is the fact that no single "unrelated" session had a 
mean party likeness score that would be indicative of 
partisan voting (indeed only four of the fourteen mean 
scores were below 70.0).
Partisan Fluctuation in the Governorship
A more detailed analysis of the data may help further 
to delineate the governor's influence upon legislators' 
voting. We first turn to the states where control of the 
governor's office changed hands.
Vermont and Oklahoma
The first two states for analysis are Vermont and 
Oklahoma. In both states the party usually possessing the 
governor's office during the time period is the minority 
party in the legislature. The deviation in control of the 
executive office finds the two branches of government 
incongruent.
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Vermont in 1969 had one of the two legislative ses­
sions with a significant degree of partisanship (see Table 
4-2). When we look at the governor's program alone, the 
degree of partisan conflict becomes even more pronounced 
with a mean of 30.3 (the second lowest score in all the 
states). Vermont's partisanship is the result of having a 
Republican Governor after a long period of executive con­
trol by the Democrats. The dominant Republican party sup­
ported its governor in a fairly uniform manner with a mean 
index of cohesion of 62.6. This score becomes even more 
significant when one considers that the major policy posi­
tion of the governor was the imposition of a sales tax.
The partisan division within the state is made more pro­
nounced by the almost total rejection of the governor's 
program by the Democrats as seen by their cohesion score of 
91.6.
In almost direct contrast to Vermont's 1969 legisla­
tive session is its 1973 session. It is one of the two 
sessions in the study where bills concerning the governor 
have a higher mean likeness score than the votes on other 
legislative matters. As can be seen in Table 4-1, this 
session had one of the higher party likeness scores. The 
similarity in issues may be the result of the new gover­
nor- -a former state legislator making a concerted effort to 
"get along" with the Republican controlled legislature. As
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Governor Salmon noted:
Well, I am a member of the alumni association having 
served four terms in the House of Representatives in 
Vermont. . . . And so my relationship with the legis­
lature is predicated on some ' day labor in the vine­
yards .' There is a very vibrant and direct relation­
ship between this governor and the legislature. . . 
Accordingly I both relish and rather enjoy a vibrant 
and continuing relationship with the legislative 
branch. The fact of the political imbalance of 
Vermont--a traditional Republican state. . . has not 
been a troublesome factor to me. . .10
Furthermore, cooperation was induced by the major substan­
tive components of the governor's program: property tax
relief.
Oklahoma, like Vermont, is another state where greater 
partisan conflict developed when the governor was a member 
of the dominant legislative party. Conflict existed in 
Oklahoma in 1967, with a Republican governor and a Demo­
cratic senate, but not to the degree that it would be 
classified as highly partisan. On the other hand, the ses­
sion which was congruent with regard to partisan attachment 
between the legislature and the chief executive had a lower 
party likeness score than in 1967. This is further borne 
out in Table 4-2, where we see a high degree of conflict 
over the governor's program. The low party likeness scores 
were the result of solidarity in voting among the Republi­
cans (mean cohesion score of 81.5 on the governor's pro­
gram) and, conversely, the absence of any solidarity among 
the Democrats. The Democrats were faced with trying to
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cooperate with a Democratic governor who proposed three 
highly controversial pieces of legislation. The governor 
had as his major pieces of legislation an oil and gas tax, 
a revision in the state income tax (to insure that everyone 
in Oklahoma paid his "fair share") and the elimination of 
the sales tax on food and prescription drugs. While he 
did not achieve the last, the first two were accomplished. 
Governor Hall attributed his success to the leadership of 
the legislature reacting to a Democratic governor after a 
long period of Republican governors. Queried about the 
effects of partisan change in the governor's office. Gover­
nor Hall said, "Yes, I think there was a reaction. The
Democrats [were] trying much harder to get along with the
12governor than if I had succeeded a Democratic governor."
This examination of Oklahoma highlights one of the 
major problems with using indicies to measure success.
Upon inspection of the results one might want to conclude 
that the governor was not in a "real" leadership position 
because the Democrats did not support him completely. How­
ever, passage of an oil and gas tax can be considered a
13minor miracle in Oklahoma. Thus, in the two states where 
partisan control of the governor's office changed hands to 
a position of congruency, there were marked shifts in the 
party likeness scores. Partisan congruence between the two
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branches resulted in more conflict between parties in the 
legislative chamber.
Florida and Idaho
Attention now turns to the two states in which control 
of the governor's office is usually maintained by the 
dominant legislative party, with the deviation being that 
the minority party captures the executive office. In 
Florida and Idaho conflicting results appear. Idaho 
appears to have little partisan voting, whereas Florida had 
the most partisan legislative session in the data set. The 
1967 Florida legislature is marked with a fairly signifi­
cant amount of partisan division, with an overall mean 
party likeness score of 52.6. This low value for the ses­
sion supports the theory that the governor has an impact on 
legislative voting behavior. It might be argued that this 
partisan division in 1967 was the result of the reappor­
tionment, which had just taken place immediately prior to 
the s e s s i o n . R o a d y  and Dauer speculate as to the possi­
ble changes resulting from reapportionment and the change 
brought about in the legislature's composition (more urban 
legislators and more Republicans) and conclude that "the 
number of Republicans is not large enough to make itself 
felt all the time, but it is large enough to be crucial.
While it may be true that increased Republican 
strength due to reapportionment caused the low party
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likeness score, further analysis tends to discount this 
theory and places greater emphasis on the governor. In 
Table 4-2 the breakdown between gubernatorial interest and 
non-interest demonstrates the importance of the governor.
On votes unrelated to him, the two legislative parties had 
a score of 64.1 (not a high value, but over the cut-off 
point). Votes related to the governor found the two parties 
in almost total disagreement; the mean party likeness score 
of 19.3 is extremely low. Further evidence supporting our 
argument is found in Table 4-3 (see p. 158). On votes un­
related to the governor, neither party was unified nor were 
they similar in their levels of intra-party disagreement.
One can also detect the reason for the low level of inter­
party agreement on the gubernatorial votes when one looks at 
the intra-party agreement levels for these votes. Both 
parties have mean cohesion scores in the 80's, with the 
Democrats being the more cohesive party (with a mean score 
of 87.5) compared to the Republican (81.2).
The parties voted in opposite directions--a fact which 
cannot be discerned from the cohesion score alone but can 
be seen with the party likeness score and a substantive re­
view of the votes. It is clear that the two parties fre­
quently voted opposite each other.
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Much of this disagreement resulted from the antagonism
of legislative leaders (the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate) toward the governor and vice
versa. In their review of legislative politics in Florida
prior to the 1967 session, Roady and Dauer speculated that
this conflict would arise, since
the role of the executive in the legislative process 
will be of singular importance in the next session. 
Kirk is a Republican, but he was elected by a clear 
and decisive margin. Consequently, the legislature 
cannot summarily dismiss him or his proposals. Nor 
can the Democratic majority. . . afford to let Kirk 
lead the show.16
This is precisely what resulted. The President of the 
Senate and Speaker of the House both introduced their own 
programs. President Pope, commenting on the legislative 
agenda, said that, "We must effect every economy possible 
because the taxpayers of this state feel they are sorely 
put upon. But we can't permit our educational system to 
fall apart. The cost of financing education as well as 
other state programs was the major source of contention be­
tween the majority party in the legislature and the gover- 
1 8nor. Kirk was determined that there would be no new 
taxes, resulting in a "hold the line" philosophy on spend­
ing. Somewhat of a showman, Kirk addressed the legislature 
at a televised evening session on the "state of the state," 
and let his position be known when he commented: "Let me
say to you now that I pledged to the people of this state
147
that I would not impose any additional tax burden upon 
them. . . and I mean to live up to this pledge fully and 
honorably.
Most of the votes concerning the governor were on this 
matter. The session saw the governor vetoing a total of 
fifty-two House and Senate Bills, some of which were vetoed 
early enough for an override to be attempted (no Democratic 
successes), but most came at the end of the session (only 
six attempts to override were voted upon during the ses- 
seion).
The 1971 legislative session, in contrast to the 1967 
session, saw the majority party in possession of both 
branches of government. The party likeness score for all 
the votes was quite high (75.5) and the gubernatorial 
interest dichotomy finds both sets of scores fairly high.
We do not detect partisan voting to any extent on either. 
Governor Askew presented the legislature with an extensive 
list of areas to be covered by legislation. Much of the 
program passed through the legislature with little or no 
conflict. However, there was some conflict in the legisla­
ture related to parts of the governor's program, including 
his proposals on criminal justice, labor compensation, and 
a special statewide election on the corporate income tax. 
This last mentioned piece of legislation, alluded to pre­
viously in the paper, was a major component of the
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governor's program, and its passage marked success for 
him.
With the Democrats gaining control of the governor­
ship, we expected some difference between the 1967 and 1971 
sessions. It was believed that a Democratic governor with a 
Democratic majority would result in more harmonious rela­
tions. However, this was not detected, especially since 
there was low cohesion among the Democrats. Instead, a 
lessening of tension occurred among all legislators and the 
governor. The latter two years of the Kirk administration 
had been more conflict ridden than his first two years, and 
Governor Askew believed that this had an effect on his re­
lations with the legislature. Governor Askew commented,
I think it wasn't just a matter of me being a Demo­
cratic governor after a Republican governor but we 
had a Republican governor who had little understand­
ing nor any desire to understand the legislative 
process. . . coming along behind him I think that 
we were able to set a pace that was a great deal 
more appreciated by some that had just gone through 
the previous four years.21
Idaho, unlike Florida, had two sessions with a low 
degree of party voting. This was unexpected, since it was 
hypothesized that the 1973 session with a Democratic gover­
nor and a Republican legislature would be more partisan.
To some extent, this belief must now be rejected. We are 
not willing to totally reject it, however, because of the 
findings in Table 4-2. In 1973, there was a large
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difference in the mean party likeness scores when we 
dichotomized the data. While there is substantial agree­
ment on non-gubernatorial votes, there does seem to be less 
agreement on votes related to the governor--a mean party 
likeness score of 63 as compared to 74.6 for non-guberna­
torial votes. This difference, though not of major propor­
tion, is noteworthy, especially when we look at the 1967 
Idaho legislature. This session is one of only two 
throughout our data where votes related to the governor 
have a larger party likeness score than the unrelated 
votes--80.5 and 79.3 respectively. The mean score of 80.5 
is the highest level for any legislature used in the analy­
sis, giving a generally higher than normal level of support 
in Idaho for the governor. The lower level found for 
Governor Andrus, therefore, may be more in line with our 
original thinking than would appear at first glance.
Caution is in order in making any definitive conclu­
sion in Idaho, however, because of its past history of 
sectional strife that is both economic and ideological in 
origin, and to some extent, crosses party lines. While 
sectionalism may be present in many other states, it
appears to be crucial in Idaho with its continuing discus-
22sion about dividing the state in two. In addition. 
Governor Andrus is a very pragmatic individual, one who is 
willing to give up issues that are going to cause a great
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deal of division and appear incapable of passage. When 
questioned during an interview about his program, Governor 
Andrus noted that he had established a set of priorities on 
legislation, but pointed out that he was flexible and will­
ing to wait for some of his legislation. "I take a nose
count and I say not this year on that one--I move it down
23the priorities and horse trade for something else." This 
adroit handling of his program was recognized by on-the- 
scene political observers as a major reason for his suc­
cess. "The Governor has presented in most cases a good, 
common sense, practical and pragmatic program that Idaho 
can do (live) with."^^ Thus, while he may "introduce" 
legislation that might cause some conflict, he is often 
willing to let it go. For example, governmental reorgani­
zation, land use planning, and the establishment of kinder­
gartens were items in the governor's program in 1973 that 
were passed in the succeeding 1974 and 1975 legislatures. 
All this resulted in less conflict than had originally been 
anticipated.
Constant Partisan Control of the Executive Office
The research now turns to the analysis of states where 
the governorship has been in constant control of a single 
party. First an examination of Oregon and North Dakota and 
then a study of Wyoming will be undertaken. While the
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control of the governorship has been by a single party in 
all three states, Oregon and North Dakota are different 
than Wyoming. In the first two states there is a partisan 
division between the legislature and the executive, while 
in Wyoming the two branches have been in control of the 
same party.
Oregon and North Dakota
Oregon, on the surface, appears to be the least parti­
san of all the states, having two of the highest party 
likeness values in Table 4-1. This is somewhat contra­
dictory to previous research, since it was the most com­
petitive relative to partisan division of the state legis­
latures used. Prior research has found a relationship be-
25tween electoral competition and party voting. The gener­
al similarity in voting by Oregon legislators may be the 
result of several factors. It is generally accepted that 
party organization, structure, and divisions are less de­
veloped in the western states when compared to the East and 
26Midwest. The political environment of Oregon, therefore, 
may not be conducive to partisan voting in the legislature. 
Although the Oregon state senate has been controlled by the 
Democrats, this may be misleading. At times, there has 
been a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans 
created to choose the President of the Senate. This bi­
partisan coalition could explain some of the similarity in
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voting in Oregon. However, the party likeness score in
1973 tends to minimize this as an explanation. In this
session, the leadership was not chosen by a conservative
coalition and the party likeness score was substantial--
72.3. It is believed that the political environment and
its tradition of nonpartisanship is the major reason for
27the similarity in voting.
In contrast to Vermont, Oklahoma, Florida and Idaho, 
where the governor's office switched control, and to 
Oregon, where there tends to be an environment unconducive 
to party voting, is North Dakota. In both sessions the 
dominant party in the legislature was the Republican party, 
while the Democrats controlled the governorship.
North Dakota is an amalgamation of the various com­
ponents of the study. The level of party likeness in Table 
4-2 indicates that there was little partisan division. 
However, as can be seen in Table 4-3, when we divide the 
votes on gubernatorial interest, low party likeness scores 
emerge, with 55.8 in 1965 and 35.1 in 1973; an indication 
of dissimilarity in voting between the Democrats and Re­
publicans .
The minority party Democrats were much more cohesive 
than the dominant Republicans. The Democrats in 1965 had a 
cohesion score of 90.1, while the Republicans had only 
51.9--a difference of 38.2. In 1973, the Republicans
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displayed a level of cohesion quite similar to the level of 
1965 with a score of 51.6. The Democrats were less cohe­
sive in 1973 with a 75.8 level; nevertheless, this was 
still 24.2 points higher than the Republicans. Although 
the overall cohesion level was much higher in 1965 than in 
1973 for the Democrats, it actually showed greater cohesion 
and support for the Governor in 1973 with a score of 91.1 
as compared to the 1965 level of 73.3. The importance of 
the governor being from one party while the legislature is 
controlled by the other party is further substantiated by 
Governor Link:
Q: How do party labels affect the relationship
[between the legislature and the executive]?
Do you think that it is important that you are 
a Democrat and they are Republicans?
Link: The fact that I'm a Democrat is a source of
irritation. They would like some reform. 
They're not too happy. . .
Q: Do you think that there is some partisan con­
flict between you and the legislature?
Link: Sure there is. There's a lot. There has to
be.
Q: How does that affect the minority party in
terms of the Democrats?
28Link: They're more cohesive.
Wyoming
Wyoming is the control case as alluded to previously. 
In both waves of analysis the governor's office and the 
legislature were in the hands of the Republican party. It
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was expected that there would be substantial agreement in 
the voting behavior of the two parties, and this was borne 
out, as can be seen in Table 4-1. In addition, little 
difference was hypothesized in the voting across time, and 
this was also true with only 3.2 points difference between 
the two waves. Only Idaho had two sessions more similar. 
Further support for the notion of congruency are the guber­
natorial interest scores for 1967 and 1973 (65.6 and 66 
respectively) while the non-interest votes had scores of 77 
and 73. The similarity was expected, especially since the 
same individual was in the governor's office at both 
times--Stanley Hathaway.
Focusing attention on the similarity between waves of 
analysis causes one to overlook a rather important fact in 
the data. In both sessions there is some difference be­
tween votes on the governor's interest bills and those un­
related to the governor's program, with the former indi­
cating more partisan division than the latter. This sup­
ports the theory that the governor has some influence in 
affecting the voting behavior of legislators.
It should be mentioned, however, that using only 
indicies to measure the governor's influence and role may 
be misleading--a great deal of data may be lost. In both 
Wyoming legislative sessions, there were about a dozen
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issues important to the governor that went through the 
legislature without any significant conflict.
Partisan Voting Behavior in Review
In summary, it was found that in the two states which 
had a constant partisan division (one party controlled the 
senate while the other controlled the governorship), there 
were rather consistent party likeness values. In addition, 
the control case also exhibited a substantial degree of 
consistency as was expected. In three of the four states 
in which possession of the governor's office changed, party 
variation in voting between the two waves of analysis was 
rather substantial. Only in Idaho was this untrue.
Moreover, the initial hypothesis was supported when 
the data were dichotomized on the basis of gubernatorial 
interest. On bills in which the governors were involved, 
the party likeness scores were lower than those on bills 
seemingly unrelated to the governor. In several of the 
sessions, the degree of party likeness was low enough to 
conclude that the legislators were voting along party lines 
in part because of gubernatorial influence. Thus, one can 
conclude that the governor had some impact on how legisla­
tors voted. But we must further inquire: If the governor
is influential, what specific effect does he have on the 
cohesion of the two parties?
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Party Cohesion
The preceding discussion has supplied evidence to 
support the proposition that governors influence the voting 
behavior of state legislators; but it has not provided in­
formation about the scope of that influence with the two 
parties. The index of cohesion will assist in the deter­
mination of that influence, since it measures the degree to
which members of a party vote in agreement and aids in de-
29termining which issues inspire unity. By previous con­
vention, a score above 60.0 on the index indicates that the 
legislators voted in a unified manner ; conversely a score 
below 60 is suggestive of manifest conflict within the
ongroup. The assumption made in this research was that, if 
the governor does have some impact on the legislators, in­
fluence would be displayed by the legislators in the extent 
to which they vote in a cohesive manner. To test for the 
effects of the governor on the parties, the votes were 
analyzed on the basis of the gubernatorial issue dichotomy. 
While the legislators were divided into the normal Demo­
crat-Republican alignments and the mean index scores were 
reported in that manner, the analysis was more concerned 
with the two parties' ties to the governor; thus, a party 
was designated as either the governor's party or the oppo­
sition party.
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It was expected that the opposition party (whether in 
the majority or minority) would show a higher level of 
party voting on bills of interest to the governor than on 
those bills seemingly unrelated to his program. In addi­
tion, it was expected that the level of cohesion displayed 
by the party would be greater than 60.0. These presump­
tions were based on the belief that the opposition party 
had a partisan interest to oppose the governor. Opposition 
would occur in an attempt to embarrass the governor and 
possibly lay the groundwork for gaining control of the 
executive office.
Conversely, while the governor's party was expected to 
show an increase in cohesion it was believed that there
would be a difference in the level of support dependent
31upon the majority-minority status. A governor's party in
the majority was expected to vote less cohesively than if
it was the minority party, mainly because a majority party
32usually needs less cohesion to garner the required votes. 
However, when the party was in the minority, full support 
of the governor might be required for the governor to have 
any chance for success.
Generally, the expected higher than normal level of 
cohesion for the opposition party did occur, as can be seen 
in Table 4-3. In eleven of the fourteen sessions, the 
party opposite the governor had an increase in cohesion on
Table 4-3. Mean Index of Party Cohesion When Votes are Divided by Gubernatorial 






Florida 87.5 (95)b 55.8 (276)C 81.2 (95) 53.7 (276)
1967
Florida 55.0 (40) 52.4 (203) 50.3 (40) 48.8 (203)
1971
Idaho 61.8 (54) 55.1 (164) 53.4 (54) 46.7 (164) (-»
1967 Ln00
Idaho 63.3 (15) 58.0 (170) 59.9 (15) 47.7 (170)
1973
North Dakota 73.3 (22) 92.1 (188) 52.6 (22) 51.9 (188)
1965
North Dakota 91.1 (16) 74.4 (177) 58.9 (16) 51.5 (177)
1973
All bills that were part of the governor's program or that he vetoed were 
labeled "Governor." This includes votes On a bill prior to the veto. All other 
votes on bills were labeled "other."
^The number in parentheses denotes the number of votes used in the analysis.
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votes related to the chief executive as compared to all the
other votes. It was only in Oregon (1967), Oklahoma
(1967), and Wyoming (1973), that the opposition party was
33less cohesive on votes of interest to a governor. Even 
when these three sessions were included with the other 
eleven, the mean shift in cohesion was 8.56--a large shift 
given the properties of the measure. The magnitude of the 
mean shift is even more noteworthy when compared to the 
mean shift for the governor’s party. However, it should be 
pointed out that, contrary to what was expected, only six 
of the fourteen sessions found the cohesion levels of the 
opposition party of the magnitude to which unity could be 
attributed to the party. The lack of party unity may have 
been the result of the majority status of the opposition 
party in eight of the legislative sessions. In only two of 
the eight sessions where the opposition party was in the 
majority was unity present. In contrast, the opposition 
party displayed unified voting in four of the six legisla­
tures in which it was the minority party.
The ability of the governor to coalesce individuals is 
seen in further detail upon inspection of the voting be­
havior of members from his party. In twelve of the four­
teen sessions the governor’s party increased its level of 
cohesion, with only the 1971 Oklahoma Senate and the 1965 
North Dakota Upper Chamber voting less cohesively on
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gubernatorial bills than on the remaining votes. The de­
crease in cohesion in these two sessions was perhaps the 
result of a severe strain placed upon the legislators.
This strain was caused by the main order of business in 
both sessions--highly controversial tax p r o g r a m s . T h e  
mean increase in cohesion for all fourteen sessions was 
6.2. This increase corresponds to the expectation that the 
governor's party increase in voting would be lower than the 
opposition party's increase. If the majority-minority 
status of the party is broken out, the other hypotheses 
concerning increased cohesion were supported. Of the six 
times that the governor's party was in the majority, there 
was a mean increase in cohesion of only 3.9, while for the 
eight sessions where the governor's party was in the minor­
ity the increase was 7.9. Thus, the belief that the gover­
nor's party, when in the majority, would have a smaller in­
crease in cohesion as compared to when the party was in the 
minority was supported.
While only six of the fourteen sessions for the oppo­
sition party showed voting levels indicative of cohesion 
within the party, this was not the case for the party of 
the governor. In ten of the fourteen sessions, the level 
of cohesion was such that it can be concluded that the 
legislators voted as a group. A 2 x 2 table has been 
created using majority-minority party status and the degree
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of cohesion for the governor's party. The findings in 
Table 4-4 support the theories about conflict and cohesion 
in the governor's party. All eight observations in which 
the governor's party was in the minority had voting levels 
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the legislators 
voted as a group. In contrast, we expected that the gover­
nor's party, when in the majority, would not show the same 
degree of cohesion and this is what occurred with four of 
the six cases showing conflict. It is believed that this 
lack of cohesion was the result of being the dominant party 
in the legislature. It must be remembered that these are 
one-party dominant legislatures, and thus the majority 
party should have sufficient strength to allow deviation 
within the party and still have a winning vote margin. On 
the other hand, the governor's party in the minority needs 
unanimity or near unanimity if it expects to successfully 
support the governor. Thus, high levels of party voting on 
bills of interest to the governor resulted.
In sum, the overall hypothesis has been supported. 
There is increased cohesion levels on bills of interest to 
the governor compared to other votes. Further, the belief 
about the differences in voting between the parties has 
been substantiated, as has been the difference in voting by 
the governor's party when majority-minority status was con­
trolled. All of this lends further support to the
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Table 4-4. Cohesion and Conflict in the Senate by the 
Majority-Minority Status for the Governor's 
Party
Conflict' Cohesion
Minority Party Florida 67 Oklahoma 67
Idaho 73 Oregon 67
North Oregon 73
Dakota 65 Vermont 73
North
Dakota 73
Majority Party Florida 71 Vermont 69
Idaho 67 Wyoming 73
Oklahoma 71
Wyoming 67
Conflict was said to be present when the Mean Index 
of Party Cohesion was below 60.0--conversely, cohesion was 
present when the Index was above 60.0.
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hypothesis that the governor does influence the voting be­
havior of legislators in one-party dominant legislatures.
Special Sessions
Special sessions were not originally scheduled for 
study, but for several compelling reasons they were used 
in an analysis of the governor's effect upon legislators. 
Their importance for study rests in the assumed influence 
that the governor is supposed to possess within the legis­
lature during a special session. The special session is 
cited as intensifying public pressure on legislators be­
cause the governor focuses attention on issues he deems 
3 5important. Therefore, one would expect that active 
participation by a governor in the legislative process 
during a special session should increase partisanship in 
the legislature compared to regular sessions. In analyzing 
the voting behavior of legislators in special session, it 
may be possible to substantiate that influence.
In addition to the theoretical implications, there 
were newspaper accounts as well as other resource material 
that provided further evidence that special sessions should 
be analyzed. Idaho had a special session in 1967, but it 
was not used. During the original 1967 session, the legis­
lature had passed legislation which, by mistake, made the 
state's Department of Public Assistance ineligible for
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financial support from the federal government. The session 
was called to remedy that situation and, therefore, the 
votes were often perfunctory. Another issue discussed with 
little or no conflict concerned an increase in the state 
gasoline tax to raise the highway construction revenues 
necessary to qualify for matching funds from the federal
O Cgovernment. In Oklahoma, the legislature met in 1971 in
a special session over a relatively innocuous subject--the
ratification of the constitutional amendment extending
37suffrage to those eighteen years of age or older. Spe­
cial sessions were also called in the other states but, 
like the last two examples, they were not substantively 
important or they were not proximate in time to the origi-
O Qnal session. The analysis of special session centers
upon two states: Oregon and Florida.
The fifty-fourth legislature of Oregon failed to
enact a property tax relief program, a sales tax plan, and
to adequately finance government programs, all of which
forced Governor McCall to call a special session in
39November of 1967. In 1974, the Governor had agreed to 
call a special session in order to enact a needed appro­
priations bill which was necessitated by a failure of the 
federal government to notify the state of the extent of 
support it would be providing. In addition, the Oregon 
legislature had passed a consumer protection in land sales
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law (HB 2607) which had a severe negative effect on home 
sales and financing, and therefore, caused great pressure 
for its repeal.
Florida had the most special sessions of any state 
under study. Governor Kirk called a number of sessions 
during his tenure in office, including a session prior to 
the first meeting of the legislature to discuss constitu­
tional r e f o r m . T h a t  session was not used in the analysis 
because, during the ensuing period between the special 
session and the normally convened legislature, a federal 
court ordered the legislature reapportioned and elections 
held.^^ It was believed that the previous legislative 
make-up would only confound the analysis because of an in­
crease in urban and Republican legislators in the regular 
session. However, the special session immediately follow­
ing the regular session was used in this study. Governor 
Kirk had rejected the legislature’s plan to finance the 
junior college system, and the July special session dealt 
with alternative plans to finance these educational pro­
grams. In 1971, the legislature was convened for several 
special sessions. The special session used for 1971 was 
one prior to the normal legislative session in April. The 
governor had called the session in January to enact legis­
lation on automobile insurance. Auto insurance had become 
a source of consternation for the legislature with rapidly
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increasing rates and threats by the insurance companies to 
effectively do away with auto coverage in Florida. Prior 
to the January session, a session was called in October of 
1970 at which time a 120-day moratorium on insurance in­
creases was imposed. Governor Askew's call was in response 
to the moratorium's end drawing near.^^ While the legisla­
ture was in session, the governor took it upon himself to 
push for the initiation of legislation imposing a corporate 
income tax. The corporate income tax was the major policy 
program that Askew had campaigned on in the gubernatorial 
elections, and he was attempting to fulfill that promise.
It is the corporate income tax that makes the special ses­
sion so significant, since, as we have noted previously, it 
was this piece of legislation which made 1971 successful for 
Askew.
It is expected that the mean Index of Party Likeness 
for all the votes in the special session should indicate 
greater partisan voting than in the regular session, and 
that the mean score should be at the level indicative of 
partisan voting (below 60.0). The expected heightened 
partisanship results from the relatively greater role that 
the governor plays in a special session. Because the 
governor usually determines the issues which will be dis­
cussed, the ratio between non-gubernatorial and guberna­
torial interest votes should d e c r e a s e . T h e  more partisan
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voting level usually found with gubernatorial interest 
votes will not be overshadowed by the myriad of other 
votes. As in the previous analysis, our hypothesis is that 
the party likeness scores for gubernatorial interest votes 
will show more partisan voting levels than the votes on 
issues not of interest to the governor. The issues that 
the governor is interested in--the reasons he called the 
special session--are important and often controversial and 
one would expect them to arouse partisan voting. In addi­
tion, the patterns in voting within the parties should 
closely resemble the voting behavior found in the regular 
sessions. Increased cohesion should result for the gover­
nor’s program for both parties. The number of sessions 
under investigation makes it difficult to offer more spe­
cific hypotheses concerning the majority-minority status of 
the parties and their relationship to the governor.
With the exception of Oregon's special session in 
1974, the data support the hypothesis that there was more 
partisan voting in special sessions compared to the regular 
sessions used in the analysis. Three of the four sessions 
had scores below 60--the level at which the two parties 
were said to be voting in a conflicting manner. The 1971 
Florida special session, with an I.P.L, score of 46.5, had 
the lowest level of party similarity of all the sessions 
under study. The 1967 Oregon special session was also
169
quite low with a score of 54.2--the third lowest level of 
party similarity in the entire study.
In Florida, the announced intent of the session was 
to solve the problems of auto insurance, but the session 
also took up the corporate income tax plan supported by the 
governor. Higher than normal levels of conflict were 
prevalent throughout the session as can be seen in Table 
4-5. On both sets of issues in the dichotomy, the I.P.L. 
was below 60, an unusual situation which never occurred in 
the regular sessions under investigation. It appears that 
the 1971 session was engulfed by conflict. However, the 
corporate income tax (governor's bills in the table) evoked 
even more conflict in the legislature; witness the party 
similarity score of 39.5. Further confirmation of the con­
flict can be seen in the party cohesion scores. Both par­
ties voted in a cohesive manner with the Democrats sup­
porting the governor and the Republicans opposing him. The 
score of 71.4 for the Democrats (while lower than the level 
of cohesion of bills unrelated to the governor) was very 
large for a governor's party in the majority. Governor 
Askew perceived the corporate tax issue to be critical and 
made sure the legislators understood this when he addressed 
them in the special session saying:
Table 4-5. Party Voting on Roll Calls in Selected Special Sessions
Index 
Special of Party 
Session Likeness
Index of Party 
Likeness
Governor Other
Index of Party Cohesion 
Democrats Republican
Governor Other Governor Other
Florida
1967
59.8 34.8(11)^ 78.1(15) 74.7(11) 65.2(15) 74.1(11) 42.0(15)
Florida
1971
46.5 39.5(10) 53.6(10) 71.4(10) 76.8(10) 63.7(10) 51.8(10)
Oregon
1967
54.2 53.3(19) 55.1(18) 32.6(19) 40.6(18) 82.4(19) 88.5(18)
Oregon
1964
74.9 62.3(14) 79.0(56) 58.6(14) 55.0(56) 60.2(14) 38.8(56)
All bills that were part of the governor's program or that he vetoed were 
labeled "Governor." This includes votes on a bill prior to the veto. All other 
votes on bills were labeled "other."
o
The number in parentheses denotes the number of votes used in the analysis
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I consider my election last November a mandate to 
vigorously and tirelessly pursue the course of tax 
reform that was laid out in my campaign. This I 
shall do. The time for tax reform is now. The 
need for a more productive tax base is now and I 
urge you to give the people a chance to speak on 
this issue.46
The conflict present in Florida's 1967 special session 
further substantiates the findings about the 1967 regular 
session. The Index of Party Likeness score was just below 
60 for the special session, which would indicate a meaning­
ful difference between the two parties. The difference in 
party voting in the gubernatorial dichotomy adds further 
support. Bills of interest to the governor had a score of 
34.8--a rather low figure--while bills unrelated to the 
governor had a large score of 78.1. The score on non­
interest bills is large enough that we can say the two 
parties voted alike. The level of similarity on guberna­
torial votes and the difference (43.3) between that score 
and the non-interest votes lend evidence to the conclusion 
that the governor was influential in legislator’s voting. 
The level of cohesion for the two parties on the guberna­
torial interest votes (74.7 and 74.1 for the Democrats and 
Republicans respectively) and the lower level for the 
other votes add more evidence for the conclusion that 
Governor Kirk had a role in the legislature.
The 1967 Oregon special session was unlike Florida, 
where the two parties voted opposite each other. The
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cohesion scores for the two parties were not uniformly 
high--in fact, the scores were quite dissimilar. The Re­
publicans had a mean cohesion index score of 82.4 on the 
governor's program while the Democrats had a cohesion level 
of only 32.6. The high degree of cohesion of the Republi­
cans and low level of agreement among the Democrats pro­
duced the low levels of party similarity in voting. Gover­
nor McCall had called the special session because in his 
words :
There is a compelling need for property tax relief, 
which can be accomplished only by the legislative 
assembly, and it now appears that revenues for the 
current biennium will not be as great as were 
estimated. . . .47
The governor sought relief on property tax appropria­
tions to aid schools and financial support for the care of 
the mentally retarded. All of these problems were to be 
solved by the initiation of a sales tax. The planned 
sales tax, once approved by the legislature, would have to 
be taken to the people for their ultimate approval. The 
differences that existed among the Democrats centered on 
the extent of support for the governor's sales tax program.
In the previous analysis of Oregon it was noted that 
the Democrats, though in the majority, were only nominally 
in control of the Senate. A coalition made up of Republi­
cans and conservative Democrats was actually the dominant 
faction in the Senate. Analysis of the individual votes in
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the session supports the existence of the coalition. A 
group of seven Democrats generally voted with the eleven 
Republicans to defeat the remaining Democrats. This split 
among the Democrats gave them the low cohesion score of 
32.6 on gubernatorial issues and, combined with the high 
level of cohesion for the Republicans, resulted in the low 
party likeness score.
In summary, the parties appear to vote dissimilarly 
because the Republicans were unified while the Democrats 
were divisive. The division among the Democrats was also 
present in the regular session. The combination of gfeater 
cohesion by the Republicans along with lower cohesion for 
the Democrats may explain the difference in party voting 
between the regular session and the special session. The 
drop in cohesion for the Democrats from 40.6 on votes not 
of interest to the governor to 32.6 for those of interest 
to the governor is attributed to the controversial nature 
of the governor's tax program.
The 1974 session in Oregon is the only one of the four 
in which the two parties had similar enough voting to 
conclude that the parties were not significant cues for 
legislators. When the index was computed on the dichotomy, 
a difference between the two sets of votes was found with a 
rather large decrease in the mean score for the party simi­
larity index. In fact, the amount (17.7) was at a level
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indicative of a difference between the two types of issues. 
However, one should note that even with the much lower mean 
party likeness score for the gubernatorial votes, it was 
still greater than 60. The party cohesion scores were also 
at a level (below 60) which would signify little party 
voting. What is shown in Table 4-5 is that the governor in 
Oregon played some role in the way legislators voted, but 
that there was little party voting within the two special 
sessions.
The findings offer some support to the previous con­
clusion about legislative voting behavior. Florida's two 
special sessions were marked by differences in party voting 
that were more pronounced when the governor's interest 
votes were analyzed. The cohesion scores also gave evi­
dence of party voting relative to the governor's interest. 
In contrast, there was little to give one confidence con­
cerning the findings about the two special sessions in 
Oregon. The 1974 special session showed little party vot­
ing overall, although there was a tendency for increased 
partisanship on the governor's votes relative to the non­
interest votes. Thus, Oregon's 1974 special session fol­
lows the pattern of minor gubernatorial influence in an 
essentially non-partisan state. The 1967 special session 
confounded the conclusion because it appeared to be parti­
san, but upon inspection, this was not borne out. Finally,
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there was not enough difference in the voting patterns in 
special sessions compared to regular sessions to lead us to 
conclude that the governor plays a more influential role in 
special sessions than in the regular session.
Summary
This analysis was concerned with the effects of guber­
natorial involvement in legislative roll-call behavior. 
Comparisons were made across states as well as within 
states over time. A further comparison was made within a 
session regarding the governor's influence on bills of 
interest to him as opposed to those in which he was seem­
ingly uninterested from a programmatic perspective. Final­
ly, an analysis of the governor's influence on legislators 
in special sessions was performed and then compared to the 
influence he possessed in the regular sessions. For the 
regular session, the analysis was conducted on seven of the 
eight states. However, only in two of the eight states were 
special sessions studied. Both the Index of Party Likeness 
and the Index of Party Cohesion were used to analyze all 
roll-call votes that exhibited conflict.
The findings suggest that some of the past assumptions 
about the role of parties in one-party dominant states must 
be re-evaluated. On the surface, it appears that party is 
still not a major cue in voting by legislatures. However,
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when we compared voting patterns in the legislatures on the 
gubernatorial interest dichotomy we found definite reasons 
to modify previous conclusions regarding the role of the 
party. Bills that were of interest to the governor tended 
to show greater partisan division than was previously 
thought to exist in the legislatures. The conclusion drawn 
was that the governor does have some influence in the 
legislative process, causing parties to become a more 
salient voting cue. We can no longer accept the assumption 
that party voting is not found in legislatures where a 
single party is consistently dominant.
Mixed results were obtained with those states in which 
gubernatorial control switched between the parties. In 
three of the four states, there were substantial differ­
ences in the two waves of analysis. The fact that one of 
the states displayed consistency across the two waves of 
analysis was rather unexpected. We found the hypothesized 
difference over time in one of the other three states. In 
addition, it was found that in the remaining two, more 
partisanship was prevalent when gubernatorial control 
switched to a state of congruence with the legislature. In 
the three states where the same party maintained control of 
the governorship, a rather high degree of consistency was 
found over the two waves of analysis.
177
Furthermore, it was revealed that both the opposition
party and the governor's party exhibited greater cohesion
when the governor became a factor in voting. The analysis
also showed that there was a pattern for the minority party
to be more cohesive than the majority, especially when it
48was the governor's party. Finally, the analysis of spe­
cial sessions found some increased partisanship, but not a 
sufficient amount to warrant any undue emphasis on them as 
a time when more partisanship occurs because of the 
governor.
This roll call analysis was not concerned with a 
governor's success, but rather his influence upon the 
legislators. It should also be apparent that the use of 
indicies alone cannot always explain the role of the gover­
nor in the legislative process. The chapter that follows 
examines each of the governors under investigation and de­
termines his position with regard to the legislature in 
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The analysis in the preceding chapter focused upon 
gubernatorial involvement in legislative roll-call voting. 
The findings revealed that increased partisanship between 
the parties and more cohesion within the parties were 
exhibited when governors became directly involved in the 
legislative process. In this chapter our analysis centers 
more on the governor and his success with the legislature 
than upon the extent to which he is a cue for legislators' 
voting. Analysis of each governor in the seven states used 
in Chapter IV will be conducted to determine which gover­
nors were successful and the degree of their success.
After determining the degree of success achieved by each 
governor, the analysis will turn to an examination of fac­
tors which may explain the variation in success among 
governors. However, before beginning the analysis our 
attention focuses briefly upon the concept of gubernatorial 
success and its measurement.
Gubernatorial Success
In Chapter 1 it was noted that gubernatorial success, 
while defined in numerous ways, has often been unsatis­
factorily measured. One determinant of success has been 
the number of gubernatorial bills passed compared to the
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number of gubernatorial bills introduced. Another defini­
tion of success used the veto and the governor’s ability to 
marshal support against an attempt to override. Other re­
search has been conducted on the premise that success can 
be defined as the ability of the governor to gain enough 
votes from his party to win.
A ratio of bills passed compared to bills introduced 
fails to take into account a number of factors which can 
make the measure spurious. First, some governors only ask 
for legislation thet they know will pass and, thus, their 
ratio of success will be high. Conversely, there are other 
governors who ask for a great deal, especially controver­
sial items, knowing that they will not pass. In effect, 
several of these proposals are introduced to set the stage 
for some future attempt at passage. Thus, the governor's 
ratio of success under such conditions will be low. In 
addition, some governors play a game of selective strategy 
by permitting some legislation to be defeated in order to 
gain passage of other bills. Finally, legislation ini­
tially introduced for a governor may be taken up by the 
opposition party and passed as theirs, thus denying credit 
to the governor. All of these circumstances can easily be 
seen to confound a simple ratio of bills passed compared to 
bills introduced.
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The veto as an indicator of gubernatorial success has 
also been used extensively. But the wide variation in the 
use of vetoes and the reasons for their use may obfuscate 
more than enlighten research findings on the success of the 
governor. A considerable amount of evidence exists to 
indicate that the governor's veto is seldom, if ever, over­
ridden.^ Thus, we should expect a high degree of support 
for the governor on sustaining a veto. The inability of a 
governor to sustain a large number of his vetoes would be 
indicative of a lack of success on his part. Finally, 
there is the argument that any veto is indicative of guber­
natorial failures, since a strong governor would insure 
that bills requiring a veto would not be passed. Thus, the 
veto should be used with caution and should not be used by 
itself as an indicator of gubernatorial success.
Another indicator of gubernatorial success which may
be misleading is the measure originally used by Sarah
McCally Morehouse. She defined success as "the ability of
2the governor to gain enough votes from his party to win." 
This concept, like the previous measures, has been dis­
cussed in depth in Chapter I. However, a brief discussion 
concerning this measure of gubernatorial success will high­
light its inadequacy. First, a governor may be placed in a 
situation where even total support from his party may prove 
insufficient for the governor to win--this is especially
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true when the governor's party is hopelessly small. A 
second point is that governors do not rely on their party 
alone to win, but build a coalition instead. If the gover­
nor's party is small, then the governor needs the full sup­
port of his party's legislators plus legislators from the 
other party if he is to have any chance of winning. How­
ever, if his party is large, then lack of support by some 
members for his program could be tolerated. Another con­
founding factor affecting the utility of this measure 
occurs when a governor aligns himself more closely with the 
"supposed" opposition party than with his own party. In 
conclusion, a governor could be successful, yet there would 
be no indication of that success using this measure.
Finally, any measure relying heavily upon roll-call 
data will exclude those bills upon which votes are never 
taken. Typically, many bills introduced during the course 
of a session are never reported out of a committee, let 
alone voted upon on the floor. Conversely, there are 
measures which "travel" through the legislative circuit 
which result in little or no conflict. Under both circum­
stances no data would be collected, and yet it should be 
obvious that either circumstance may have important impli­
cations for gubernatorial success.
In short, we have offered a number of arguments to the 
reader to demonstrate that no single measure alone can
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capture, to the fullest extent, the many facets of a suc­
cessful governor. We turn now to the process that will be 
used to calculate the legislative fate of the governors 
under investigation.
The evaluation of a governor will use a variety of 
factors. While a single uniform measure would make com­
parisons easier, there is a greater need to correctly 
evaluate each governor. Until a measure can be devised 
that can adequately test for gubernatorial success, a 
qualitative approach will be more efficacious. This analy­
sis will use a variety of items, including the governor's 
program, his use of the veto, his leadership of the legis­
lature, and his appointments, as well as personal assess­
ments for each governor. The analysis of a governor's pro­
gram will rely heavily on information gathered in the 
several interviews conducted in each state, the data col­
lected in our roll call analysis, and media accounts of the 
governor's relationship to the legislature. Since knowing 
what a governor "asks for" is as important as the sheer 
volume of his proposed legislation, we will look at the 
"more important bills" closely and analyze them in greater 
detail. The governor's success on these bills may be the 
real test of gubernatorial success. Important bills will 
be determined by evaluating the newspapers' coverage of the 
legislature and the personal assessments of the governors.
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(Each governor in the interview was asked to determine what 
the key issues were for the session under investigation-- 
see appendix for question.) To further assess the key 
legislation for each governor we asked them whether some 
bills were more important than others to the success of 
their programs (see appendix for question). In evaluating 
the governor's program one must be cognizant of the normal 
treatment given to it by the legislature. For example, 
does the governor's program usually get summarily defeated? 
In addition, our assessment of the governor's program will 
consider that portion of the program which may be defeated 
and is subsequently passed during the session as the pro­
gram of the opposition majority party. Finally, whenever 
possible, it is necessary to consider those parts of the 
program which may be in a "trial balloon stage" with pas­
sage not expected until some later session.
The veto is an additional tool to determine guberna­
torial success. Some governors view their job in essen­
tially a negative way--protecting the citizenry from the 
evils proposed by the legislature. Governors with only 
this perspective toward their role must be judged by their 
particular use of the veto. In this evaluation the number 
of vetoes issued and the ability of the governor to sus­
tain the veto are the important cues. Different evalua­
tions of the veto will be made because of the partisan
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structure of the states under investigation, with variation 
in use dependent upon the majority/minority status of the 
governor.
Appointments or nominations to a position may, under 
certain conditions, provide a cue to gubernatorial success. 
In most instances appointments provide us with little sub­
stantive information about the influence of the governor in 
the legislative process since confirmation is usually rou­
tine. However, there are exceptions to this rule at times, 
with some gubernatorial appointments being opposed quite 
strongly; a failure to get nominees approved would reflect 
negatively on a governor's success. Information concerning 
appointments will rely upon gubernatorial interviews and 
accounts in newspapers.
Using the interview material and media accounts of the 
legislative sessions under study, each of the governors and 
their ability to work with the legislature will be exam­
ined. A governor who cannot work with a legislature may 
have little chance of being successful. Governors may be 
able to sustain their votes and get their appointments con­
firmed and yet still be relatively unsuccessful as legisla­
tive leaders because of their inability to cooperate or 
work with the legislature. This, for some governors, may 
be the most important clue to their success or failure.
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Our attention now turns to the appraisal of each of 
the governors with regard to their legislative success. 
Table 5-1 was constructed to assist in the analysis of the 
governors and the extent to which each was successful.
The table presents each of the four items used in the 
analysis (gubernatorial program, the veto, legislative 
leadership by the executive, and appointments) with a,five 
position scale. In addition to the four concepts, an 
overall assessment of each governor is given using the five 
position scale. Governors are ranked as extremely success­
ful, moderately successful, average, marginally successful, 
and not very successful; however, these rankings should not 
be viewed as a definitive statement. The positioning of 
the governors on each of the scales is highly qualitative 
and presented only as an aid to the reader in understanding 
the final relative assessment of each governor with regard 
to success. No quantitative measure can or should be com­
puted from the scales since they do not constitute mathe­
matically equivalent scales (not all scales are weighted 
equally for each governor). When a concept was much more 
dominant in drawing a conclusion about a governor than the 
other items it was designated by brackets.
We first look at the four states where the governor­
ship changed partisan control over the time period under 
scrutiny. This will be followed by an analysis of the two
Table 5.1. Evaluation of Governors on Four Success Criteria
Program
Extremely Moderately Marginally Not very
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states where the partisan alignment of the governorship and 
the legislature were constantly in opposition. Finally, 
our attention will focus upon a "control" state, or one 
where the party of the governor was the same as that of the 
legislature during the entire time period. The analysis of 
each of the states in a single time period will be followed 
by analysis over time within the states. Next we will 
compare the governors across states--looking first at 
governors who held office under similar circumstances, then 
under contrasting conditions. After determining the in­
fluence of partisan bases of power we will turn to an 
analysis of the impact of institutionally derived bases of 
power. The power relationship existing between the legis­
lature and the executive as depicted in Table 3-6 will be 
used in this discussion.
Analysis 
Oklahoma and Vermont
Both Vermont and Oklahoma are states where the minor­
ity legislative party usually controlled the governorship, 
with the shift in partisan control of the governorship 
bringing about a partisan congruence between the two 
branches. In Vermont the Republicans were the dominant
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legislative party, while the Democrats were dominant in 
Oklahoma.
During 1973, Governor Salmon of Vermont was generally 
successful in his relations with the legislature, as was 
Governor Bartlett of Oklahoma in 1967. As can be seen in 
Table 5-1, both governors were judged to have generally 
faired well over all the items. No particular item by it­
self made these two governors successful, rather the combina­
tion of all items contributed to their success. However, for 
both governors, the relationship between the legislature and 
the executive could be characterized as harmonious. This 
carried over into the voting behavior of the legislature, 
as we saw in Chapter IV, with rather high party likeness 
values (Vermont 74.9 and Oklahoma 74.3) for all votes and 
only small shifts in party voting when votes were examined 
by substantive category. The relationship between the two 
branches was seen as cordial by the two governors, with 
Governor Bartlett commenting that "we have had a competi-
3tive yet harmonious relationship." Governor Salmon, in
his message to the legislature, was even more emphatic :
One accomplishment stands out in my mind above all 
others. This General Assembly discarded partisan 
labels. You, the legislators, considered each 
piece of legislation, not in terms of its ultimate 
political effect, but as it related to the people 
of our state. No governor could ask more. No 
governor could expect more. No governor could 
appreciate more.4
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Governor Salmon's appreciation may stem from the fact 
that he achieved the major piece of legislation he asked 
for--property tax relief. Property tax relief was the main 
campaign promise he made while running for office in 1972. 
Salmon felt he had to keep that promise--"! had made a 
promise, I wanted to deliver on that promise. . By
being pragmatic, he was able to keep that promise. He 
introduced the bill and worked it through the legislature 
(even challenging one committee chairperson to report it 
out)^ and when it appeared that the legislation was in 
trouble, the governor was willing to accept changes. The 
structure and amount varied from the original plan; the 
program was $2.5 million less than originally designed-- 
but it had passed. When again the legislation appeared to 
be in trouble and the governor had to make a decision to 
keep pushing his plan, a revised Senate plan, a House re­
vision, or no plan at all, the governor chose the Senate
nversion. While different from his original bill, the
Q
governor could still claim the program as his own. The
governor was not alone in identifying the tax program as
his, since the media commented that.
There was no question that the Democratic governor 
had won a tremendous boost with passage of his 
[italics are mine] $10 million property tax relief 
act. . .9
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The governor's influence and success in the 1973 ses­
sion was not limited to the property tax relief bill alone, 
but manifested itself in other areas also. He gave support 
to and assisted in keeping intact Vermont's bottle ban law 
which had been passed under former Governor Davis. In 
addition, he supported several other bills which were con­
sidered major pieces of legislation during the 1973 ses­
sion, including a "right to know" law prohibiting most 
secret sessions of public agencies, constitutional reform, 
and a capital construction bill (providing for payment by 
cash rather than bonds). Moreover, the legislature passed 
a state employee pay raise at the urging of Salmon as a 
major part of his program. The "tooth fairy" bill (as the 
comprehensive dental care bill was known) was another indi­
cation of the impact that the governor had on the legisla­
ture. With the session drawing to a close, the dental care 
bill was stymied in a conference committee (the Senate 
members were opposed to House changes) and tempers rose.
The Governor called the conference committee members into 
his office for a meeting. Some "private head bumping" re­
sulted in the Senate accepting the House changes to the 
bill.^® Finally, the governor did not have to veto any 
legislation, nor were any of his major appointments denied. 
All of these examples suggest that Salmon was a successful 
governor.
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Governor Bartlett is considered to have been success­
ful with the 31st Oklahoma legislature. The governor 
vetoed a number of bills, and while that would normally 
indicate a lack of success, this was not the case for 
Bartlett. He was from the minority party and it would be 
unlikely that he could gain enough influence with the 
majority Democrats to prohibit legislation. However, the 
governor was able to sustain all but one of his vetoes.
The veto overturned was a bill giving the Democratic lieu­
tenant governor a salary increase and added job responsi­
bilities.^^ Governor Bartlett viewed vetoes as an impor­
tant source of power and was very proud that he vetoed a
large number of bills (56) during his term of office and
12only had a few overridden (4). In his final message to
the legislature we can detect, in his somewhat humorous
reference, the perspective that he took toward the veto
and the governor's relationship to the legislature:
As I take your leave, I feel guilty about one 
thing--and that is eliminating your favorite 
pastime--voting for a bill popular in one area, 
then sending the Hot Potato to the second floor 
for veto.13
The governor's view is one of an individual who sees 
his role as protector of the people, ensuring that the 
state constitutional checks and balances exist between the 
two branches of government.
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At the same time, the governor was only moderately 
successful in another area with regard to the legislature-- 
the appointment of a Tax Commissioner. Even before the 
session began, controversy arose over the chairmanship of 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Governor Bartlett opposed the 
reappointment of J. T. Dunn, while the legislature favored 
maintaining Dunn. The Senate rejected Bartlett's first 
choice, T. Morford, a former Republican state senator.
It was not until late in the session that a compromise was 
reached when Bartlett gave up on Morford and Dunn stepped 
down as chairman. Approval was ultimately given to 
Bartlett's second choice, Clarence L. DeWees (Finance 
Director for the Department of Education and a Democrat). 
Thus, while the governor did not get his first choice, he 
was able to force out of office a strongly favored indi­
vidual.
The Governor offered a number of proposals in his 
legislative program and did, in fact, achieve many of them. 
The underlying theme in the governor's program reflected 
his belief that there should be no tax increase. The 
Governor presented a budget plan involving slight increases 
in expenditures for only a limited number of programs. One 
of the few increases that the governor sought was for the 
salaries of employees at the state's mental health facili­
ties. He achieved the increased salaries, as well as
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appropriations required for the establishment of new junior 
colleges in Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties. Bartlett also 
sought reform in the penal system (a Department of Correc­
tions was created) and the judicial branch (a constitution­
al amendment was initiated for the people to ratify). Both 
were major components of Bartlett's program and passage 
marked a successful session for the governor. Some ana­
lysts might argue that the governor was not all that suc­
cessful. The negative assessment might result from the 
fact that many social services were not greatly expanded 
and that education (both common and higher) may have suf­
fered financially under the Bartlett administration. But 
this should not be used to measure the governor's success, 
since the governor had no intention of making significant 
changes in these policy areas. The governor, in fact, felt 
that the continued financing of government without in­
creased taxes (which, in essence, necessitated a status quo 
orientation toward education and social services) was a 
major accomplishment of his administration.^^
Governor Bartlett was for the most part successful, 
and there are at least five reasons for that success. He 
promised no new taxes and, as a result, the legislature was 
willing to let him take full responsibility for the budget 
and governmental services. Furthermore, he was elected by 
a wide margin and the legislature in all probability read
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this as a mandate for the governor's policies. Third, the
governor's program (for all its proposed reform) was not
earthshattering. It was not a program that would evoke a
great deal of emotion on either side. Fourth, as a
former state senator, the Governor got along well with the
legislative leadership; the leadership seemed to like him.
In fact, news accounts assessed the governor's relations
with the legislature as good. As a result, the leadership
was not disposed to push for programs for which there were
no funds available, thus sparing the governor from poten-
18tial embarrassment. Finally, the governor felt that his 
membership in the opposition party was a very positive 
arrangement, since the legislature did not expect to con­
trol him like they had when the Democrats held the gover­
norship. This division of the branches by party, according
to Bartlett, insured a separation of powers and the fixing
IQof responsibility more clearly.
We have labeled Deane Davis and David Hall of Vermont 
and Oklahoma respectively as successful in the sessions 
under investigation. Both governors were aberrations, be­
cause they were of the same party as the majority in the 
legislature and the normal (during the period of study) 
occurrence was for the minority party to be in control of 
the governorship. Looking at Table 5-1 we can see a fairly 
high ranking for both governors. Governor Davis was judged
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to be only average in legislative leadership, for reasons 
to be demonstrated later, but this did not severely detract 
from his overall performance. Governor Hall was evaluated 
as being extremely successful in most areas in the session 
under study.
In Vermont, Governor Davis came into office in 1969 
following a popular Democratic Governor (Philip Hoff) who 
had held office since the 1962 election. Davis, who had 
not had government experience for quite some time, was slow 
to offer the necessary and expected program leadership 
(especially for a governor of the same party as the domi­
nant legislative party). The legislature was eager to be 
led by a Republican Governor, but for the "first six weeks
of the session no leadership, either from the governor's
20office or the legislature, was to be found." Part of the 
problem for Davis in his first weeks was his announcement 
that the imposition of a sales tax was necessary. This was 
particularly troublesome because Davis had campaigned on a 
platform of no sales tax. To make matters worse, the pro­
posed tax plan called for a four percent sales tax, even on 
food. The legislative leaders were repelled by the tax on 
food, and it took five weeks of conflict between the legis­
lature and the governor before an agreement could be 
21achieved.
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Davis was willing to compromise, however, and accept a 
House version involving a 3 percent tax which excluded 
food. Once this compromise occurred, passage was esential- 
ly assured, although some controversy persisted between 
Davis and legislative Democrats. The Democrats were 
opposed to the tax plan partially because of their ideo­
logical commitments but also for media consumption and
22partisan advantages. In the final stages of the session
the Governor became more active in the legislative tumult.
For example, he called a summit meeting with legislative
leaders in which he "passed the word to extend the session
beyond the normal period" in order to insure that the tax
23bill would pass. Both the extension and bill passage 
resulted.
This was not the only proposal of interest to Davis, 
who also centered his attention on legislation calling for 
a referendum on a constitutional convention, two conserva­
tion measures, the financing of education, and others. The 
main emphasis behind the education bill was the state's 
financing by a substantial amount (40 percent of the cost 
per student) the cost of common school education. However, 
the sales tax issue stood out as the distinguishing feature 
of the legislative session. Environmental issues were 
approved in following years after the groundwork was laid 
by Davis in 1969. In sum, the governor normally did not
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like to get involved in the legislature and did not like to 
be challenged by legislators, but was willing to exercise 
some clout when he felt he had to. Vetoes and appointments 
played only a minor role in evaluating the governor since 
his success was directly tied to the passage of the sales 
tax. He did not get exactly what he originally proposed, 
but he got enough to have the bill identified as his (a 
possible negative aspect with regard to reelection 
attempts). The importance of the bill is brought into 
perspective by the media: "The 1969 session wasn't flashy
or innovative. It was a single issue session--a sales tax 
legislature.
Democratic Governor David Hall of Oklahoma is a good 
example of how we may be misled by using simple indicies to 
determine success. Governor Hall was successful in the 
first session that he worked with, but most standard indexes 
would not reveal how successful he really was. The data in 
Chapter IV depict partisan voting in the 1971 session when 
we look at the governor's interest votes (IPL=40.0). We 
also found high levels of cohesion by the Republicans 
(voting against) and low levels for the Democrats (voting 
for) on the governor's interest bills-82.4 and 46.4 re­
spectively. The low level of cohesion for the Democrats, 
when translated into other indicies for success, support, 
or agreement, would indicate that the governor was not
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successful. However, the low values that would result from 
computing these indicies would not take into account the 
size of the governor's majority party--the Democrats had 
over 75 percent of the seats. As a result of their size 
the Democratic legislators did not have to support Hall 
completely for Hall to win. Winning, if that is what we 
want to call it, is exactly what the governor did.
Governor Hall came into office after Bartlett and
eight years of Republican control of the governorship. He
had campaigned on the "fair share" concept of taxation,and
his fulfillment of that campaign promise, and the necessity
to raise revenue, forced Governor Hall to push his tax
program. Taxes were not the only part of his program, but
like Vermont in 1969, the Oklahoma legislature in 1971 was
really a single issue session--taxes. An oil and gas tax,
a revision of the income tax (involving greater prog-
ressivity in rates), and the elimination of prescription
drugs from the sales tax--were the major components of the
Hall tax program. The prescription drug measure failure
(the only item Hall felt he failed on in his four year 
25tenure) reflects on Hall's success, but this failure is 
mitigated by the enormity of his two other tax proposals. 
The passage of the income tax revision and the imposition 
of a new oil and gas tax were nothing short of miracles in 
Oklahoma and marked a successful session for Hall. "No
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measure for which the governor sincerely fought was de­
feated and no measure to which he was sincerely opposed was 
passed.
When first introduced, there was much skepticism about 
Hall's programs ever coming to pass. The governor's suc­
cess was largely dependent upon two factors. First, he was will­
ing to compromise. He proposed a tax package that came to 
$83 million knowing that it would never pass without some 
cutting, and so in presenting such a large request he 
enabled the legislators to reduce it. The $45 million sum 
passed was sufficient to meet the new needs of the state.
The second major reason for the governor's success was his 
taking office after eight years of Republican gubernatorial 
rule. As a result, whatever he (Hall) wanted, he was going 
to get. Governor Hall was cognizant of this, as he pointed 
out, "The Democrats [were] trying much harder to get along 
with the governor than if I had succeeded a Democratic 
Governor.
Governor Hall may well have been too successful in the 
1971 session. His legislative success dwindled after the 
first year, so that it was harder to get legislation passed 
in later sessions--". . .the program was so strong the 
first year, that it caused a trauma that shook the last 
three years.
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While the governor was successful on 21 of the 22 
items that he campaigned for (only the prescription drug 
measure failed), in later sessions he was not in as strong 
a position as in the first. Lawmakers from his party 
tended to oppose him more in succeeding years with the firm 
expectation that he would not be reelected because of ad­
verse public response to his tax success, alleged corrup­
tion in his administration, and the appearance of attrac­
tive Democratic aspirants for the governor's office. In 
fact, in the last session, legislators withheld appropriat­
ing large sums of money in order to prevent Hall from re-
29ceiving too much credit. Thus, from a longitudinal per­
spective, we have a governor with mixed results--a highly 
successful first session with great impact followed by 
much less success.
In summary, when we look at the four governors in 
these two states, we find, on the whole, successful indi­
viduals. It is important to find that governors, even from 
the minority party, can achieve some success and with what 
appears to be less partisanship. The more interesting 
findings concern the two governors whose partisan ties are 
congruent with the dominant legislative party. There was 
more conflict present within the legislature when Davis and 
Hall took office, yet both achieved significant amounts of 
success in passing difficult tax programs. It is our
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belief that Bartlett and Salmon were successful because 
they had programs that were popular and acceptable to the 
legislature (not earthshattering as one commentator noted), 
while Davis and Hall were successful in spite of their 
controversial tax programs. This success was largely de­
pendent upon the dominant party evoking more partisan con­
trol over votes when it was necessary. In conclusion, we 
find that the change in the governorship from usual minor­
ity party control to majority party control makes a differ­
ence, not so much in determining success but rather in the 
qualitative nature of success. Programs that would be, by 
their very nature, controversial (taxes) were passed when 
the governorship switched to the dominant and congruent 
party.
Florida and Idaho
In contrast to the previous two states, the governor­
ship in Florida and Idaho was normally controlled by the 
party that was dominant in the legislature (Democratic in 
Florida and Republican in Idaho). The aberrations found a 
Republican, Claude Kirk, in the executive office in 
Florida and Cecil Andrus, a Democrat, as governor in 
Idaho.
In Idaho and Florida we find contrasting results for 
the governors from the party normally in control as can be
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seen in Table 5-1. The analysis leads us to conclude that 
Governor Samuelson of Idaho was not very successful, while 
Governor Askew in Florida was very successful in his first 
session. Both governors were judged on only three of the 
four items to determine their final evaluation. The 
appointment process provided such limited material so as to 
make any evaluation speculative. Governor Askew was rated 
high across all the items while Governor Samuelson was 
rated low on veto and legislative leadership.
Governor Askew was elected to follow Kirk in 1970 
mainly as a tax reform candidate, and in 1971 a new tax 
program was achieved. In order to have the legislature act 
on the tax issue as soon as possible, the governor called a 
special session before the regular session was to convene. 
The legislature, after extensive debate, passed a joint 
resolution calling for a proposed constitutional amendment 
(see Chapter IV, special session), Approval for the reso­
lution was granted because "the Governor feels he has an 
election mandate to propose the corporate profits tax
constitutional amendments, and I am perfectly willing to
30allow the people the right to vote on this issue." Sub­
sequently during the regular session, the vote on the 
amendment was moved foreward for an earlier decision by the 
people. Askew took his fight to the people, as he had
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during the election, and the people approved the tax reform 
overwhelmingly.
The tax was not the only success for Governor Askew.
He won approval for a majority of his programs, including 
the nonpartisan election of judges, correction reforms, 
reorganization of state departments (including the State 
Commerce Department), more state aid to local schools, re­
habilitation measures (alcoholic and mental health 
patients), and assistance to the labor force. Some issues 
on which he lost were subsequently passed in later ses­
sions. Environmental issues were dominant concerns for the 
governor in his workings with the 1972 and 1973 legisla­
ture, as were matters pertaining to education. On the 
whole. Governor Askew was very successful in achieving his 
main obj ective as well as gaining other measures in his 
first legislative program. In addition, what few vetoes 
the governor issued were sustained.
The governor's success can be attributed to a number 
of factors, including the previous governor. Most politi­
cal observers felt that Governor Askew was definitely ad­
vantaged by following Governor Kirk. Even Governor Askew
31was cognizant of this. Governor Kirk was so controver­
sial that Askew was a welcome relief. Since Askew under­
stood the legislative process, he was willing to work with 
the legislature and gain their support. Moreover, the
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governor gave the legislature a sound program to consider. 
The personal credentials of the governor, such as his in­
tegrity and his popularity with the people, both contrib­
uted significantly to his success. Finally, the governor 
was not afraid to go to the people, as he did with the 
corporate income tax, to garner support for his program.
In contrast to Governor Askew is Governor Samuelson of 
Idaho. As a Republican with a Republican legislature, we 
would expect Samuelson to be successful, but for the most 
part he was not. The governor appeared, on the surface, to 
be much more successful than actually was the case. The 
initial opinion was based on the fact that many programs 
brought forth by the governor were passed. Annual sessions 
of the legislature, the phasing out of inventory property 
tax, highway safety, placement of teachers into the public 
employees retirement system, and reorganization of state 
agencies were all requested by the governor and approved by 
the legislature.
We believe that Samuelson considered reorganization of
32agencies his most important accomplishment. These in­
cluded the establishment of a Department of Administrative 
Services, the merger of the offices of Tax Collector and 
Tax Commission, and the reorganization (including increased 
funding and staffing) of the Insurance and the Savings and 
Loan Agencies.
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Upon further analysis, however, we must reject the 
initial impression of success and conclude that the gover­
nor did not achieve as much as possible. This reappraisal 
results from the fact that the governor failed to offer the 
leadership that the Republican legislature expected from a 
Republican governor.
There is ample evidence for this conclusion. The
length of the legislative session, the number of vetoes
issued, the budget, and the general confusion in the 1967
legislature are indicative of Samuelson*s failure. The
1967 session, lasting 89 days, was the longest session
until that time. "The legislature moved slowly in the
early weeks . . . there was a lack of leadership because no
33one seemed to be putting the pieces together."
The governor also had considerable problems with the 
passage of legislation that he did not like. The governor 
vetoed over thirty bills--a considerable number for a 
governor from the same party as the majority. The legisla­
ture passed a judicial reform package which had considera­
ble support in and out of the legislature, and Samuelson's 
vetoes of the many bills related to judicial reform were 
not greeted with enthusiastic acceptance. However, they 
were upheld in the end. The point is that a strong gover­
nor would never have allowed the legislation to get as far 
as his desk in the first place.
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Another indication of Samuelson's lack of "command" 
over the legislative process was reflected in the necessity 
of calling the legislature back into special session. The 
special session was required in order to pass corrective 
legislation and new appropriations because the governor, 
the executive office, and the legislature had failed to 
enact the proper legislation to bring Idaho in compliance 
with federal regulations.
Moreover, most of the confusion in the initial regular 
session resulted from the governor's budget or lack of a 
budget. Instead of working on a budget before the session, 
or using the budget prepared by the previous governor, he 
offered only a total budget figure--$152.1 million. That 
figure was reported to be nothing more than a 12 percent 
incremental increase and not based on any policy needs or 
goals. That might not have been too unacceptable except, at 
the same time, Samuelson asked for programs which demanded 
more funds than he had asked. To further add to the prob­
lem, the state agencies had requested $178 million in 
funds. As a result of no detailed budget by the governor 
and the excessive agency demands, the legislature was left 
to determine where the funds would be allocated. When the 
governor finally decided to present a more detailed budget, 
it was after the scheduled deadline.
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Even with those problems the session could have been 
"saved" had the governor been flexible enough to deviate 
from his budget figures. Instead, Samuelson stood stead­
fast with the $152.1 million figure until nearly the end of 
the session. It was not until it became obvious that his
original budget ceiling was entirely unrealistic that the
35governor reviewed the budget requests. It was the
Senate's determination to provide the two universities with 
$2.1 million more than what the governor wanted which 
forced Samuelson to change his position. "This was the 
first legislative 'break' away from the governor, if the
Of.legislature was ever really with him." The governor
acceded to the legislature's demands for the $2.1 million 
and this cleared the way for legislative adjournment. We 
believe this discussion has shown that the governor was not 
in control of one of his most important functions--the 
creation of a budget--and he was unwilling (or unable) to 
give the legislature the needed leadership.
In sum, one of the governors who "sat" with a legis­
lature of the same party was successful, while the other 
governor, under similar circumstances, was not very suc­
cessful.
Our attention now turns to the two governors whose 
party identifications made them aberrations with regard to 
partisan ties with the executive office. First, we look at
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Governor Kirk of Florida and then Governor Andrus of Idaho 
to determine how they both fared with their respective 
legislatures. As seen in Table 5-1, Governor Andrus was 
successful but it was not a strong position while Governor 
Kirk was not very successful primarily because of his veto 
and his legislative leadership.
The 1967 legislative session in Florida was Kirk's 
first. The session virtually defies description and as a 
result Kirk's performance is difficult to assess. Kirk is 
an example of a governor who might be successful without 
accomplishing much of his program. If a governor can be 
successful by using the veto, then Governor Kirk was suc­
cessful. He vetoed over forty bills, with almost all being 
sustained. The use of the veto enabled Kirk to shape the 
legislative session and the policies of his state. How­
ever, the lack of any sustained program for his own party, 
the turmoil that surrounded the session, and the governor's 
actions, forced an observer to conclude that this was not 
the most successful legislative session that a governor of 
a state could have. As the Miami Herald observed.
It was the longest, most political and least produc­
tive session in modern memory, stretching 102 calendar 
days and demonstrating that . . .  a Republican gover­
nor and a Democratic legislature go together like oil 
and water . . . .  Governor Kirk's disavowal in prac­
tice of his White Paper promise . . . his cavalier
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use of the veto and his broken promises which frus­
trated legislative compromise add up to highly 
erratic leadership.37
The session was destined to be one of the most chaotic 
sessions, in part because a court ordered reapportionment 
plan was put into effect shortly before the session began. 
Besides reapportionment. Governor Kirk called a special 
session for constitutional reform without consulting legis­
lative leaders and, thus, antagonized them. Generating 
antagonism was only one of Claude Kirk's traits. A politi­
cal novice who became the first Republican Governor of 
Florida in 94 years, he was flamboyant, bombastic, and 
certainly not humble.
Three key issues were interrelated and were the source 
of much of the confusion and conflict in the session: 
education, budget, and taxes. From the very beginning the 
governor vowed not to have a tax increase. Any program 
which would necessitate a tax increase would have to be 
cut. This position brought the governor into direct con­
flict with the legislature and the Florida Educational 
38Association. Financing educational needs (including 
higher salaries for teachers, increased funding for the 
junior college system, new universities, and special pro­
grams for the elementary schools) was generally considered 
to be the essential task of the legislature in 1967. When 
the Democratic legislators tried to allocate what they
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thought were the necessary funds, they became embroiled in 
a direct conflict with Governor Kirk because the budget 
would necessitate a tax increase. The first budget passed 
by the legislature was vetoed by the governor because it 
was approximately $1.5 billion for the biennium, some $250 
million more than the governor was willing to approve. In 
response to the veto, the Democratic legislature passed a 
new budget which was almost exactly what the governor had 
proposed originally. They did this knowing there were 
errors in his budget and, thus, the governor would have to
ontake the responsibility for what might result. Kirk 
shunned the notion that the budget passed was his and de­
clared that the legislature was acting "with political 
m a l i c e . A t  the same time he proceeded to line item veto 
$165 million in funds for junior colleges, textbooks, 
school lunch programs, special education units, and money 
for most cabinet agencies. Thus, with the effective use of 
the item veto, the governor was able to write the budget on 
his own, which in turn caused a great deal of consternation 
for the legislature.
The budget, taxes, and education were not the only 
subjects which caused conflict between the legislature and 
the governor. One other example, the crime issue, provides 
an indication of the type of relations that existed between 
Kirk and the legislature and why it is so difficult to
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evaluate the governor. When the governor ran for election, 
one of the main themes of his campaign attacked the in­
creasing crime rate in Florida, at the same time promising 
to wage war on it if elected. Kirk, once elected, followed 
through on the promise by employing a private detective 
firm (using private donations) since there were no public 
resources readily available to conduct such a program.
At the governor's prodding, and as a result of his using a 
private firm, the legislature created a Florida Bureau of 
Law Enforcement. However, the Bureau would be placed under 
the direction of the cabinet rather than solely under the 
governor. The governor responded by vetoing the legisla­
tion and then offering a compromise to the legislature.
He agreed to accede to their wishes to place the Bureau 
under the cabinet if other modifications were made. Subse­
quently, the legislature approved $1.5 million for the 
Bureau contingent upon the approval of the enabling legis­
lation. The governor approved the funds but vetoed the 
contingency clause and the crime legislation package, say­
ing "Obviously, we will have to veto it . . .  I can't give 
away constitutional authority. As a result of all these 
various incidents, partisan politics was the rule rather 
than the exception during the 1967 session. In Chapter IV 
we saw that this session had the lowest party likeness 
value of all sessions under study. We believe that the
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chaos, turmoil, and lack of leadership necessitate the 
judgment that the governor was not very successful in his 
legislative relations.
The actions by the minority governor of Idaho, Cecil 
Andrus are in contrast to Governor Kirk's behavior. Andrus 
is an example of how one can easily make a mistake by using 
only simple indicies to determine the success of a gover­
nor. The governor did not have a high ratio of bills 
passed to bills introduced; in fact, less than half of the 
governor's proposals passed. Other indicies might give us 
difficulty in analyzing Andrus, since many of the bills 
that passed showed little or no conflict and, thus, such 
bills would not be used in the computation of such meas­
ures. Not taking into account legislation that passed 
without conflict could be highly misleading. The ability 
to get legislation approved without causing a great deal of 
conflict may say something about the program, but it also 
says something about the governor. At the same time, there 
were a number of bills in the governor's program which 
would not be used in the computation of the indicies. Some 
bills from the governor's program were killed not by roll 
calls but by standing committee inaction. That bills never 
get out of committee should be considered in assessing a 
governor and, in this case, they reflect negatively upon
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Cecil Andrus. Considering all of these points, we might 
conclude that the governor was not very successful.
But such a judgment would be in error; he was success­
ful in 1973 for two reasons: (1) some of the key legisla­
tion that reflected his program was passed; and (2) he was 
able to have his vetoes sustained. The governor vetoed a 
number of acts, all of which were upheld. More important 
to the assessment of Governor Andrus is the legislation 
approved in later years. The 1973 legislation comprised 
part of the "foundation" for three important programs 
approved in 1974 and 1975. Land use planning, statewide 
kindergartens, and massive reorganization of state govern­
ment were all discussed and worked on in 1973. The three 
items were not expected to be approved in 1973 but rather 
were aired so that they might have an easier time in later 
s e s s i o n s . T h e s e  three items were the main theme of the 
governor's program in his first term, and their passage, 
against heavy opposition, mark the governor as successful.
Governor Andrus' success was primarily the result of 
the governor being pragmatic and willing to compromise.
So while Andrus was opposed quite strongly by a right wing 
element, he was able to build the necessary coalitions that 
a minority party governor needs to be successful. Andrus 
commented about this coalition building:
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I do the same thing that he [Tom McCall] did and 
that is to put together a coalition of the two 
[parties] and that is the only way I know. I can 
hold most of the Democrats but not all of them; 
but, I can pick up five or six Republican votes 
on the other side of the Senate aisle . . .45
This successful coalition building was the result of subtle 
and adroit handling of both legislators and his program.
The governor presented, to a large extent, a pragmatic 
program that the legislature could handle. In addition, 
the governor was willing to let bills go, rather than cause 
a good deal of conflict if he saw little chance of passage 
during the s e s s i o n . H o w e v e r ,  the governor was willing to 
fight and to go to the people if he believed strongly in an 
issue. Reorganization was a case in point where initially 
the legislature said "no" and the governor went to the 
people in referendum form. The people overwhelmingly 
approved the idea, and the legislature then responded posi­
tively to governmental reorganization. On balance, we con­
clude Governor Andrus was successful.
In reviewing the four governors of these two states, 
we find that two governors were successful (Askew and 
Andrus), while the other two (Kirk and Samuelson) were not 
very successful. The two successful governors served under 
dissimilar conditions, as one was from the same party as 
the majority in the legislature, while the other was a 
minority party governor with a legislature dominated by the
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opposite party. The minority party governor was the 
aberration--a situation which might be expected to induce 
failure since the legislature was not used to working with 
a minority party governor. The expectation that a minority 
party governor might have difficulty working with the 
legislature was borne out in the case of Claude Kirk of 
Florida. We determined that Kirk was not very successful 
in his dealings with the 1967 Florida legislature. Gover­
nor Samuelson was not very successful in spite of the fact 
that he was a majority party governor. On the whole, the 
partisan patterns of these two states were not of prime 
importance in determining who was successful.
Oregon and North Dakota
Up to this point, the Chapter has focused upon four 
states in which there has been a lack of consistency in 
partisan control of the governor's office. In the four 
states, the office has switched between being congruent 
with the majority party to being aligned with the minority 
party (or vice versa). Our attention now turns to the two 
states in which the minority legislative party always held 
the governorship. The two branches are constantly con­
trolled by opposing parties. One can study the long term 
effects of party on executive-legislative relations, at the 
same time controlling for the effects of partisan switches
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in the governorship. Moreover, this situation allows us to 
better understand executive-legislative relations since a 
working arrangement should be established if needed programs 
are to be approved.
In Oregon, the Democrats were the majority party in the 
Senate, while the governor was a Republican. In contrast. 
North Dakota's Senate was under the constant control of the 
Republicans, while the Democrats always maintained posses­
sion of the executive office. Tom McCall served as governor 
of Oregon during both periods of analysis, 1967 and 1973, and 
was considered successful in both. In 1966 the Governor came 
into office after an election characterized by its lack of 
i s s u e s . T h e  governor had previously been a political ana­
lyst for the news media in Portland before being elected to 
his first political post. Secretary of State, in 1964. This 
media background and the lack of political experience were 
both important factors in the behavior of McCall toward the 
legislature and may explain the successes that the governor 
achieved. While McCall was successful as governor through­
out the period, his rate of success was not constant. We 
believe, as do political observers in Oregon, that McCall
grew in stature in office and that correspondingly his
49success increased.
McCall's success was based not so much on the number 
of gubernatorial bills approved but rather the nature of
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the programs accepted. Two environmental bills deemed very 
important by him were approved; one was designed to protect 
Oregon beaches from development and the other created the 
Williamette River Park system. Other successes were 
achieved by the governor, including executive department 
reorganization. However, two interrelated issues dominated 
the 1967 session--school financing and taxes. As in other 
states, increased demands for funding education programs 
resulted in tremendous growth in local property taxes. As 
a consequence, there was a demand by the citizenry for the 
state to give relief to local government. Solutions in the 
regular session were sought, but no formula emerged to com­
pletely solve the dilemma and, as a result, a special ses­
sion was convened by the governor. Originally, the gover­
nor sought a revision in the income tax rates, but a nega­
tive economic situation and the possibility that Oregon 
would become the highest income tax state in the Union (a 
politically unacceptable position) forced the governor to 
give up on that plan.^^ In its place, the governor pro­
posed a new sales tax of 3 percent. The governor was able 
to achieve approval by the legislature for changes in the 
constitution allowing a tax. In addition, necessary 
changes in state appropriations for educational programs 
were accepted. Getting the sales tax out of the legisla­
ture, along with the school aid program, were the key
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achievements for McCall during the 1967 legislature.^^ 
However, these successes were mitigated by the sound defeat 
given to the sales tax proposal by the electorate of Oregon 
when the issue was put to them in a referendum.
In 1973, property taxes were still a key issue in the 
legislature. To relieve citizens' property tax burdens, 
McCall proposed that the state take over completely the 
operating cost of public schools in the state. In order to 
pay for this proposal, the governor planned to increase 
state income taxes, along with a business profits tax. 
Overhauling Oregon's tax structure was given top priority 
by legislative leaders. They (the Speaker of the House and 
the President of the Senate) joined in solid support of 
McCall's tax plan. When the plans got bogged down, the 
leaders took necessary action, with the President of the 
Senate "firing" the chairman of the Revenue Committee. He 
was ousted because he and a handful of other members de­
layed action on the governor's bill. Again the plan was 
defeated. Another proposal was subsequently submitted to 
the legislature and passed. This more modest proposal did 
not seek to fully fund the cost of education, but only to 
increase aid from 22 percent to 30 percent. The increase
to 30 percent would necessitate no new taxes and, thus,
52would not require the people's approval. So while the 
governor did not achieve his goals for financing education,
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he was able to encourage the legislature to increase its
53funding of education over previous levels.
Notwithstanding all the attention given to school 
financing and property tax relief, there were other pro­
grams supported by the governor and approved by the legis­
lature. Included among them was the act reducing the 
penalty for possession of marijuana (Oregon was the first 
state to pass such a law). In addition, the governor 
achieved legislation concerning landlord-tenant relations, 
public transportation, public housing, housing subdivision 
control, and kindergartens. Perhaps the most important 
legislation supported by the governor and enacted in 1973 
was SBIOO. "Passage of SBIOO, the statewide land use 
planning law, was a hallmark of the session," according to 
M c C a l l . A c t u a l l y ,  the bill created a Department of Land 
Conservation and Development which monitored local planning 
and zoning. This gave Oregon one of the first comprehen­
sive programs in the country.
As we might expect from a minority party governor, 
McCall was unable to control all the legislation and, thus, 
he was forced to veto a number of bills. In 1967, he 
vetoed seven bills, while in 1973 he vetoed sixteen; all of 
these vetoes except one were sustained. Only an act per­
taining to candidates' qualifying for office passed over 
his veto. The relatively large number of vetoes and the
Ill
governor's ability to sustain them were additional indica­
tions of the favorable position of the governor with regard 
to the legislature.
This is not to say that the governor failed to have 
problems. There were setbacks for McCall, including a 
number of bills that were killed in committee. One of the 
more controversial pieces of legislation "bottled-up" in 
committee was a bill requested by him to establish a Fish 
and Game Commission. Opposition to the bill was strong 
from the commercial fishing industry, which succeeded in 
keeping the bill in committee. The governor commented 
that, "It's amazing the Legislature is owned by Bumble Bee 
Foods, that one lobby is so p o w e r f u l . I n  an attempt to 
get the proposed legislation out of committee McCall sup­
posedly threatened to veto a bill, SB614, pertaining to the 
legislature's Emergency Board (the Board represents the 
legislature on budget matters when the legislature is not 
in s e s s i o n ) . T h e  threat did not work; in fact, it 
aroused hostility among the legislators to the point where 
the governor's bill was definitely dead for the session. 
This is just one example of the times that the governor was 
not successful. But the successes were greater than the 
failures. The important failures came, in fact, at the 
hands of the electorate and not the legislature.
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What factors contributed to the governor’s success? 
Earlier, we noted that the governor had a media background 
and little political experience, and both were reasons for 
his success. The lack of political experience may have re­
sulted in different levels of success between the two ses­
sions, but it also resulted in the governor seeking an 
executive assistant for legislative affairs. This indi­
vidual got along well with the legislators and understood 
their behavior. He was considered by many analysts of 
Oregon’s politics as a major force in the governor's 
success.
More important to the governor’s success was his long 
time experience in the media. In a state where personali­
ties more than anything else contribute to an understanding 
of the political process, the background of Tom McCall was
C Q
especially significant. He was perceived as an honest, 
hard-working individual who always said what he believed. 
Some say that the governor did not know how to be politi­
cal, that he said and did what he felt, and that once he
raised an issue, he would not stop until his goal was
59accomplished. While he often used organized interest 
groups, McCall was his own best lobbyist. The governor's 
lobbying was often conducted in front of the people of 
Oregon and not behind closed doors. The people of Oregon 
listened to Tom McCall and he said things they remembered.
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The people felt comfortable with him, and thought of him as 
one of them. Legislators knew that he could gain the 
peoples' support when he wanted to and, thus, prodded the 
legislature into action with this support.
Finally, McCall was successful because he "got along 
with" many of the opposition Democrats. In fact, the 
governor aligned himself more closely with Democrats than 
Republicans. As he noted: "it was Democrats, not Re­
publicans, who forced a vote . . . for my key programs.
The problem for the governor, as he saw it, was not to get
support from either party in particular, but to find the
6 ?progressive supporters--mostly in the Democratic party.
Thus, we see in Oregon a successful governor coming from 
the minority party but working more closely with majority 
party members.
Our attention now turns to North Dakota, a state in 
which the Republicans were dominant in the legislature, 
while the Democrats have maintained control of the gover­
norship. William Guy was governor during the first time 
period (1965), while Arthur Link served during the second, 
1973. We have determined that Governor Link was not very 
successful in his relations with the legislature, while 
William Guy was very successful. Governor Guy was viewed 
as successful with regard to his legislative program as 
well as the budget, appointments and leadership (Table 5-1).
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On the other hand, Governor Link had only limited success 
with regard to his vetoes and his legislative program. He 
did not fare any better in his legislative leadership, and 
in gubernatorial appointments he did even worse. He was 
considered to be not very successful for appointment.
The 1965 legislature had, like many other states, two 
main goals: (1) tax reform--to bring equity to all the
people of the state; and (2) to adequately finance the
£  Oneeds of the people. Governor Guy was successful in 
attempting to accomplish these two goals. The governor, 
with the assistance of his party, was able to pass a number 
of bills, including ones concerned with R.E.A., a Budget 
Department in the Governor's office, constitutional re­
forms, abolishment of the Board of Administrators, and the 
creation of a State Employee Retirement program. Increased 
funding of educational programs was also approved. While 
these are important measures, they serve as only a prelude 
to the most significant act of the session--tax reform.
The tax plan introduced in the House (where the gover­
nor had a small working majority) consisted of several 
parts. There were plans to increase the sales tax to 3 
percent and, on a much broader base (more items would be 
taxed), raise income taxes (linking it to the federal tax 
structure), establishing general income tax withholding, 
and abolishing all personal property t a x e s . B e c a u s e  of
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the Democratic majority in the House, the governor was 
able to be firm on the tax program. The Democrats did not 
give in to the Republican majority in the Senate. The 
Senate wanted a smaller sales tax rate, along with only a 
partial reduction of personal property taxes. A longer 
than normal legislative session was needed, but in the end 
the governor got the program passed. The Republicans be­
lieved that the tax program would be associated with the 
Democrats, in general, and the governor in particular.
They also believed that the elimination of the property tax 
would be outweighed by increased income and sales taxes, 
resulting in unfavorable public sentiment toward the Demo­
crats, thus causing them to be ousted from office.
As in Oregon, the governor's success in the legisla­
ture was mitigated by the people. Shortly after the gover­
nor signed the tax legislation, a drive for a referendum 
was started. The people, through the referendum, rejected 
the tax program. However, this should not reflect on the 
governor's success, since we are measuring the governor's 
success with the legislature and not the people. Governor 
Guy commented that "the 1965 session was the most monument­
al of the seven sessions that I was involved in as Governor 
and once as minority assistant floor leader.
What accounts for the success of Guy in the legisla­
ture? The control maintained by the Democrats in the House
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surely helped the governor, but this only partially ex­
plains his success. There were other reasons for Guy's 
success, including the personal nature of the governor. We 
believe the governor was assisted by the fact that 1965 was 
his third session as governor. In his words: ". . .as
each subsequent election took place and I won, they [the 
legislature] gained a little more respect for the office 
and the governorship. I knew them--they knew me . , . I 
had become a predictable quantity and they knew what to 
expect.
In 1973 Arthur Link became governor of North Dakota 
after 12 years of William Guy. When North Dakota lost its 
second Congressional seat held by Link, and Guy decided not 
to run again for governor. Link ran for and won the gover­
norship (he has never lost a race). Link's long service in 
the North Dakota legislature was expected to be of assist­
ance to him in his relations with his former colleagues. 
However, Link's service may not have been as advantageous 
as one might have expected since he was only marginally 
successful.
First, Link was able to sustain only one of his major 
vetoes (thus the low rating on this item in Table 5-1).
Only the governor's veto of legislation that would have 
lowered the drinking age to 19 was sustained. He vetoed 
this measure because there was no protection against
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alcohol being introduced in the high s c h o o l s , S e n t i m e n t  
that he "stabbed them [students] in the back" was prevalent 
in and outside the legislature, but supporters of the bill 
could not muster enough votes to o v e r r i d e . W h i l e  Link 
had this veto sustained, he could not muster that support 
on three other bills, A reapportionment plan was passed 
over Link's veto, A measure which reduced the governor's 
power over the State Industrial Commission (the commission 
controls the Bank of North Dakota and the state's grain 
elevators) was also approved over the veto. Finally, the 
governor was unable to sustain his veto on a bill dis­
banding the Natural Environmental and Resources Council,
The board had not been operative for several years, and 
there was a belief that it would never be functional again. 
The governor believed that it could serve as a natural re­
source department, especially since there was no such 
existing department.
Link also faced opposition in the legislature over his 
appointment of a key state officer, the Director of the 
Department of Institutions, The governor nominated for 
reappointment the already sitting Director, Walter Fielder, 
Fielder had been embroiled in a number of controversies 
including his dismissal of the state prison warden. As a 
result, the Senate was opposed to him. Several attempts 
were openly made by the governor to get the senators to
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72change their minds but to no avail. Finally, the gover­
nor nominated another individual to the post, but he was 
also rejected by the Senate. Link reacted publicly that 
the Senate was playing politics;
I'm shocked at this kind of action by the Senate.
It's a pure and simple indication of the Senate's 
complete lack of any desire to cooperate with the 
governor's office on any level at all.73
It was only after the legislature adjourned that the gover­
nor made his next appointment (as a result he was rated 
very low on this concept).
Throughout these events Democratic legislators sup­
ported the governor, "We want to put the Republican party 
on notice that we will not allow the programs on which 
Governor Link was elected to die without a f i g h t . B u t  
the support was usually to no avail, as the Bismarck 
Tribune noted, "Link's proposals have had a rough going in 
the Republican dominated assembly . . .
The major components of the governor's program were 
defeated: the youth program (to put young people to work
in the summer), funding for the arts, voc-tech expansion, 
and the creation of a consumer affairs division. More im­
portant to the governor was his major program plank— tax 
reform and tax relief. The governor requested removal of 
groceries from the sales tax, a "federalizing" of the state 
income tax (tying the state income tax more closely to
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federal income tax), and property tax relief (to be accom­
plished by increasing aid for teachers). This program was 
"killed" by the Republicans very early in the session. 
However, recognizing that tax relief was being demanded by 
the people, Republican legislators picked up on the gover­
nor's tax program. The Senate favored the idea of making 
changes in the income tax. The House was supportive of the 
exemption for food from the sales tax. Both chambers 
approved increased state aid to the schools. The contro­
versy over the program continued between the two houses 
throughout the session. Near the end, both houses agreed 
to a compromise by accepting parts of each concept. Thus, 
a tax program which changed the income tax, the sales tax,
and held the property tax down (by increased school fund-
76ing) was accepted. This was exactly what Link had pro­
posed early in the session. Therefore, the governor should 
be given some measure of credit for this legislation. It 
was one of the few bright spots in an otherwise dismal per­
formance. One cannot conclude that this single piece of 
legislation marked Link as a success. Too many other seg­
ments of the executive's legislative performance were nega­
tive (the rest of the program, the vetoes, and the appoint­
ments) for us to conclude that the governor was a success.
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Link was personable and an Individual expected to get 
along well with the legislature since he had been a state 
legislator for 24 years and was at one time Speaker of the 
House. He understood the legislative process and worked 
well with lawmakers while a colleague. This may have been 
his undoing, however, upon becoming governor. It is sus­
pected that Link could not adequately adjust to the differ­
ent set of expectations of behavior. While a legislator, 
one set of norms about acceptable behavior were probably in 
use and, upon taking office as governor, another set of 
standards were placed upon him. The older norms made these 
new norms for behavior difficult to follow. Behavior which 
was once acceptable could easily be seen as an unacceptable 
mode of conduct for a governor. His past experience led 
him to be a very active--perhaps too active--participant in 
the legislative process. As one state senator observed, 
"Link is a little more inclined to get into the legislative 
part . . .  I would kind of like to see him stay out of the 
legislature."^^ Thus, lawmakers might have been repulsed 
by the governor's active involvement in the legislature and 
responded accordingly.
A more important explanation for Link's lack of suc­
cess, we believe, is the fact that he took office after 
William Guy. Guy was perhaps the "best" politician in the
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state and had been the center of state politics for twelve 
years. The former governor had been very successful in his 
relations with the legislature, and he knew how to work 
(manipulate) the legislature. He was a predictable quanti­
ty. Arthur Link was the "new boy in town"--a new quantity 
to be tested. The legislature was not only testing him but 
was also measuring his reactions. Legislators in many 
ways were flexing their muscles against this untried gover­
nor. As a result, the legislature appears to have been 
more aggressive than previously concerning the governor.
In sum, two factors--legislative experience and time of 
taking office--contributed to Link's failures.
In reviewing the results of the study of Oregon and 
North Dakota, it was determined that two of the three gover­
nors studied were successful. The successful governors were 
not from the same state, so one may eliminate the possibility 
that their success was the result of a special relationship 
between the governor's office and the legislature in one 
state. All three governors were from the minority party, 
and as a result, there is more evidence for our previous 
findings that success is not dependent upon partisan align­
ments among the two branches. We expected that long term 
experience of working together between the two parties in 
the different positions would facilitate cooperation and a 
commonalty of interest. In Oregon, we found an increasing
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rate of success for Governor McCall across his two terms, 
thus potentially confirming our expectations. However, in 
North Dakota, there was no increased success, but rather a 
decrease with Governor Link being judged unsuccessful.
Thus, we cannot make any final determination on the effects 
of constant partisan alignment on gubernatorial success.
Wyoming
The last state under investigation--Wyoming--serves as 
the control case for the study. Throughout the time 
period, the governorship and the legislature were both 
under the control of the Republican party. Constant domi­
nance of both branches of government by the same party 
partially controls for the incongruencies in partisan 
alignments in the other states. One would expect that the 
governor always coming from the majority party should re­
sult in favorable conditions for his success. The gover­
nor's legislative party may yield to his wishes for legis­
lation, or may become so accustomed to the governor pro­
viding the leadership in the legislature that they become 
dependent upon him for legislative program initiatives. 
Stanley Hathaway was successful in both waves of analysis 
as he was expected. As can be seen in Table 5-1, he may 
have been the most successful governor under investigation. 
Governor Hathaway ranked very high on all four concepts
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over both periods of investigation (the ranking is a com­
bination of the two waves). If one were to rank him for 
each session the only difference might be a slight reduc­
tion in his performance with his legislative program in the 
second time period. The reason for this judgment will be­
come evident later.
Governors of Wyoming have been strong leaders in the
78state, and Governor Hathaway followed in that tradition. 
Hathaway was the first two term governor in Wyoming in 
twenty-five years. His reelection in 1970 by a large 
margin (60 percent of the vote) was indicative of the popu­
larity of the governor among the people.
Hathaway's success can be attributed to a number of 
factors, including his constant attention to his 4-E's-- 
economy, efficiency, environment and education. He believed
that by paying attention to these four substantive areas he
79would place himself and the state in a good position.
In 1967, Hathaway gave considerable emphasis to the 
economic development of the state, encouraging business and 
industrial growth. In addition, the legislature approved 
his programs for education (increased funds for the Univer­
sity of Wyoming, expansion of voc-tech and junior college 
education, consolidation and increased aid to local 
schools). Other areas of emphasis during the 1967 legisla­
tive session involved the repeal of the inventory tax and
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reorganization of state agencies (creation of a Department 
of Recreation, a Public Service Commission, and Board of 
Equalization). However, the governor's performance was not 
without its failures, especially with regard to improving 
the laborer's lot and in highway safety proposals. In sum, 
when one weighs the successes against the failures, the 
governor's successes had a decided advantage in 1967.
Hathaway's 1973 session was also relatively success­
ful. However, there were some failures, including legisla­
tion for no fault insurance, new electrical facilities, 
highway legislation, natural gas control and the expansion 
of Casper College. The defeat of the legislation expanding 
Casper College into a four year school probably was the
most important of these failures since the governor had put
80his full support behind its passage. He attacked the
opposition, especially the University of Wyoming, as sacred
81cows who needed to be challenged. However, the gover­
nor's endorsement and efforts were not enough to counteract 
the strong lobbying of the University and the Board of 
Regents, and the legislation went down to defeat.
However, these defeats were only minor setbacks for 
him in 1973. In keeping with his 4-E's, Hathaway achieved 
reorganization and consolidation of state agencies to 
bring about efficiency in government. To assist the eco­
nomic conditions of the people of Wyoming, Hathaway
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successfully pushed for repeal of the property tax on
chattel. Legislation concerning the environment was also
of central concern to many Wyoming residents in 1973.
Legislation was approved creating a Board to oversee mine
reclamation. This was only one of several bills on the
environment and orderly state growth requested by Hathaway.
The key bill in 1973 was the Environmental Quality Act which
placed the air, water, and land reclamation offices into
82one department.
The governor was not only successful in getting de­
sired legislation passed, but he was also able to block 
bills which he opposed. In most instances, a veto was not 
required since the governor was able to get the nocuous 
legislation killed before it would get to his desk. As a 
result, only a handful of legislation was ever vetoed. As 
he commented:
Remarkably, I vetoed, I think, only three bills. A 
lot of people have asked me the reason for that and 
I think the prime reason was that through the com­
munication system I had, I was able to see the por­
tions that I objected to stricken or I would just 
say--I can't buy this concept and it would end up 
in committee and not see the light of day.83
The governor's comments emphasize the extent of his in­
fluence.
Hathaway's success can be attributed to a number of 
factors. First, the governor was dealing from a position 
of strength because the legislature was dependent upon the
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executive office (and the attorney general's office) for 
the legislation. Prior to the Legislative Service Agency's 
establishment in 1974, the legislature had no help in doing 
background research and only minimal assistance in writing 
legislation; therefore, most bills originated in the gover­
nor's office. In sum, the legislature could not be viewed 
until recently as a co-equal branch of government, but 
rather a weak stepchild. Secondly, the governor presented 
a comprehensive program that appealed to most individ­
uals.®^ Not only did the governor present a program that
could appeal to most people, he also refused to tie himself
85too strongly to any single bill. As a result, the gover­
nor could support a number of approaches to problems. 
Hathaway, for example, presented the legislature with three 
alternatives to the problem of natural gas regulation, be­
cause he was not sure what would pass. In addition, the 
governor was not averse to crossing party lines for sup­
port; he asked Democrats to introduce and carry some pro­
posals through the chambers (e.g., the Death Penalty Bill). 
Moreover, we believe that much of the governor's success 
was the result of his popularity among the people. In sum, 
we believe that the leadership Hathaway brought to the 
legislative process, the successful passage of a prepon­
derance of his program, and his ability to defeat unde-
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sirable legislation without using the veto are all indica­
tive of his success.
Explanatory Factors
Twelve governors in the seven states were examined, 
and it was concluded that nine out of the twelve were 
generally successful. The three remaining governors (Kirk, 
Link, and Samuelson) were not very successful. The analy­
sis now focuses on characteristics common to the governors 
that may assist in explaining the variations in guberna­
torial success. The analysis examines the effects of 
partisanship, gubernatorial power, legislative power (inde­
pendence), and the integration of gubernatorial and legis­
lative power in explaining the governors' success. Final­
ly, prior legislative experience was used as another ex­
planatory variable in trying to understand the differences 
in success among governors.
The overall high level of success for the governors 
under investigation came somewhat as a surprise. The fact 
that nine out of the twelve governors were fairly success­
ful leads us to conclude that governors under most circum­
stances can have favorable outcomes in their executive- 
legislative relations. In fact, even the three governors 
evaluated as not very successful enjoyed some measure of 
achievement in their relations with the legislature. Every
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governor had at least one policy position he wanted carried
out and if the desire was strong enough, he had the tools
and capacity to do so. Joseph Chamberlin's observation in
the late 1930's holds true today:
Armed with the veto and his power of patronage, to­
gether with the threat of direct appeal to the people, 
a governor, even with both houses of the legislature 
against him, may wield no small influence in shaping 
legislation. If there is not a 2/3 majority against 
him in each house, or if the partisan majority against 
him does not dare to oppose his veto because of his 
influence with the people whom he can reach by speech, 
by newspaper, or by radio, his wishes must be takeninto consideration.86
Indeed, governors may not even need a third of the seats to 
accomplish their goals. In Oklahoma, only 25 percent of 
the senators were from the same party as Governor Bartlett, 
and he was successful in his relations with the legisla­
ture. What factors can explain the success of governors in 
their relations with the legislature?
The first conclusion drawn from this study is that 
partisan congruence between the control of the two branches 
was neither necessary nor was it sufficient for governors 
to be successful. Governors need not be from the same 
party as the majority of the legislature to be successful. 
Governors Andrus, Bartlett, Salmon, Guy and McCall were all 
from the minority party of the legislature and were able to 
achieve many of their goals. Governors, when necessary, 
build coalitions of legislators from both parties that 
bring them success. The success may, however, be less the
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result of the governor building a coalition than the legis­
lature's willingness to accept gubernatorial involvement.
A theory confirmed by the work of Bernick et al. found that 
the dominant theme among legislators was mutual cooperation
with the governor "in proposing program initiatives and
87solutions to pressing social problems"
Additionally, the current research also found that 
being from the dominant legislative party was no assurance 
of gubernatorial success. Governor Samuelson in Idaho was 
from the majority party and he was not very successful. 
While the legislature is willing to work with the governor, 
they are not willing to blindly follow his initiative--they 
will pass legislation they believe necessary (as we saw in 
Idaho) even if it was to be later vetoed. Ironically, the 
dominant legislative party may place an extra demand upon 
the governor from the same party to lead. The legislators 
expect a program of legislation; more important, they ex­
pect the governor under these conditions to offer a budget 
from which they can work. While legislators may expect a 
budget from a minority party governor, they also take the 
initiative to create their own. When the two branches are 
aligned politically, the legislators wait for a budget from 
the governor rather than present their own budget. Failure 
to present a budget may lead to a loss of confidence by
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lawmakers and a usurpation of the leadership roles, re­
sulting in gubernatorial failure.
In addition, several other observations may be made 
about the role of party in determining gubernatorial suc­
cess. Consistency in party control of the governorship 
does not insure success on the part of the governor.
Failure on the part of a governor is not the unique proper­
ty of a particular party or partisan alignment. On the 
whole, the discussion of the role of party leads to the 
conclusion that partisan attachment does not play the 
dominant role in explaining gubernatorial success that one 
might expect.
There also appears to be little explanatory value in 
the employment of formal measures of gubernatorial or 
legislative power (separately or in combination) in 
accounting for gubernatorial success. The three less suc­
cessful governors do not come from a unique set of states 
with regard to gubernatorial power. North Dakota (Link) 
and Idaho (Samuelson) are states in which the governors 
have high gubernatorial prerogatives, but Florida (Kirk) 
has been designated as a relatively weak gubernatorial 
state. In similar fashion, the three unsuccessful gover­
nors do not come from uniformly high legislative power 
states. North Dakota and Idaho are both low in legislative
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power, as measured by independence, while Florida is high 
on this index.
When combining a revised gubernatorial power index with 
Declercq's measure of legislative power in a four-fold 
table (see Table 5-2), one finds little evidence to make any 
firm conclusions. It is interesting that in the three 
states (Oklahoma, Vermont, and Oregon) where uncertainty 
existed as to whether the legislature or the governor might 
be dominant, we found governors to be successful. This 
conclusion is somewhat diminished because of the mixed 
findings for the other four states. In Florida, the legis­
lature should be the dominant actor with the governor in 
the weaker position. Instead, one governor was successful 
whidje the other was unsuccessful and, as a result, no con­
clusion can be drawn about gubernatorial success under 
these conditions. However, because we were using only one 
state and two governors, considerably more research needs 
to be conducted before a definitive conclusion is made.
Idaho and North Dakota confirm the conclusion that this 
four-fold typology is inadequate for explanatory purposes.
In Idaho and North Dakota, plus Wyoming, the governor 
was expected to be dominant and as a result, successful. 
Wyoming corresponds to this expectation, but Idaho and 
North Dakota do not. In North Dakota, Governor Link was 
not very successful. One might argue that Link's failure
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was the result of his being from the opposite party and, 
therefore, in a weaker position. Two points argue against 
such a position--(1) Governor Guy was successful and he, 
like Link, was from the minority party; and (2) Governor 
Samuelson was from the dominant party in Idaho and he was 
unsuccessful. As a result, we must conclude that the four­
fold typology does not adequately depict gubernatorial suc­
cess. Furthermore, we conclude that gubernatorial power 
cannot be translated directly into gubernatorial success. 
The possession of formal power does not mean that a gover­
nor will be successful, just as the lack of such power does 
not doom a governor to failure. In summary, the concepts 
of gubernatorial power, legislative power, and the integra­
tion of the two do not adequately explain gubernatorial 
success.
Another factor that might explain gubernatorial suc­
cess is prior legislative experience on the part of the 
governor. Two countervailing theories can be developed 
concerning previous legislative experience. One proposi­
tion would make prior legislative experience the essential 
ingredient to success since experience would build better 
understanding of the legislative process. Salmon and Askew 
both believed this to be an essential ingredient to their 
success. In addition, service in the legislature before 
becoming governor may enable an individual to make personal
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contacts that become invaluable upon taking office. This 
was what we believed assisted Bartlett's performance as 
governor.
However, Governors Davis, Hall, McCall, and Hathaway 
were all successful and had no prior legislative experi­
ence. Conversely, Governors Link and Samuelson had prior 
legislative experience and they were not very successful. 
This leads to the contrary view of experience which posits 
that prior experience in the legislature results in the 
governor becoming too active in the legislative process. 
This activity may offend legislators because he (the gover­
nor) is interfering in the legislature. Some political 
analysts believe that experience in the legislature results 
in just the opposite type of behavior, with the governor 
becoming too passive and deferential and, therefore, inef­
fective. Governor Link might represent an example of the 
former theory while Samuelson represents the latter. Suc­
cessful governors with prior legislative experience would 
negate either one of these two perspectives; and we had 
several, including Salmon, Bartlett, Askew, Andrus, and 
Guy. We are, however, unwilling to dismiss any argument 
about legislative experience with the number of cases under 
investigation. What is probably more accurate is that 
prior legislative experience may be either an aid or a 
detriment, depending upon how it is used by the governor.
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If a governor uses his experience wisely, it can become an 
invaluable tool in gaining what he wants, but it may also 
be a hazard when used unwisely (either by too much involve­
ment or too much deference). The confounding results and 
theories make legislative experience itself an unacceptable 
factor to explain gubernatorial success.
Summary
Twelve governors in seven states were studied with 
a special concern for their ability to be successful. 
Success was defined using various measures, including 
gubernatorial program, vetoes, appointments, and ability to 
perform a legislative role. When the governors and states 
were studied in a comparative perspective, success did not 
appear to be characteristic of any one group of governors 
(states). Little difference was seen between the states 
across a single time period. In addition, analysis of the 
states over time does not allow us to detect any uniform 
pattern of behavior. Little evidence exists that previous­
ly suggested explanatory factors, such as formal guberna­
torial power, legislative power, the integration of guber­
natorial and legislative power, or legislative experience, 
have much usefulness in explaining gubernatorial success or 
failure. Finally, the most important result, as far as 
explanatory power is concerned, was the inability of
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partisan situations to explain success. Partisan align­
ments do not appear to be either necessary or sufficient 
for success.
The final chapter contains some concluding remarks 
about the results of the present study. A new model is 
presented to assist in explaining executive-legislative 
relations. Finally, the chapter concludes with some re­
marks about research on the governor.
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study took two different approaches to assess the 
role of the governor in the legislative process. The first 
focused on the governor's impact upon legislative voting 
behavior. The second examined the governor's ability to 
achieve success within the context of executive-legislative 
relations. In this chapter, we review the findings and 
discuss their implications for the existing body of litera­
ture on the governor. The results of the study suggest a 
model of executive-legislative relations.
Although the original research design called for eight 
states, only seven were used in the analysis, since it was 
impossible to obtain adequate information on the Texas 
governors and their programs. Since a major question of this 
study was to determine the governor's effect on voting in 
one-party dominant legislatures each legislature in the seven 
states was controlled by a single party. The design was also 
constructed in order to control for the effects of partisan 
division between the executive and legislative branches.
Long term partisan congruence between the two branches was 
compared to situations in which the governor and the legis­
lature were consistently from the opposite party. Further 
comparisons were performed with states where the partisan
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control of the governorship shifted during the two waves of 
analysis. In short, we were able to make three types of 
comparisons: (1) comparisons across a single time period;
(2) comparisons within and between states over time ; and
(3) comparisons between votes of interest to the governor 
and votes of little interest to the governor within a state 
in a single time period. One intent of such a design was 
to make the findings potentially generalizable beyond the 
states under analysis.
The use of all votes within the seven states substan­
tiated previous findings that party was not a voting cue 
for legislators. However, when a comparison was made be­
tween votes of interest to the governor and those not of 
interest to the governor, there was reason to modify the 
previous findings. When the governor becomes involved in 
the legislative process from a programmatic perspective, 
there is definite reason to believe that party becomes a 
more salient cue for legislators’ voting. In addition, it 
was discovered that legislators in both parties increased 
their level of voting cohesion as compared to normal levels 
when the governor's position was well-known on specific 
issues.
Comparisons in voting between the states and over time 
produced mixed results. In three (Florida, Oklahoma, and 
Vermont) out of the four states (Idaho was the fourth)
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where party control of the governorship switched, there was 
a substantial difference in the party voting for the legis­
lators between the two time periods. In the three states 
where partisan attachment of the governorship remained con­
stant over the time period (North Dakota, Oregon and 
Wyoming) an impressive degree of consistency in voting was 
found over the two waves of analysis. It would appear that 
variations in partisan control of the governorship have an 
effect on the voting behavior of the legislators.
Concluding the analysis of the governor's impact on 
legislator's voting, we turned our attention to the study 
of gubernatorial success. Theoretical considerations 
dictated the procedures for the analysis of gubernatorial 
success. No single measure of success was believed to be 
an adequate test. As a result, no uniform procedure was 
used, but rather a variety of indicators were employed in 
the evaluation of the individual governors. Action on the 
governor's program, vetoes, appointments, and the working 
relationship between the governor and the legislature were 
all used, though not in a uniform manner. In some states, 
for example, selected legislation was given greater weight 
than other portions of the governor's program or vetoes. 
Decisions on weighing the various items were based upon 
media coverage of the legislature under investigation and 
information gained from interviews with the governors.
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Unfortunately, the lack of a single measure and weighting 
scheme makes replication cumbersome. However, the qualita­
tive analysis, even with its lack of parsimony, was judged 
superior to analysis with a single measure which would not 
capture all of the dimensions of gubernatorial success.
Evidence from this analysis indicated that governors 
can usually achieve success. Nine out of the twelve gover­
nors under investigation were determined to be successful. 
On balance, the comparative analysis of success enabled us 
to conclude that success or failure was not unique to any 
one partisan alignment. Analysis of Governors Kirk 
(Florida) and Link (North Dakota), and their relations with 
the legislature in an individual case study approach might 
lead one to conclude that partisan division between the two 
branches of government was the major cause of the gover­
nor's failure. However, under comparative analysis, evi­
dence was presented indicating that party division alone 
does not insure failure (or success). In fact, partisan 
congruence was found to be neither a necessary nor a suf­
ficient condition to insure success. Majority party gover­
nors as well as minority party governors can be successful 
or unsuccessful.
Analysis with explanatory variables believed to be 
important in determining gubernatorial success was found to 
be inadequate. Legislative experience on the part of the
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governor, formal gubernatorial powers, formal legislative 
powers, and the integration of gubernatorial and legisla­
tive powers did not aid in explaining the variation in 
success rates among governors.
The general high level of gubernatorial success and 
the inadequacy of the variables used to explain the varia­
tions in gubernatorial success dictate continued considera­
tion of executive-legislative relations. One avenue for a 
possible explanation of gubernatorial success is an amalga­
mation of process and structural variables with role 
theory. Such an approach would take into consideration im­
portant contextual factors that affect the interplay be­
tween governors and legislators. It would also consider 
the personalistic qualities believed to be inherent in 
these relationships. Figure 6-1 is a realistic model of 
the amalgamation of structure, process, and role theory.
The model hypothesizes that contextual variables 
affect the views of both the governor and legislators 
(Paths A and B). For example, partisan alignment may guide 
lawmakers in determining if the governor should be a leader 
and how active that leadership should be. If the governor 
is from the minority party, then legislators may expect 
less assistance in solving state problems than if the
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governor is from the majority party. Another example is 
the issues that dominate the politics of the state during a 
governor's tenure; the legislators' views of the governor's 
proper role may be dependent upon whether a tax increase is 
needed. Needed revenues would require demands by legisla­
tors for the governor to be active in the enactment of that 
policy. Moreover, one must remember that the views of the 
governor as well as the legislators are not static but 
dynamic ; these perceptions are constantly changing as a 
result of contextual factors.
The expectations of both the governor and the legisla­
tors concerning the governor's role as chief legislator de­
termine the actual behavior of the governor since an indi­
vidual's behavior will normally conform to the role ex­
pectations (Path F and G). At the same time the legisla­
tors ' views will affect their perceptions of the behavior 
of the governor (Path H) since the "clarity and consensus 
of the role expectations determine the degree to which the 
role enactment behavior is convincing, proper, and appro- 
priate." The actual behavior of the governor, relative to 
the legislature, affects the legislator's perception (Path 
I) of the governor's role enactment. These perceptions of 
gubernatorial behavior are incorporated by the legislators 
with their views (Path H) and result in a response (Path
3J). The extent to which the views of the legislators
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toward the governor's role are congruent with their percep­
tion of gubernatorial behavior will determine the legisla­
tor's response to the governor. The response of the legis­
lators is hypothesized as affecting the governor's success 
(Path K). Incongruency between Paths H and I will cause a 
negative response (Path J) which if widespread enough among 
the legislators will result in failure (Path K). Congruen­
cy between Paths H and I will result in success. Since 
gubernatorial behavior and legislative action are not 
static, Path L is placed in the model. This path indicates 
that the response of legislators is fed back to the gover­
nor who in turn, responds by another act (Path I).
Although they may rarely occur, there are some poten­
tial instances where the governor's actual behavior affects 
his success independent of the legislators' response (Path 
M). This might occur when the governor makes an interim 
appointment or allots emergency funds while the legislature 
is not in session. A veto after the legislature had ad­
journed is another example of this occurrence.
Previously, it was hypothesized that contextual fac­
tors affect the views of both the governor and the legisla­
tors (Path A and B). The contextual factors will affect 
the legislators' perception of the governor's behavior as 
denoted in Path D. Path C hypothesizes that contextual 
factors will also affect the governor's actual behavior
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directly. Some circumstances and settings may demand 
activity on the part of the governor which may not coincide 
with his expectations. For example, the fact that the 
governor is from the majority party, or worsening economic 
conditions and increasing need for revenues may dictate a 
governor's action that normally would not be followed. It 
is also hypothesized that certain environmental conditions 
may affect the governor's success without the governor or 
the legislators coming into play at all (Path E) (e.g., the 
federal government withdrawing aid to the state may result 
in the governor's failure).
A most important component of the model refers to the 
setting of the governor's actual behavior. The governor's 
behavior is more than the formal powers given to the office 
(we have seen their inability to explain variation), but it 
is also defined by the use of informal powers and the abil­
ity to "control" interpersonal relationships. The dynamic 
interrelationship between these three components is of no 
small importance. Legislators do not respond to a single 
action but to a series of these three dimensions of the 
governorship (Path I).
The above model has utility for (1) the evaluation of 
a governor in a single session; (2) with a single issue 
across a series of sessions--in other words, over time 
(one may want to place a Path Z into the model to reflect a
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feedback); or (3) the model may be used continuously over 
the entire term of the governor.
While there are difficulties with a number of its com­
ponents with regard to measurement, it is believed that the 
model reflects the ongoing processes and will also aid in 
any further work on executive-legislative relations.
Listed below are some of the components, the variables used 







2. Electoral Margin of Governor
3. Prior Legislative Experience
4. Issue Demands Current at Time of Study
5. Structural Components
A. Size of: state, legislature, executive
office
B. Staff available to legislature and to 
governor
C. Formal powers of governor (veto, special 
session, budget)
D. Term of office for governor
E. Organization of legislature--power of 
legislative leadership
II. Governor's View of his Legislative Role
1. Interviews (e.g., what do you perceive to be 
the role of governor in the legislature?)
2. Media Investigation
III. Legislator's Views of Governor's Role
(Through interviews and questionnaires--possible 
forced choice questions, e.g., "The governor 
should keep out of the legislative process.")
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A. Use of media
-number of press conferences 
-content of media coverage (tone)
-issues discussed
B. Meetings with legislators 
-log of activity by governor 
-responses by legislators to inquiries
concerning contacts
C. Party leadership role
D. Prestige
V. Legislator's Perception of Governor Activity
(Questionnaire--e.g., Is the governor behaving in 
a proper manner with regard to the legislature? 
Why or why not?)
VI. Legislator's Response
1. Roll Call Votes
2. Bills Reported Out of Committee
3. Verbal
A. Response to question






5. Fulfillment of Leadership Role
Some concluding remarks concerning the model are in 
order. Probably one of the most frustrating and difficult 
tasks in conducting research on the governor in the legis­
lature is the determination of gubernatorial success. 
Presently, there is no single measure that can accurately 
reflect gubernatorial success, which makes testing the com­
plete model cumbersome. However, a measure which does not
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accurately reflect the real events is of little value. The 
model must be tested by measuring gubernatorial success in 
a qualitative multi-dimensional assessment. The only other 
recourse to this process is to put aside the study of 
gubernatorial success until a simple accurate measure can 
be found; but such an action has a circular consequence 
since we cannot find an appropriate measure unless we study 
the governor with regard to success.
The model can be used to assist in future research. 
Especially deserving of serious attention are the informal 
powers and personal skills of the governor. We must try to 
assess the importance of the less formal aspects of the 
governor's office and the ability of the governor to keep 
an open dialogue with the legislature.
Another area of research which we have not treated is 
the relationship between gubernatorial success and elector­
al success. It is believed that success in the legislature 
does not necessarily coincide with later electoral success. 
Success in the legislature may actually work against a 
governor. A governor who must introduce a new tax and can 
get it passed may, in the ensuing election, be hurt by pas­
sage of his tax. The public may be continually reminded of 
the governor's success when they pay the tax but could 
quickly forget that the governor was unable to achieve his 
goal of a new tax--the public may even actually forgive the
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governor for introduction of such a tax. Thus, research on 
the two forms of success should be conducted.
In reviewing the material on gubernatorial success, we 
found that different governors had different policy orien­
tations. Future research might consider whether majority/ 
minority governors ask for different types of programs. 
Included within this research might be the question of 
whether a particular category of governors introduce tax 
programs.
Lastly, the model is particularly useful for compara­
tive research on executive-legislative relations. There 
should be little doubt of the utility of comparative analy­
sis. Ample evidence exists that conclusions drawn in this 
study were particularly dependent upon the comparative 
aspect of the analysis. Tentative findings on a single 
case or topic were often rejected when the data were placed 
into a comparative perspective. Thus, comparative analysis 
avoids the possibility of drawing conclusions from the 
idiosyncratic case. It is suggested that similar research 
be conducted with competitive state legislatures. This 
would enable us to determine if the findings reported in 
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1. What do (did) you perceive to be the role of the 
governor in the legislative process?
a. Should he be innovative or passive in policy making 
and in his relations with the legislature?
b. Should he actively involve himself in the tumult 
of passing legislation?
2. What do you think the legislators think (thought) your 
role should be?
3. How would you describe your relationship with the 
legislature? (i.e., cordial, etc.)
4. What effect does (did) it have that you followed 
(another)______________________?
5. What effect do (did) party labels and connections have 
on you and your relations with the legislature?
6. Did you work with the  major­
ity? How successful are (were) you?
7. What has been (was) your relationship with the Senate
leaders?
8. How difficult is (was) it to oppose the legislature?
Do (did) you try and work with the _____________________
minority at all?
9. How difficult is (was) it to oppose the legislature?
10. What effect does (did) the size of the majority have
on your relations and success with the legislature?
11. What procedures do (did) you follow to get legislation
introduced for you and then passed?
12. On legislation that you had some opinion on--either in 
opposition or support--how do (did) you make your 




13. What tools do (did) you use to either get legislation 
passed or defeated? Which was the most successful?
a. Veto and the threat of
b. Message
c. Informal meeting
d. Tenure-term of office
e. Appointive powers
f. Patronage
g . Budget powers
h. Appeal to the media
14. Has (did) your influence increase(d) or decrease(d) 
while you have been (were) in office? (What effect 
does (did) it have on your relationship that the 
opposition party controls(ed) the Senate?)
15. What effect does (did) the size of your electoral 
margin have on your success?
16. Do (did) differences exist between you and the legis­
lature because you represent different constituencies?
17. Do (did) you perceive your position on issues being
the same as that of the party?
18. What are (were) the key bills and issues that you
face(d) with the legislature in ______________________?
19. Are (were) some of your bills more important than 
others? Which ones?
20. How difficult is (was) it to get your personal 
appointments approved?
21. Have (did) you actively campaigned (campaign) for or 
against any legislators? (senators)?
a. What were the results?
b. Do (did) you perceive this as a legitimate func­
tion?
